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This thesis is a highly original, philosophical study in two parts. The first part 
is a film titled ‘What’s special about me?’, made with two young deaf boys. 
The film was shot, on small hand-held devices by the author and the boys 
themselves. In the film, the boys talk about their lives and experiences. The 
film does not, however, make an empirical contribution to the thesis. It is 
there to enable a philosophical argument to be made about the educative 
potentialities of film. 
The second part of the thesis is a written study. The opening chapter of the 
written part of the thesis draws upon the current literature on deafness to 
describe the young deaf experience, particularly in schools. The second 
chapter turns away from traditional narrative methodology. It takes an 
unusual turn to argue for a philosophical approach that is best suited to 
reaching a philosophical understanding of the three key concepts of 
accounting, translation, and voice, in relation to the stories of young deaf 
people on film. The third chapter provides an explanation of these three key 
philosophical concepts, drawing upon the works of the 19th century 
Transcendentalist philosopher, Henry David Thoreau, and the work of the 
20th century ordinary language philosopher, Stanley Cavell. The fourth 
chapter argues that the disruptive nature of film is at the heart of what makes 
film educative, in a perfectionist way, as opposed to educational. The 
penultimate chapter provides a reading of the film, offering a richly 
philosophical and original reading of the film through dialogue. The final 
chapter begins by making new claims for the understanding of the 
philosophical notions of accounting, translation, and voice in relation to the 
film. It then goes on to make claims upon the communities involved with 
young deaf people, and the deaf community itself. 
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A note to the reader 
 
Part of this thesis is a short film (30 mins.) titled, ‘What’s special about me?’. 
As maker of the film, and writer of the thesis, I want the reader to watch the 
film after reading the ‘Introduction to the thesis’ section. 





It was a bright, warm evening in late May. Our philosophy film group had just 
finished watching Terrence Malick’s The Tree of Life. The room was silent 
apart from the fan whirring noisily in the projector. Richard reached to switch 
it off before pulling back the blinds. Still silence. There were only five of us 
present that evening. Attendance was always lower towards the end of term. 
I didn’t mind that though. It made watching the films more intimate 
somehow…the discussion easier. 
Richard broke the silence, “So, what did you make of it?” he asked, looking 
around the room, “Who wants to start?” Not wanting to make eye contact, I 
turned my head towards the window, focussing on the last of the blossom 
falling from the tree outside. I couldn’t speak. What was in my head was too 
personal, too unsettling. “Okay, let’s start with the title…what did you make of 
it, Rachel?” I breathed an inward sigh of relief, as Rachel responded, at 
length, talking about the symbolism of the tree with its roots firmly spread 
underground and branches spreading outwards and upwards, reaching for 
the sky. She wasn’t wrong, who could argue with that? Ruth agreed with her, 
adding that the tree could be seen as our connection to Mother Earth, that 
there was a spirituality going on in the film. “Isn’t it also about the choices we 
make in leading our lives, like it says in the film, between the way of Nature 
and the way of Grace?”, she added. I had nothing to say on this. It made no 
connection to what was going on in my head.  
As he reached for another biscuit, crumbs falling down the front of his shirt, 
Dave started a conversation on the aesthetics of the film. He loved the fast-
moving images, blurred colours as the film travelled from the city through to 
an imaginary world. Kirsty, contradicting him, argued that the film was too 
visually complex, and that it detracted from the story of the family. My 
attention was resting on this last word, ‘family’. What was it in this film, this 
family, that I found so disturbing? I couldn’t yet articulate it in my head, let 
alone say it out loud and share it with the group. 
It was Claire who unlocked my thoughts, asking, ‘Why do you think the mum 
and dad are only referred to as Mr and Mrs O’Brien?’ I spoke for the first time 
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since the film had ended, “I’m not sure, maybe it’s about them being 
distant…maybe it says something about their relationship to the rest of the 
family, especially to Jack”, I suggested. Then it struck me. I knew why I said 
‘maybe’ and why I was only suggesting. I hadn’t been thinking about the film 
and Mr and Mrs O’Brien’s disparate, and sometimes desperate, parenting…I 
had been thinking about my own parenting. My children were by now, grown 
up, and making their own way successfully in the world. Yet, something in 
the film had disturbed me, making me question my own parenting. You only 
get one chance at it; was I good enough? As Mrs O’Brien said of the infant 
Jack, “He’ll be grown before this tree is tall”.  Aesthetics, narrative and 
symbolism had no place in my thinking, I was in a moment of philosophical 
crisis caused by the film. I made no further contribution to the discussion. 
***** 
In his major work on film, The World Viewed (1979), the 20th century 
philosopher, Stanley Cavell, acknowledges that even his friends tell him that 
he has again ‘made a difficult book’ (p. 162), but makes no excuses, and 
declares that he continues to ‘believe in the book’ (p. 162). In the same way, 
I declare to the reader of this thesis that they may meet with difficulty, but 
that I too believe in what I have written. Nevertheless, I acknowledge that I 














Introduction to the thesis 
I have spent 34 years teaching in high schools in Leeds, including several 
positions at senior leadership level. Latterly, I worked in an 11-18 
comprehensive school which housed a resourced provision for Deaf and 
Hearing Impaired (DAHIT) students. As Deputy Headteacher, I was the 
senior leadership link for that provision. As a result, for the last ten years of 
my career, I have worked closely with young deaf people and their teachers 
and have become what the deaf community calls ‘Deaf Aware’. 
Consequently, I have been vociferous in making the case for meeting the 
needs of a significant minority of the school’s population; this means a lot to 
me, both personally and professionally. 
In 2015, I completed an MA in Education for which the dissertation focused 
on the experiences of deaf students in the school. This was an empirical 
piece of work using narrative methodology to elicit the stories of three young 
deaf students. Whilst the dissertation was successful on an academic level 
and for what it taught me about the deaf students’ experience of being in the 
school, I became increasingly dissatisfied and began to question whether 
there are issues in using narrative methodology that are specific to deaf 
people. At the same time, I was experimenting with making film with the 
students, and found that the relationship between the students as film 
makers and the audience produced something richer than traditional 
narrative methods.  
In turn, this raised philosophical questions about voice and the need to give 
account – to tell one’s own story. Under the direction of my supervisor, I 
turned to the philosophical works of the 19th century Transcendentalist, 
essayist, Henry David Thoreau and the 20th century ordinary language 
philosopher, Stanley Cavell, to investigate notions of account, translation, 
and voice, in relation to the educative potentialities of film for storytelling. 
Moreover, I wanted to investigate the deaf experience in the context of film 
making and the experience of film viewing and making. Consequently, I 
carried out this original PhD research project, which is both practical (in the 
making of a film) and philosophical in its approach. 
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The link between education and film is well established. Indeed, there are 
many films about education, Educating Rita (Gilbert, 1983), and Dead Poets’ 
Society (Weir, 1989) being two notable examples. These films serve to 
portray and illustrate the potentialities of education. However, I intend to do 
something different. Watching and discussing film philosophically through the 
Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain (PESGB), I have 
experienced the potential for film to disrupt. In the preface, I presented an 
extended reflection on my viewing of Terrence Malick’s The Tree of Life 
(2011), which made me reflect philosophically on parenting and my own 
values as a parent. It is this potential for film to be unsettling and disruptive 
that has, in part, driven my approach to this thesis. 
Alexis Gibbs (2017b), in writing about film refers to the Wittgensteinian notion 
that to explain the meaning of film is to distance ourselves from the actual 
experience of the world. He argues that the tendency to use film in education 
merely for illustrative purposes is to miss out on the potentialities of film for 
educative purposes; film is educative in the experiencing of it. To use a film 
to explain an idea and to explain the film as an educative tool have their 
place, but such approaches can also stifle our experience of the film - our 
acceptance. Whilst not wanting to misrepresent the young deaf people’s 
reality, film can provide an alternative reality, and this is what I intended in 
making a film with young deaf people. As Gibbs explains, ‘this is where the 
challenge of acceptance begins; we have to accept the plausibility of the 
world we are watching before we can explain it’ (p. 696). It is to this end that I 
do not intend to conduct any empirical analysis of the film I made, measuring 
its success against set criteria. Rather, I intend to reflect critically and 
philosophically about what it means to watch the film and to make the film. I 
will focus on how the boys are given voice through the making of the film, 
and how the viewer is put into translation1. Further, I will consider whether 
deafness itself (as a concept) is put into translation. A close reading of, and 
writing about, the texts of Cavell and Thoreau (and the making of the film) 
provides an alternative route to a new understanding of young deaf people. 
 
1 The word ‘translation’ is used here in a philosophical way which is linked to notions of 
disruption and unsettlement. There is more discussion of this concept later in the thesis. 
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In disrupting the notions of voice, accounting, and translation through 
philosophy, I intended to make a film that unsettles concepts of deafness. 
The thesis itself is an act of translation. It is this approach that is at the heart 
of the originality of this thesis. At this point, whilst I accept that I cannot 
dictate when the reader of this thesis watches the film, I recommend that 
they do so before embarking on the first chapter. This will give context to 
what I write and place the boys’ voices at the forefront of the thesis. 
It is worth noting in this introduction, that the philosophical writings of neither 
Thoreau nor Cavell can be understood in a straightforward, linear way. Little 
in Thoreau’s seminal work Walden (1854/2014) can be taken at face value. 
What at first reading may come across as a simple account of the time 
Thoreau spent by Walden pond in Concord, Massachusetts, soon becomes 
a multi-layered description of an experiment in living that is riddled with 
difficult metaphor. Add to this, Cavell’s own declaration that in writing The 
Senses of Walden (1992), he intended to make Walden a difficult book (and 
he succeeds), and there is clear warning for the reader of this thesis 
unfamiliar to the works of Thoreau and Cavell, that what is to come may also 
be difficult in parts. Cavell pays little heed to the conventions of linear 
temporality and he repeatedly revisits philosophical concepts only to reach 
the most subtle difference in outcome. This is most clear in Little Did I Know 
(2010). The Cavellian scholar Mahon (2019, p. 749), writes, ‘Cavell’s writing 
is difficult…it is challenging, complex, intricate, intractable, obstinate, testing, 
and tough [author’s italics]’. 
In this next part of the introduction, I explore first, why I have written this 
thesis and made a film, and what the current discourses are in education that 
make it the right time to do this. Second, I also intend to give the reader a 
sense of where the project is heading from this point, without pre-empting the 
contents and claims of the thesis. 
Earlier, I made reference to my long career in secondary education. Over 
those 34 years I have experienced a constant state of flux, with many policy 
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changes. One of the major discourses has been that of inclusion2. In this 
thesis, I refer specifically to the inclusion of young deaf people in schools. I 
do not understand inclusion to be solely about such policies as the closure of 
special schools for the deaf, to create specialist Deaf and Hearing Teams 
(DAHIT) in resourced provision in mainstream settings. Whilst these are 
important policies, what I am concerned with here is a richer notion of 
inclusion that focusses on the deaf experience of inclusion across all school 
settings; a notion of inclusion that encompasses social as well as academic 
inclusion. The opening chapter draws on the current literature around the 
inclusion of young deaf people, not in the traditional sense of a literature 
review, but in order to give the reader an understanding of what it is like to be 
a young deaf person in schools today. It is not my intention to analyse the 
impact of the global pandemic caused by COVID-19 in this thesis, this will 
hopefully be the concern of future research. However, in chapter 1, I will refer 
to the concerns I have for its potential impact on the experience of young 
deaf people in schools. 
This is a philosophical thesis that is concerned with hearing3 the stories of 
young deaf people through film. It acknowledges that to have voice, to be 
able to give account is important. In schools today, there is much talk of 
accountability, another of the discourses that has led to the making of this 
film, and the writing of this thesis. Teachers are accountable for their actions 
as well as the outcomes of students. Accountability is used as a measure. 
Even the notion of student voice has become, not a means for students to 
give account, but something that is embedded in the accountability of 
teachers and schools. The way that voice is understood in this context is light 
(Charteris and Smardon, 2019). This thesis problematises such notions of 
account and voice and philosophically disrupts them. Using the philosophical 
works of Thoreau and Cavell, the thesis looks at the philosophical notions of 
 
2 It is not my intention to conduct a large-scale debate about the wider issues of inclusion, 
but to focus on those issues of inclusion that are specific to the deaf experience in schools. 
 
3 The word ‘hearing’ here and throughout the thesis, is to be understood, not on a superficial 
or tokenistic level, in that we are simply listening to stories on film. Rather, ‘hearing’ is used 
in a richer sense, in that what we are hearing puts a responsibility upon those who are 
listening, it demands a response. 
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accounting, translation, and voice in the context of a film made with two 
young deaf boys who give their account on film.  
The second chapter describes the unusual philosophical approach I take in 
writing this thesis in place of theoretical frameworks or method. This 
develops in the third chapter into a philosophical discussion of the key 
concepts of accounting, translation, and voice, with reference to the works of 
Cavell and Thoreau. In chapter 4, I describe what I mean by ‘educative’ in 
the context of film and philosophy. As a philosophical study, the thesis does 
not go on to provide a critical analysis of the film, as might happen in a 
typical empirical project. Unusually, what is presented in chapter 5, is a 
philosophical reading of the film in the form of dialogue which may unsettle 
the reader. In chapter 6, the thesis concludes by making philosophical claims 
in relation to accounting, translation, and voice. These claims are made in 
the context of making and viewing the film that I made with the deaf boys. 
Consequently, I then return to the original socio-political context of the thesis 
and make demands upon the deaf community, the community of schools, 










Chapter 1. What it means to be a young deaf person 
1.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter, I will revisit some of the literature that informed my work for 
my MA dissertation4 (McCall, 2015), alongside more recent research, in 
order to create a picture of what it is like to be a young deaf person in society 
today. This includes literature that addresses these issues in the light of 
concerns about the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. This is not a literature 
review in the traditional sense. Rather, it is a purposeful and selective 
reading of the current literature to demonstrate that accounting and voice are 
recurrent and crucial themes in relation to deafness in young people. To 
understand the context and some of the imperative for my research, it is 
important to consider here, the inclusion of the deaf learner in school, the 
effects of delayed language learning on the future outcomes for deaf 
students5, the impact of adolescence, and the deaf learners’ encounters with 
narrative (giving account, telling stories). It will become apparent to the 
reader of this chapter that little of the available current literature is based in 
the United Kingdom, which is a cause for concern for the deaf community 
here. Referring also to research carried out outside the United Kingdom, it is 
the purpose of this chapter to explore the literature relating to the young deaf 
experience in order to demonstrate the distance between the deaf and the 
hearing worlds, despite claims for inclusion. This remains a distance that 
sets young deaf people apart, and is unsettling in a way which echoes the 






4 I refer to this literature not to create an argument that supports the use of narrative 
methodologies in researching with young deaf people, but to point to the concerns I have 
regarding the use of narrative in such contexts. 
 
5 In order to reflect the terminology used in the literature, the terms deaf learners, deaf 
pupils, deaf students, and young deaf people are used interchangeably in this chapter. 
16 
 
1.2 Identity and adolescence in young deaf people 
 
Far from being a singular concept, the category of ‘Deaf’ is highly 
complex and political; there are many ways to be deaf (Napier et al., 
2018, p. 101).  
The use of ‘deaf’ (lower case) may, in the literature, refer to the physiological 
condition of a person with hearing loss, whereas ‘Deaf’ (upper case) relates 
to cultural identity where a person self-identifies as ‘Deaf’ – belonging to a 
community where BSL (British Sign Language)6 is the common language. 
The concepts of ‘identity’, ‘self-awareness’, and a ‘sense of self’ are also 
problematic. They are terms often used interchangeably in different 
professional settings, for example by Terry et al. (2017), in the social 
sciences, Wareham et al. (2006) in the university sector, and Irish et al. 
(2006) in the context of sports psychology. From a sociological perspective, 
Lu et al. (2015) contend that young deaf people, like their hearing peers, 
develop their sense of self through meaningful interaction with a range of 
other people, including adults and children in the public environment. Even in 
the Early Years Foundation Stage (EYFS)7 , Golos et al. found that children 
as young as three years old were beginning to develop a sense of self, ‘a 
sense of self-worth’ (2018, p. 40), and that the learning and development of 
young deaf children were being disrupted by the lack of cultural and linguistic 
role models in these settings.  
Furthermore, Poe (2006) contends that young deaf people find it difficult to 
separate their ‘deafness’ from additional circumstances which might include 
age, gender, class, culture, and finances. Calderon and Greenberg (2003) 
point to the barriers of adolescence, communication, and environmental 
circumstances that young deaf people face in being able to make a useful 
contribution to the wider community. It is hard for young deaf people to place 
themselves in that community. Hardy (2010, p. 67) argues that young deaf 
people have to make a difficult choice between belonging to, ‘one of three 
 
6 BSL (British Sign Language): the principal manual sign language used to communicate 
with and between deaf people in the United Kingdom. 
 
7 The Early Years Foundation Stage (EYFS) encompasses the learning and development of 
young children from birth to 5 years. 
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groups: deaf aligned, hearing aligned or the “bridge between two worlds 
group”’. Looking at the distance between these two worlds, Golos et al. 
(2018), highlight the lack of role models as a barrier to building a bridge 
between the two. The lack of role models was apparent on two levels. Firstly, 
there are few deaf teachers or educationalists to act as personal role models, 
and secondly, deaf people are underrepresented in the educational 
environment, for example, in textbooks and on classroom posters.  
Even within the family, Terry et al. found that some deaf young people 
experienced ‘devaluation and disrespect’ (2017, p. 56), with family members 
talking about them as if they were not present or making decisions about 
them without consulting them. These experiences had life-long impact on 
self-esteem and sense of self. Nikolaraizi and Hadjikakou (2006) also stress 
the importance and the influence of environmental factors in the 
development of self-identity. They argue that those children who are brought 
up in a deaf environment will develop a sense of belonging to that deaf 
community and identify as being of that culture. On the other hand, young 
deaf people brought up in a hearing environment could develop what might 
be best described as a ‘bicultural identity’ (ibid., p. 477). In addition, they go 
on to describe a final subgroup whose identity is in the margins, where they 
feel they belong to neither the deaf nor the hearing communities. It is 
important to reiterate that the word ‘deaf’ in relation to the words ‘community’, 
‘culture’ and ‘identity’ is applied to a wide and diverse section of the 
population. The ‘deaf community’ is very much a heterogeneous group that 
cannot be identified by a set of fixed criteria. Khairuddin et al. (2018) are 
clear in their research that, in addition to the variation in environmental 
conditions in which deaf children are brought up, there is equal variation in 
the delays of language acquisition and loss of hearing, the consequence of 
which is varied participation in schools and community.  
Exploring the issue of culture and communication in Polish schools, Kobosko 
finds that, ‘Deaf adolescents using sign language and those using oral 
language have different deaf cultural identities’ (2010, p. 321). Napier et al. 
(2018), go further than this, making distinctions in the sociolinguistic diversity 
in the deaf community and its impact on identity. This notion is echoed in the 
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work of Knight and Swanwick, where they recognise the importance of the 
link between language and culture, when they argue that, ‘All languages 
exist within and are central to a cultural context’ (2013, p. 9). It is evident so 
far then, that deaf identity and culture are complex issues that will 
undoubtedly have significant implications for schools in relation to meaningful 
inclusion (more on inclusion in section 1.4 of this chapter).  
Calderon and Greenberg (2003) contend that young deaf people grow up 
having to learn how to live in both the deaf world and the hearing world, and 
that this stepping over the threshold from one world to the other represents 
an obstacle that the hearing do not have to encounter. They go on to argue 
that young deaf people feel compelled to live in both worlds in order to be 
deemed a successful individual, and that this has a profound impact on deaf 
identity. In the auto-ethnographical work of Irish et al. (2018, p. 179), one 
young deaf respondent declares, ‘I am tired of being an alien’. And yet, as 
Esera (2008) argues, the ability of deaf students to communicate with 
teachers and peers is crucial to the educational experience. In another auto-
ethnographical piece of work, Poe (2006, p. 1), as a young deaf person, 
contends that, ‘developing a true sense of identity as a separate individual’ is 
much more difficult for deaf teenagers than hearing teenagers. In China, Ye 
et al. (2016), found that even those deaf adolescents educated alongside 
their deaf peers in specialist schools experienced higher levels of loneliness 
compared with hearing adolescents attending mainstream schools. Lerner, in 
her writing, discusses the underlying themes of ‘loneliness, alienation or 
outwardly imposed solitude’ in the deaf world (2010, p.4). In their publication 
on the deaf experience in schools, Israelite et al. (2002) focus on the 
relationships between deaf students, their hearing peers, and adults in the 
school. They conclude that there are barriers to overcome, and that schools 
play a crucial role in building those relationships in order help young deaf 
people to develop their deaf identities. Ye et al. (2016, p. 1033), refer to this 
gap in relationships as ‘the loneliness between deaf and hearing 
adolescents’. In their examination of the education of young deaf people in 
schools, Nunes et al. (2006) also point to this distance between deaf and 
hearing peers, concluding that the socialisation of young deaf people is of 
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equal value to their academic outcomes. Without friends, in a state of 
isolation, a young deaf person has nobody to whom they can voice their 
story. 
The research is clear about the implications for schools with regard to deaf 
students finding a sense of self during adolescence. Ohana (2006) has 
investigated how a young deaf person’s relationships with both deaf and 
hearing peers can impact upon the creation and development of a sense of 
self. Dammeyer et al. (2018) also highlight the importance of young deaf 
people feeling connected enough to take part in social activities and 
friendships in school. McMahon et al. (2016) add to the body of knowledge in 
this field, finding that relationships and communication with peers, are crucial 
to the development and education of young deaf people. Stinson and Foster 
(1999) argue that it is the responsibility of schools to provide opportunities for 
social interaction between deaf and hearing students so that they might 
develop friendships and feel part of a larger community. 
There is also agreement in the research in the field, that raising deaf 
awareness in hearing students and staff is an additional imperative for 
schools, especially in those schools where deaf and hearing children are 
educated together (Hardy, 2010). Nunes et al. argue strongly that schools 
need to have, ‘a proactive role in helping hearing pupils learn how to 
overcome communication barriers and develop more positive attitudes 
towards deaf pupils’ (2006, p. 123). Wolters et al. (2014) also refer to the 
need for schools to be mindful of how adolescents’ self-perception and their 
perception of their peers has implications for their status within the peer 
group. On the other hand, Nunes et al. (2006) find that it is not that deaf 
students come up against highly negative behaviour from their hearing 
classmates, but that it is the lack of a hearing pupil’s ability to communicate 
with the deaf child that impacts negatively on the development of friendships. 
It is clear then, that schools have a duty of care to raise deaf awareness in 
both the deaf and hearing members of their communities in order to diminish 




1.3 The effects of delayed language learning on the future learning outcomes 
for deaf students 
 
Research into deaf learners in schools paints a sombre picture of that 
experience. Looking at how young deaf people felt about themselves as 
learners, Hatamizadeh et al. (2008) found that, when questioned, less than 
19% of deaf students regarded themselves as proficient learners – a 
significantly different reaction to that of their hearing peers, of whom 85% 
would describe themselves as proficient. Swanwick and Marschark (2010) 
reinforce this rather pessimistic position explaining that this is not just about 
self-awareness or self-assessment, but that young deaf learners really do 
learn less than hearing students. The two main threads through the available 
literature relate to the effects of delayed language learning on the future 
learning outcomes for deaf students (Caemmerer et al., 2016) and the beliefs 
and the lack of understanding that persist in schools in relation to deafness 
(Marschark et al., 2017), preventing young deaf students from accessing the 
whole curriculum and making sufficient academic progress in line with 
hearing students.  
Brinkley (2011) states that the biggest problem faced by deaf learners is not 
that they are unable to hear, but that they acquire language in a different way 
to the majority. This, he argues, is true regardless of whether the child’s first 
language is English or British Sign Language (BSL). That is to say, the pre-
school experience of language acquisition in the home is influenced by such 
factors as the parents’ signing abilities and the fact that young deaf children 
are not exposed to external sources such as television, radio, and music. In 
their work on semantic fluency in deaf children, Marshall et al. (2018) are 
clear in pointing to the negative impact that deafness has on spoken 
language acquisition. In their research, they focused particularly on 
vocabulary as an essential part of language acquisition which is closely 
related to narrative ability, finding that young deaf learners are significantly 
behind their hearing peers both on the learning and retention of new 
vocabulary. The overwhelming majority of deaf children are born to hearing 
parents who have no signing skills, and where the child’s exposure to signing 
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is also limited, there are resultant significant language delays (ibid. 2018). 
Furthermore, to assume that all deaf children arrive at school with the same 
level of disadvantage would be to take too simplistic a view. Caemmerer et 
al. (2016) describe how scores on standardised reading tests on deaf 
children’s arrival at school vary significantly in proportion to the level of 
signing and/or English to which the child was exposed in the pre-school 
home. Deaf students arriving in schools then, are required to learn in a 
language of which they have had relatively little (if varying) experience in 
comparison to their hearing peers – they are at some distance to the 
language. We can see here, that if young deaf people are at a distance to 
the language, they are at a distance to voicing their stories. 
Once in school, young deaf learners face other barriers to learning. 
Dammeyer et al. (2018) describe how the extent of hearing loss and 
language varies, as well as the contexts in which these young people live. 
More importantly, they go on to explain that, for nearly half of the deaf 
population, deafness is not their only disability. In spite of this, McMahon et 
al. (2016, p. 657), describe ‘a dearth of research on the inclusion of multiply 
marginalized populations’. This is of concern in the context of the work of 
Caemmerer et al. (2016), on the relationship between deafness and learning 
disabilities. This is particularly significant when their findings show that 
around half of deaf and hearing-impaired children have at least one co-
occurring disability. They point to the failure of schools to identify additional 
learning difficulties in young deaf children. If these needs are not identified 
then they cannot be met, adding further impairment to the experiences of 
young deaf learners. Even amongst those deaf students who wore cochlear 
implants8, standard testing for learning disability normally used with hearing 
students failed to identify additional learning needs. Consequently, deaf 
students are not accessing the full curriculum and are failing to participate 
fully in classroom activities and discussion (Stinton and Antia, 1999). As a 
result of this lack of participation, deaf students experience a feeling of 
isolation – being at a distance from the group, resulting in poor academic 
 
8 Cochlear implants: Surgically implanted electrodes designed to provide a sense of sound 
which aims at reducing hearing loss. 
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achievement. These feelings of being separate were confirmed in research 
carried out by Foster et al., which found that deaf students were concerned 
about the pace of instruction, and that they did not feel as much a member of 
the ‘family’ (1999, p. 225) as the hearing students. 
Marschark et al. (2017) question the assumptions made in primary and 
secondary schools regarding the education of deaf learners and their 
experiences in schools. They investigate, for example, the assumption that 
deaf students, because of the visual nature of BSL (even though not all deaf 
people use it), are better visual learners than their hearing peers. The results 
of their research indicate that this assumption is clearly wrong. This research 
is a strong indicator as to what is the biggest barrier that the young deaf 
learner experiences; that is, teacher education or rather, the lack of teacher 
education in the field of deafness in mainstream settings. Bryant et al. (2017) 
describe young deaf people with disability as suffering from a ‘disability 
perspective’ (2017, p. 40), in that teachers can sometimes see these children 
as being somehow deficient or less capable than their peers, and that low 
teacher expectations have an adverse effect on the learning outcomes of 
these children. Brinkley makes a useful distinction in this regard between 
what he calls ‘Deaf Awareness’ (p. 64) and ‘Deaf Understanding’ (2011, p. 
64). Deaf awareness, he argues, can be achieved in mainstream schools 
through Continuing Professional Development (CPD), teaching everybody in 
the school some basic sign language, and holding annual deaf awareness 
days. However, deaf understanding is only achieved when one works directly 
with deaf students, as opposed to simply being in the same building as them, 
and that understanding is embedded at every level be it in the classroom or 
at leadership level. It is only in overcoming this lack of understanding at all 
levels that links back strongly to the notions of the inclusion of deaf learners 
in schools. 
The lack of understanding about deafness and the crucial factor of delayed 
language development clearly have implications for educational practice. But 
what of deafness itself? It is important to understand what it means to identify 
as deaf, and where that positions the individual in relation to an identifiable 
group (should that exist) in schools. Powers (2006, p. 1) writes that it is 
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‘incumbent upon teachers to encourage young deaf learners to develop the 
personal qualities that are linked to success’. However, this is just one 
element pertinent to the successful inclusion of young deaf people in 
schools. The next section of this chapter moves on to explore and challenge 
notions of inclusion. It will look at the literature relating to inclusion, what it 
means to be deaf in school, and the impact that inclusion does, or does not, 
have on the young deaf person in schools. 
 
1.4 The inclusion of young deaf learners 
 
In recent years, there have been ideological and policy changes in many 
countries away from teaching children with disabilities9 in specialist settings, 
towards inclusion into mainstream schools, enabling them to lead their lives 
in circumstances as near as can be, to the rest of the population. There is a 
growing body of work that has been carried out, some in the United 
Kingdom, but moreover internationally, on the inclusion of young deaf 
learners in schools. This is not to say however, that a level of inclusion has 
been achieved where young deaf people can be said to have a voice and to 
be included in the sense that their experiences of school are of no greater 
nor less a value than that of their hearing peers. It is for this reason that I 
consider that it is appropriate to my argument to look in some detail here 
about the current state of inclusion in schools, with particular regard to the 
experiences of young deaf students. Indeed, the picture that comes out of 
this literature is a complex one, not least because of the range of 
understandings of what is meant by ‘inclusion’, and because deafness, as an 
isolating condition (Olsson, et al., 2018), works against notions of ‘inclusion’. 
School inclusion, argue McMahon et al. (2016, p. 658), ‘has been used to 
refer to a wide variety of practices, attitudes and institutional values, 
 
9 The word ‘disability’ is used in this thesis as cited in the literature.   It is worth noting here, 
that there is a position taken by some in the deaf community, that ‘the Deaf are not disabled, 
they are a language minority’ (Brinkley, 2011, p. 13) with their own culture and means of 
communication.  More recently, Terry et al. (2017) argue that it is important to understand 
that there is significant opposition to the use of the word in relation to deafness, with many 
Deaf people not seeing themselves as ‘disabled’, but as a group which is subject to 
stereotyping and prejudice. 
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reflecting the complexity of this construct’. It is useful here then to consider 
‘The debate on inclusion’ (Powers, 2002, p. 242) in the context of young deaf 
people.  
To provide places for deaf students in mainstream schools may be a policy 
step change towards inclusion, but this would be to take an overly simplistic 
view of what inclusion means. Specialist school provision faces just as many 
challenges regarding inclusion as mainstream and the question then 
becomes, how well does either type of school achieve inclusion for young 
deaf learners? At the beginning of this century, much of the research, for 
example, Avramadis et al., (2000), concentrated on the issues relating solely 
to inclusion into mainstream schools. Other research, however (Ainscow et 
al., 2006), creates a more expansive definition of inclusion, and focuses on 
breaking down barriers whatever the educational setting. Powers (2002) too, 
sees beyond the issue of inclusion being about the provision of mainstream 
places and develops a set of criteria – ’indicators of inclusion for deaf 
students’ (p. 237) – in order to define what a good learning environment for 
young deaf people should look like. This is in stark contrast to classroom-
based research carried out by Foster et al. (1999), looking at the practical 
adaptations that teachers made for deaf students. Their outcomes showed 
that, in practice, only a few changes were made. Furthermore, participants 
were often of the view that the onus of responsibility for engagement in 
learning should lie with the student, with the help of support services. Whilst 
acknowledging that learners do indeed have a level of responsibility for their 
own learning, McMahon et al. (2016), observe that it is incumbent upon 
schools to adopt inclusive best practices (organisational, academic, 
assessment and planning, and social), if young deaf people are to achieve in 
line with their hearing peers. Wareham et al., (2006) also recognise the 
responsibility of schools for young deaf people’s learning. They observe that 
understanding how deaf students learn and communicate is key to inclusion. 
They go on to argue that there is no one single experience (I will turn to the 
lack of homogeneity in the deaf world later in this chapter). Their work also 
points out that not only pedagogical adaptations need to be made, but also 
that there are practical and physical modifications to be made, in order to 
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create a learning environment conducive to the success of deaf learners. 
McMahon et al. (2016) develop these ideas in their work on ‘Organizational 
Inclusion’ (p. 658), arguing for a common framework for inclusion in schools, 
encompassing school administration, leadership, and professional 
development best practices for inclusion. On a cautionary note however, 
arguing that research into the education of deaf learners should have 
practical implications for the experience of deaf learners, Swanwick and 
Marschark (2010) raise concerns that too much research remains in the 
sphere of academia, having too little impact on the inclusion of deaf learners 
in schools. McMahon et al. (2016) also conclude that teachers and 
researchers need to work together in order to maximise the impact of any 
improvements in inclusion best practices. In the Higher Education sector, 
Caica (2011) finds that even those deaf students who do make sufficient 
progress to gain places at university face further obstacles. This is because 
whilst universities purport to embrace notions of inclusion, diversity and 
difference, there is a lack of understanding of the need for flexibility and the 
use of appropriate teaching strategies that would have real impact on the 
deaf experience. This is disappointing when, as Wareham et al., (2006) 
argue that deaf and hearing-impaired students can be helped to access a 
fulfilling and successful university experience with the application of a little 
common sense.  
More recently, in their work in Sweden, Olsson et al. (2018) conclude that 
regardless of the kind of institution, what matters is that all children are well 
taught, and that a sense of community is created where integration10 is 
promoted and discrimination can be challenged. This dual role of the school 
with regards to inclusion is made clear in the work of McMahon et al. (2016), 
in the United States, which makes a useful distinction between ‘Academic 
Inclusion’ (p. 658) and ‘Social Inclusion’ (p. 659). Academic inclusion refers 
to the child being able to fully participate in learning and to achieve their 
potential as an individual. Social inclusion concerns the child being able to 
take part in social activities and to make friends amongst their peers whether 
 
10 The word integration is sometimes used interchangeably with inclusion in the literature, 
but in this thesis, I take integration to be an element of inclusion as a broader term. 
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they have a disability or not. Their work points to there being a strong 
correlation between success for students with disability (both academic and 
social) when these dual elements are addressed by the school. In the first 
study of its kind in Malaysia (based on research carried out at Manchester 
University in the UK), Khairuddin et al. (2018) expand on this notion and call 
for schools to recognise that there are a series of interrelated dimensions of 
inclusion that need to be in place for inclusion to be successful. These 
include the home experience as well as the curricular, organisational and 
social elements, but point to a level of inflexibility in schools which is 
hampering progress towards the inclusion of young deaf learners. These 
findings make Swanwick and Marschark’s (2010) call to bridge the gap 
between deaf studies and practice even more urgent.  
It is clear from the literature on inclusion, that whilst there may be 
disagreement by what we mean by inclusion there remain some important 
issues to be resolved, including defining priorities and applying research to 
practice. That the debate on inclusion in schools persists in broad terms and 
specifically in relation to young deaf learners, points to the conclusion that 
young deaf learners remain at some distance to their peers and the 
institutions in which they are learning – they are in the margins, and if they 
are in the margins, how are their voices to be heard? Having set the context 
for the inclusion of deaf learners, this chapter will now move on to look more 
closely at the relationship that young deaf people have with telling stories, 











1.5 Young deaf learners: stories and voice 
 
Whilst deafness is a central concept to this thesis, it is important to 
remember that another important concept is film and its potential for eliciting 
the stories of young deaf learners which reveal philosophical insights into 
accounting, translation, and voice. In her work on the narrative function of 
deafness in film, Lerner refers to deaf characters as a metaphor for the 
isolating effect of deafness, representing ‘those without a voice’ (2010, p. 1). 
Whilst the next chapter of this thesis (on methodology) looks in more depth 
at what we mean by narrative, it is worth noting here that Riessman advises 
her readers, ‘not to expect a simple, clear definition of narrative’ (2008, p. 3). 
From a philosophical perspective, the nineteenth century Transcendentalist 
Henry David Thoreau points to the importance of giving his own account and 
encourages all writers to give a ‘simple and sincere account of his own life’ 
(1854/2014, p. 3). Yet, it is in this requirement to give account, very 
specifically, that young deaf learners are at a distance to the word. This 
section picks up on the notions of narrative and voice in the context of 
deafness, with particular reference to the receptive and productive issues 
that young deaf people face with narrative, resulting in young deaf people 
feeling unsettled. Whilst this section investigates some of the technical 
issues young deaf learners experience with narrative, it cannot ignore the 
importance of narrative to the culture of deaf children and how stories ‘serve 
as a window into their cultural worlds’ (Van Deusen-Phillips et al., 2001, p. 
311). 
The range of approaches taken in research into deaf children and narrative is 
notable both methodologically, and in its focus, from the autoethnographic 
approach taken by Irish et al. (2018), through to the approach taken by 
Jones et al. (2016) in developing a quantitative method to measure the ability 
of young deaf people to retell stories. The divergence in approach in the 
literature in this area – a collection of research, investigating different 
aspects of young deaf people’s communication skills using a variety of 
definitions of ‘narrative’ – belies the convergence in outcomes and 
conclusions. This variation is evidenced by research focussing on different 
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aspects of narrative skills. Akmese and Acarlar (2016) for example, focus on 
the specific ability of young deaf learners to use grammar, including tenses 
and pronouns in writing, whereas Crosson and Geers (2001) and Jones et al. 
(2016), are more interested in young deaf people’s storytelling abilities 
through voice, as a reaction to the use of visual stimuli. Rathmann et al. 
(2007), and Bernaix (2013) do however, display some consensus in the 
focus of their research, in that they each explore spoken and written 
production of narrative in young deaf people, and both come to the 
conclusion that more research is required to support schools in developing 
successful approaches to narrative with deaf pupils. However, the current 
literature finds that the ability of young deaf people to understand and use 
narrative is, with variation (Tarwacka-Odolczk et al., 2014), impaired by the 
inability to create more complex sentences due to word omission (Akmese 
and Acarlar, 2016), and by difficulties in structuring narrative due to struggles 
with tenses and other grammatical devices (Jones et al., 2016). This 
conclusion is confirmed in Teruggi and Gutierrez-Caceres’ (2015) research, 
which found that deaf children consistently produced significantly less 
complex sentences than their hearing peers. This leaves young deaf learners 
struggling to voice relevance and detail in their narrative, and this issue is 
critical to the thesis. The (in)ability to give account, to tell our stories is at the 
very heart of being. Human beings are story-telling beings as evidenced in 
the 44,000-year-old cave paintings found in Indonesia, right through to telling 
your story to a therapist as found in modern day Cognitive Behavioural 
Therapy (CBT). 
Acknowledging the power of narrative as a cultural tool for organising and 
interpreting life experiences, Jones et al. describe narrative as being ‘the 
ability to communicate a story containing sequential information, usually 
about a past or future event’, and emphasise the importance of narrative 
communication in developing social skills (2016, p. 269). Acquisition and 
development of language entails learning how to take part in the discursive 
process (Tarwacka-Odolczk et al., 2014). This is a skill which usually begins 
with interaction with parents in the home. Given that deaf children can be 
born into a range linguistic circumstances – BSL, English, or mixed – 
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communicative competence of deaf children will vary. Furthermore, the age 
of sign language acquisition can also vary significantly. Some children learn 
at home, others only start to learn when they start school. This inconsistent 
and unusual pattern of language transmission (when compared with hearing 
children) does impact on the linguistic performance as the child grows (Smith 
and Cormier, 2014), both in the perception and in the production. 
Nevertheless, the research is clear (Akmese and Acarlar, 2016; McMahon et 
al., 2016; Dammeyer et al., 2018) that despite variation in the approaches to 
research in this area, there is nonetheless agreement that narrative is of 
great significance to young deaf people culturally, but it is also something 
which they have difficulty both processing and producing11. The notion that 
narrative (giving account) is also of philosophical importance to young deaf 
people is investigated later in the thesis. 
 
1.6 Concerns about the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on young deaf 
people 
 
I stated in the introduction to the thesis that it is not within the scope of this 
project to provide a full analysis of the impact of the global pandemic on 
young deaf people. There is much work to be done in this area in the future, 
and indeed, prominent researchers in the field (Swanwick et al., 2020) have 
already begun. It is however, appropriate to raise current concerns about 
what that impact might be. 
In an open letter, published in The Guardian newspaper (2020), Wright et al., 
leading figures in the world of deaf children’s mental health, point to the high 
rates of mental health problems that deaf children faced before the 
pandemic, and argue that COVID-19 is creating additional challenges. This, 
they argue, is due to reduced communication and the further distancing from 
their deaf and hearing peers through the use of face masks and school 
closures. They call for extra consideration to be given to deaf children to 
have access to good communication through electronic means during 
 
11 The word producing, in relation to voice, is used deliberately here as a link to the 
production of film and the production of a response to film later in the thesis. 
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periods of home schooling, and that see-through masks and shields be used 
in educational settings as students return to school. 
The National Deaf Children’s Society (NDCS) are providing regular updates, 
offering advice (2021) to families who have deaf children of school age. They 
too raise concerns over the mandatory wearing of face masks in school. 
They argue that the loss of ability to lip-read and to see facial expressions 
will lead to increased feelings of isolation, loneliness, and misunderstanding. 
This, they argue, has caused high levels of anxiety in the deaf community. 
In their research on the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on deaf people 
and their families in Ghana, Swanwick et al. (2020, p. 141), found that ‘the 
global crisis of COVID-19 exposes and deepens issues of societal exclusion 
for deaf adults, children, and their families’. They contest that the pandemic 
has caused difficulties that are specific to deaf children of school age. These 
relate to the temporary closure of schools during periods of lockdown which 
have impacted negatively and disproportionally on deaf children’s social and 
language development. Of further concern is that while the effects of the 
pandemic have, to a certain extent, been a shared human experience, 
information about the pandemic has been available predominantly to the 
hearing population. This, they conclude, leaves the deaf population further 
marginalised and raises concerning questions about societal inclusion. 
It is clear from this snapshot of current concerns about the effects of the 
global crisis on deaf people, that there is potential for the gaps between the 
hearing and deaf worlds I described earlier in the chapter to widen. It is also 
apparent that there is both scope and need for further research, and action to 
be taken in this area. There are evident signs that the social and academic 








1.7 Reflections on what it means to be a young deaf person 
 
The fact that this chapter has relied upon research carried out throughout the 
world, demonstrates the lack of available literature in the United Kingdom, 
despite the high political profile of the inclusion of young deaf learners and 
other vulnerable groups in this country. The prevalence of political and 
ideological discussion does not necessarily relate to more academic 
research, nor does it seem to lead to greater levels of inclusion that can be 
verified through academic research. And, whilst there is a discernible, if 
limited selection of literature dedicated to the obstacles facing young deaf 
learners in relating their stories, there is even less dedicated to hearing those 
young deaf voices. 
Whilst arguably laudable in its aims, the political and ideological drive 
towards the inclusion of young deaf learners into mainstream educational 
settings, has not been without its problems. As demonstrated in this chapter, 
the very definition of inclusion is unclear and subject to interpretation. The 
degree to which schools have been successful in addressing both social and 
academic inclusion for young deaf students remains inconsistent, and the 
common framework argued for in the academic literature is far from being in 
place. It is my claim then, that deaf students remain in the margins. Through 
hurdles of problematic language acquisition from birth and in early years, the 
majority of deaf children are placed at a severe disadvantage that has long 
term effects on their learning outcomes at school and beyond. This 
disadvantage is compounded by the lack of deaf awareness in families, 
schools, and society as a whole, and indeed of what it means to be deaf. It is 
further compounded by the negative impact the COVID-19 pandemic is 
having on young deaf people and their families. For around half of young 
deaf learners, multiple disability puts them at a double distance from their 
peers. It is also clear that coming to an understanding of one’s identity, or 
sense of self, as a D/deaf young person in the years of adolescence is 
difficult. The D/deaf culture, and consequently D/deaf identity, is neither 
easily defined nor homogeneous, leading to a sense of isolation and 
loneliness not experienced to the same degree by their hearing peers. If we 
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accept the argument of Jones et al. (2016) that narrative is a powerful 
cultural tool, the difficulties that young deaf learners have both in 
understanding and producing narrative, takes them further away from a 
defined cultural identity. This leads to one of the key questions of this thesis:  
How are we to hear the voices and stories of young deaf people? In 
Thoreau’s philosophical terms, how are young deaf people to give account 
of, and for, their lives?  
The next chapter of this thesis will investigate why a philosophical approach 
has been adopted in the project, in preference to the narrative/social 
sciences methodologies more commonly used when carrying out research 
with those whose voices are seldom heard. It will present an account of the 
questions that are of interest and the affordances of exploring them from a 
philosophical perspective, juxtaposing this with the kinds of questions that 
are typically addressed through narrative/social sciences methodological 
approaches. This is not to imply that some methods, or approaches, are 
inherently ‘better’ or ‘worse’ than others, echoing Crotty’s (1998) view that 
the researcher must choose the approach to suit the specific project, as each 
individual project goes in search of different knowledge. Indeed, I shall argue 
why a philosophical approach lends itself better and more appropriately to 
my investigation into the educative potential of film when looking into the 















Remember that methods are created for particular research tasks, not 
simply lifted from a research methods manual and replicated (Clough 
and Nutbrown, 2007, p. 165). 
The previous chapter of this thesis focused almost exclusively on the 
empirical work (much of it using narrative methodology) carried out with 
young deaf people. From this, one can learn a great deal about young deaf 
people and the barriers to communication they face, which in turn 
problematises, and brings to the light, their experiences with what I will come 
to discuss philosophically as accounting, translation, and voice12. In this 
section I will discuss the sorts of questions and hypotheses that empirical 
literature addresses, and how such studies tend to be characterised by a 
structure that includes a literature review (much as I have done), followed by 
the methods section, data collection, analysis, findings, and conclusion. I will 
also look at the sorts of questions the empirical literature addresses: 
hypotheses tested et cetera. 
As I discussed in chapter 1, the themes emerging from the empirical 
research on young deaf learners focus on the impact of problematic 
language acquisition (Calderon and Greenberg, 2003; Brinkley, 2011), 
identity and adolescence in young D/deaf people (Napier et al., 2018) and 
issues relating to young deaf learners: stories and voice (Van Deusen-
Phillips et al., 2001). The research questions asked focus on creating an 
inclusive experience for deaf learners in schools that can have measurable 
impact for the outcomes of those young deaf people (McMahon et al., 2016). 
Where empirical research looks at questions of narrative and deafness, it 
endeavours to develop quantitative systems of measurement of deaf 
children’s abilities to retell stories initially presented in non-verbal video 
 
12 Accounting, translation, and voice: These terms are central to this thesis. Whilst they have 
straight forward meaning in everyday usage, they have a more nuanced reading in the 
philosophical literature. I return to these terms in future chapters. 
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format (Jones et al., 2016). Throughout this body of literature, the research 
questions have been posed, the data collected and analysed, and 
conclusions reached. As I referred to in the previous chapter, the research in 
the field of deafness and young people is limited and merits further 
investigation and resource. However, this does not detract from the value of 
previous research to explain and analyse the young deaf experience. The 
research gives an account, from a particular perspective, of the deaf 
experience: from the lack of deaf awareness in families, and in schools 
(Terry et al., 2017), to the exploration of the social capital of deaf 
adolescents in society (Wong et al., 2018). There are, however, peculiarities 
in the use of narrative methodology that are specific to conducting research 
with young deaf people that have emerged from my own research (McCall, 
2015). As such, in considering what the empirical literature does, I must 
consider also what it does not do. 
Traditional empirical approaches to research with young deaf people 
formulate a research question and choose a methodological approach best 
suited to the task (Crotty, 1998) of addressing the question. Predominantly in 
this area of research, narrative methodology is adopted as a means of 
eliciting stories from those whose voices are seldom heard (Olsson et al., 
2018; Akmese and Acarlar, 2016; Terry et al., 2017). There are many 
interpretations of what constitutes narrative methodology13, but it is widely 
used in the context of storytelling in the social sciences. Bold (2012) asks her 
readers to be accepting of the breadth and diversity of narrative, persuading 
them, ‘to develop and justify their own conceptual understanding of narrative 
in relation to their own research’ (p. 17); my research seeks to create such 
an understanding to support my own work. However, narrative is not without 
its critics. The failings of narrative research have been addressed by, among 
others, Hodgson and Standish (2009). They point to the tendency for 
researchers in the social sciences to focus too heavily on the processes 
involved in carrying out narrative methodology to the detriment of their 
responses to the research questions posed.  
 
13 Other related methodologies include life history, life course analysis and biography. 
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An aspect that is unique in my research, however, is that it is my contention 
that there are issues with narrative and questions of validity that are specific 
to research with young deaf people. Marschark and Hauser (2012) refer to 
young deaf learners as being ‘long underserved’ (p. 218). As such, deaf 
learners fit well into the category of ‘marginalized groups’ (p.14) for whom 
Riessman (2008) argues that narrative methodology is best suited. However, 
I see problems with using the narrative interview or ‘grounded conversation’ 
(Goodson and Sikes, 2001. p. 28) with young deaf learners. First, deaf 
people have difficulties both in understanding and producing narrative (Jones 
et al., 2016)14, and for a non-BSL (British Sign Language) user to reach a 
‘truth’ in discussion with a deaf child, there is the need for an intermediary in 
the form of an interpreter. Second, there is an issue with language and 
interpretation. If we are using narrative to uncover some notion of ‘truth’ or 
‘trustworthiness’ (Riessman, 2008. p. 184), then the lack of homogeneity in 
the deaf population and the numerous layers of interpretation involved when 
using a spoken English (and possibly other languages), alongside BSL, 
poses problems for translation and interpretation. I acknowledge that all 
social research is value-laden and is therefore an interpretation, but here we 
have further, particular distance. It is a double distance through an 
interpreter. Can one be accurately described as giving voice to reach a ‘truth’ 
if that voice then has to be re-interpreted? I acknowledge the use of a BSL 
interpreter in the making of the film, and that there may be some double 
distance still at play here. And yet, as I am not in search of some 
generalisable truth in my work, it remains my intention to enable young deaf 







14 The difficulty in producing narrative here is in relation to the ability to use grammatical 
devices that are dependent on finer linguistic and pragmatic skills. 
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2.2 Turning to philosophy 
 
It is at this point, whilst conscious of the affordances of empirical 
methodology, I turn to philosophy and film, and film making, as ‘method’15 to 
address the questions of accounting, translation, and voice in such a way 
that empirical data collection and analysis cannot. In developing this idea, I 
will explore what taking a philosophical approach to research might mean, 
how it differs from empirical research in the social sciences, and why film as 
philosophical ‘method’ is best suited for the aims of this research, whilst 
acknowledging the potential difficulties that a philosophical ‘method’ 
presents.  
It is important to make clear here that I write about ‘research aims’ in a 
philosophical sense as opposed to ‘research questions’ which are raised and 
addressed in typical empirical research. What I am attempting to do in this 
thesis is distinctive. What I am pursuing is not quantifiable: it cannot be 
measured. My aim is twofold. Firstly, I aim to reach a philosophical 
understanding of voice in the context of deafness. Secondly, I intend to do 
this through exposing the viewers of the film to deafness, and the film itself, 
through their experience of the film. I have drawn here, for the purposes of 
discussing method, a clear distinction between the practical and the 
philosophical. However, I do not wish to over-emphasise the dichotomy 
between the philosophical and the practical. In a more nuanced explanation, 
it is important to remember philosophy always has been, and always will be, 
deeply rooted in the practical. As Standish (2010) describes, the mode of 
enquiry of ancient philosophy is linked to the question of how one should live 
one’s life, and is, in that sense, deeply practical. Philosophy then, is 
concerned not only with the abstract and subjective, as is argued in many of 
the research methods texts (Crotty, 1998; Clough and Nutbrown, 2002) but is 
linked to the practical. To illustrate, in her visual research on children 
diagnosed as having Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), Nancy 
Vansieleghem (2015) describes her work as ‘empirical philosophy’ (p. 97). In 
 
15 I am not choosing philosophy as method in the sense that it might be one of a range of 
methods available in a research handbook. Rather, I am engaging with the discipline of 
philosophy and adopting a philosophical approach to my research. 
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describing her work in this way, she refers to her research as having 
empirical elements whilst at the same time, having philosophical elements in 
the questions she raises, and in the reading and writing of her response. 
What is important for Vansieleghem is that ‘there are other ways of thinking 
and seeing. And it makes possible a better understanding of what research 
can do’ (p. 97). The approach she takes here disrupts the easy dichotomy 
that some suggest between the empirical and the philosophical. 
To articulate the aims of my research I will draw upon the work of American 
philosopher Stanley Cavell, whose work is central to this thesis. This may, at 
first, appear to be an unusual move, especially as Cavell has not written 
explicitly about schooling or deafness, although it is interesting to note that 
he makes reference to his own ear problems in A Pitch of Philosophy (1994). 
Cavell’s work in ordinary language philosophy, scepticism, and the 
knowledge of other minds, has more recently been taken up by philosophers 
of education (Fulford, 2017; O’Reilly, 2017; Standish, 2018; Saito, 2018; 
Skea, 2019). Cavell’s philosophy, particularly that which deals with film as 
philosophy and doing philosophy through film, exemplifies both the 
philosophical ‘method’ I adopt, and adds weight to the aims of my research. I 
refer to several of his books throughout the thesis and in this chapter, I will 
focus particularly on The World Viewed (1979), a book in which he not only 
investigates cinema as art, but also film as philosophy, and examines our 
experiences of film. Here, Cavell invites us to consider the ‘magic’ of film. 
This is not in the senses of the physicality or mechanics of film production, 
which he boldly claims could be regarded as relatively trivial. Those involved 
in the production of film may take issue with this hyperbolic claim, but in 
making this point he is emphasising the other aspects of film that film 
producers do not want to emphasise. For Cavell, what is worthy of 
consideration is how ‘movies reproduce the world magically’ (Cavell, 1979. p. 
40). Film, he argues, does not literally present us with the world but allows us 
to view it in a particular way – ‘the screen overcomes our fixed distance’ 
(ibid.), as shown in the title of the book: The World Viewed.  
If, as part of this research, I were to produce a film merely to re-produce the 
deaf world which the young deaf people inhabit, my approach would be 
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empirical, using film in a way that is common in narrative methodology. This 
is not my intention. Cavell writes, ‘It is an incontestable fact that in a motion 
picture no live human being is up there. But a human something is’ (ibid., p. 
26). That is to say, as viewers we experience the presence of that human 
something without being in its presence. It is this experience of film making 
and film viewing, and the effect that film produces in the viewer, that is key to 
my interest in producing film with young deaf learners. In this sense, 
producing film with young deaf learners is not to document a re-production, 
as in ‘to make a copy’ of their lives on screen. The distinction I make here 
between film reproducing a life on screen and experiencing presence on 
screen is important to this research, and yet difficult to describe, but that is 
the point. I acknowledge that both viewpoints are valid, but I see 
reproduction affording a didactic representation, whereas the experience of 
film is more ethereal. It is less determinate, resisting teleology in that we do 
not know what people are going to get out of it. Alexis Gibbs is, perhaps, 
helpful here when he suggests that ‘film must be seen as something that 
thinks as well as something that conveys the thoughts and ideas of, say, its 
director’ (Gibbs, 2017a, p. 276). 
Here, in my research, I am not concerned with using narrative, or any other 
empirical methodology to create measurable systems to analyse the extent 
to which young deaf learners can tell stories or give account. Rather, 
engaging with the empirical literature does points to an absence of questions 
(for me) of a more philosophical nature regarding the concepts of voice, 
accounting, and translation. To return to Standish’s (2010) view that when 
discussing the philosophical and the practical, one is deeply invested in the 
other, a close reading of the practical soon gives rise to the philosophical. 
Therefore, I do not address practical notions of voice, as in the reductive 
notion of ‘student voice’ in education, as exemplified in the analysis of a 
series of questionnaires (Charteris and Smardon, 2019). Rather, I pose 
philosophical questions about what it means to have voice and to give 
account. What I am concerned with is not empirically researchable; the 
research will not be carried out in the same way. In his work on the concept 
of practising in schools, the philosopher of education, Joris Vlieghe (2016), 
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makes a case for a philosophical approach to phenomenology, in that he 
does not engage ‘in a conversation with students, but with other theorists’ (p. 
63) to understand what is going on in practising in schools that he observes. 
Similarly, what concerns me, and this research, are questions emerging from 
the practical; questions of the meaning and value (Standish, 2010. p. 11) of 
notions of voice, accounting, and translation. The next section of this chapter 
explores this ‘philosophical approach’ to my research, which itself is not 
without complexities, and explains why it is the right approach to this piece of 
research. 
 
2.3 Philosophical ‘method’: An inappropriate heading 
 
In doing philosophy we need to be aware of the awkwardness in 
thinking in terms of having a method, still more, any kind of 
methodology (Smith, 2009. p. 437). 
Typically, in an empirical thesis, there would be a section here on 
methodology. However, this is not an empirical piece of work. Neither is it a 
typical 80,000-word philosophical thesis. Rather, it is a piece of research 
following a philosophical approach to which the making of film is integral. The 
film-making process and the viewing of the film, as acts of translation 
themselves, are crucial to the thesis (The word ‘translation’ here refers to the 
philosophical sense of unsettling or disruption. There is further discussion of 
this notion in chapter 3 of the thesis). Furthermore, to investigate film and 
film making, using the works of the ordinary language philosopher Stanley 
Cavell, and nineteenth century transcendentalist philosopher and essayist 
Henry David Thoreau, as a lens, are part of my philosophical process. 
This non-empirical, philosophical approach16 will involve a close reading of 
the philosophical works of Thoreau and Cavell. This section is not to be seen 
as the traditional ‘method’ section that would predictably appear at this stage 
of the thesis - there is no data to be collected nor any empirical analysis of 
the film to be made. Neither can it be presented as replacement for the 
 
16 In The Claim of Reason (1999a), Cavell usefully describes an ‘approach’ as getting nearer 
to something, whilst acknowledging its distance. This is of pertinence here. 
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‘method’ section. This might be thought of as problematic for me as the 
researcher. There is no handbook to a philosophical method to be called 
upon. There is no agreement as to what constitutes a philosophical approach 
other than what can only be described, in this case, as one that requires 
careful attention to those writers and their texts, and the deaf learners 
involved.  
Writing about the place of philosophy in educational research, Fulford and 
Hodgson (2016) point to the established status of empirical research in the 
university and the ubiquitous module on research methods in MA degrees. 
They do this, not to make facile distinctions about the differences between 
the two approaches, but to consider what educational philosophy offers that 
is distinctive. They argue that there is no ‘right way’ to engage in a 
philosophical approach – their book is not a manual. Rather, theirs is an 
argument for the possibilities of educational philosophy, making the case that 
philosophy ‘through its practices of reading and writing, is research in itself’ 
(ibid., p.4). Whilst educational philosophers17 can reach a level of agreement 
in how the ‘method’ differs from the empirical, they have more difficulty in 
articulating precisely what the ‘method’ is. Referring back to the quote at the 
beginning of this section, where he points to the dangers of trying to define 
the philosophical method, Richard Smith (2009) offers no easy solution on 
how to proceed. Indeed, Smith (2009) points to there being a contradiction in 
trying to establish a method. If philosophy ‘goes where it goes’ (p. 438), then 
tying it to a prescriptive method would stop it being philosophy. Claudia 
Ruitenberg (2009), in a special issue dedicated entirely to the problem of 
method and philosophy, acknowledges the challenges that philosophers 
themselves have in talking about philosophy as method and goes on to write 
that philosophers ‘learn to read and write, well, by reading and writing 
 
17 I make a distinction here between ‘educational philosophy’ and ‘philosophy of education’. I 
do not take these terms to be interchangeable. Fulford and Hodgson (2016) describe 
educational philosophy as being educational in and of itself, through the reading, writing and 
engagement with sources. On the other hand, philosophy of education is more concerned 
with the search for an ‘educational truth or principle’ (ibid, p.28) which can then be applied in 
the context of education. 
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philosophy’ (p. 316). In that sense then, the thesis too, becomes an act of 
translation.  
I acknowledge here then that whilst my approach is to turn to a close reading 
of the works of Thoreau and Cavell, there are many other approaches that 
philosophers of education use. I have already referred to the two differing 
approaches taken by Vansieleghem (2015) and Vlieghe (2016) as examples, 
but in both instances, they are making the case for engagement with the 
sources. For some philosophers of education, it is about engagement with 
eighteenth-century books on education (Griffiths, 2016); for others it could be 
about engaging with digital technologies (Kouppanou, 2016), or art, poetry, 
or film. Standish (2010) is clear, when he writes about the significance of 
sources in a philosophical thesis, that there is likely to be drawn upon the 
work of a limited number of sources in order to maintain the focus of the 
thesis. It is important to draw a distinction between the research methods 
textbooks, as criticised by Fulford and Hodgson (2016), which approach 
method in a technical sense that could be described as mechanical or even 
pseudo-scientific. The methods referred to here are both proscribed and 
prescribed, whereas things are much more open in a philosophical approach 
than the empirical methods texts suggest.  
What then, can philosophy offer a thesis like this? First of all, for the 
purposes of this thesis, I have already argued against the appropriateness of 
an empirical approach to working with young deaf people. Second, in 
wanting to give young deaf people a voice and the opportunity to give 
account, a close reading of philosophical works on voice and account are 
highly appropriate here. Likewise, in making a film that disrupts the viewer’s 
notion of deafness, I turn to philosophical writings on notions of translation 
understood philosophically (translation here is not simply the act of changing 
words from one language into another. It refers to the act of disrupting or 
unsettling ideas that a person holds –  putting the reader or viewer into a 
state of translation). Approaching this thesis from an empirical perspective 
might provide an informed view on the nature of deafness and issues relating 
to giving voice which would be of value. However, the approach here is an 
unusual one, as it involves integrating philosophy and film making together, 
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again disrupting the notion of the dichotomy between the practical and the 
philosophical. I particularly look at the philosophical impact – the film’s effect 
on the viewer and the way in which it affords a richer understanding.  
 
2.4 Film does philosophy 
 
Film is made for philosophy; it shifts or puts different light on whatever 
philosophy has said about appearance and reality, about actors and 
characters, about scepticism and dogmatism, about presence and 
absence (Cavell, 1999a, p. 25). 
The original approach taken in this thesis, of integrating philosophy and film, 
and film making is not accidental. The link between film and philosophy has 
long been established, but this relationship is not a straightforward one. Jerry 
Goodenough makes some useful distinctions to clarify this relationship. He 
describes the link between film and philosophy on three levels. Firstly, he 
refers to ‘Film as illustrating philosophy’ (2005, p. 3). Here he uses Paul 
Verhoeven’s 1990 film Total Recall to describe how a film, whilst not making 
a claim for philosophy, can raise philosophical issues such as the nature of 
experience, personal identity over time, and questions of external-world 
scepticism. Secondly, he refers to ‘Film about philosophy’ (2005, p. 6). In this 
case he cites Dick and Kofman’s 2002 film, Derrida, as an unusual film that 
is about a philosopher and his life. Goodenough’s third and final distinction is 
‘Film as Philosophy’ (2005, p. 10). Here, he argues that it is possible to 
watch a film as a means of engaging in philosophy. He draws upon two films, 
Ridley Scott’s Blade Runner (1982) and Alain Renais’ 1961 film, L’Année 
Dernière à Marienbad. Films in this category, he argues, ‘illustrate significant 
philosophical issues’ (2005, p. 10). The film Blade Runner raises questions 
about what it is to be a ‘person’, and we, the audience, in watching the film 
are invited to consider what we consider the conditions for personhood to be. 
Goodenough describes this experience of film ‘as a kind of philosophical 
mirror, making us look to see how we see ourselves’ (2005, p. 14). In writing 
about L’Année Dernière à Marienbad, Goodenough reiterates this ‘mirroring 
of the self’ (2005, p. 14) in a different philosophical context. Here, the 
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narrative of the film is so disrupted in time18 that is without linearity and 
rationale, forcing the viewer to make their own decisions about truths and 
falsehoods. Film therefore, can do philosophy, and the viewer, according to 
Goodenough, is consequently engaged in a philosophical act. Goodenough’s 
theory about the relationship between film and philosophy then, makes a 
compelling claim not only for film being philosophical, but also that it can do 
philosophy. In his theory however, there is an implicit dichotomy between 
those films that fall into being philosophical (in a way that fits into one of the 
three categories he describes), and those which do not: the rest. For Cavell 
though, whose claim is that ‘Film is made for philosophy’ (1999a, p. 25), film 
is philosophising in a different way. In the next paragraph, I shall look at 
Cavell’s approach to film and philosophy in The World Viewed. 
Cavell’s approach to film and philosophy does not present a theory nor does 
it present a list of criteria by which to judge the philosophical potential of any 
given film, ‘rather, it is to draw attention to distinctive possibilities of film, as a 
form of art, to exhibit the world’ (Hodgson and Ramaekers, 2019, p. 36). Film 
can make things both present and absent to us, the viewer. In writing about 
photography, Cavell describes photographs as showing something which is 
not actually present, even if we recognise what the photograph is showing 
us. Of photographs, he writes, ‘what is manufactured is an image of the 
world’ (Cavell,1979, p. 20). However, whilst acknowledging the ‘automatism’ 
(ibid., p. 101) that photography and film have in common, the projection and 
screening of moving pictures, he argues, produces a different experience. 
We, the audience, are allowed to be ‘mechanically absent’ (ibid. p.25), but 
cinema has ‘discovered the possibility of calling attention to persons and 
parts of persons and objects; but it is equally a possibility of the medium not 
to call attention to them; rather to let the world happen’ (ibid., p. 25). In the 
calling of attention to people, aspects of people and things, film establishes 
our connection with the world and how we view it: film does philosophy. 
Cavell is not concerned with a particular set of movies that could be 
described as intellectual or have a particular audience in mind. Indeed, his 
 
18 The potential for film to disrupt, and the impact of broken narrative are notions that I return 
to later in this thesis. 
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claim is that we ‘all care about movies’ (ibid., p. 5), and some of the films he 
uses to illustrate the philosophical nature of film, for example Stella Dallas 
and Gaslight, are examples of what might be called the ‘Hollywood 
melodramas’ or as Cavell himself describes them, ‘the melodramas of the 
unknown woman’19 (Cavell, 1996, p. 3); films of the 1930s and 1940s that 
could be best described as ‘tear-jerkers’. In this sense then, film, and 
therefore philosophy, are for everybody. 
 
2.5 On a broader conception of the ethical 
 
In section 2.4 of this chapter, I pointed to a false dichotomy between the 
philosophical and the practical, and how such an understanding presents too 
simplistic a picture of the relationship between the two. In fact, I would argue 
that the relationship is much more nuanced. In a similar vein, I now turn my 
attention to the question of ethics in my research. Whilst I acknowledge that 
there are critical, practical ethical considerations which I must detail, there 
are broader conceptions of the ethical in research at play here. Writing about 
ethics in educational research, Paul Standish argues: 
There is a background problem that the very assiduousness of these 
endeavours can mask. This concerns the way in which the ethical has 
 been conceived in the modern world. The ethical comes in, as it were, 
at points of conflict – where there is a question over confidentiality, 
where the research is sensitive in some way… What is left out [here] 
is that  broader conception in which it is recognised that values 
permeate our lives…and hence [are] inevitably there at the start in 
research in education (Standish, 2002, pp. 211-212). 
 
It is not my intention here, to engage (as I might in an empirical piece of 
work) in a ‘tick-box’ exercise where I address, systematically, the 
subheadings of practical ethical considerations such as confidentiality, the 
hierarchical power relationship, and issues of child protection. Rather, as 
Standish suggests, I look to the starting point of my research and consider 
 
19The ‘melodramas of the unknown woman’ include such films as: Stella Dallas (Vidor, 
1937), Now, voyager, (Rapper, 1942), Gaslight (Cukor, 1944) and Letter from an Unknown 




what I am trying to do, from a broader ethical perspective, in working with a 
highly vulnerable group of young people. 
In making film with young deaf people, I have duly taken into consideration 
the ethical guidelines as stipulated by the British Educational Research 
Association (BERA20) for carrying out research with children in schools. I 
declare this not as a ‘platitudinous statement that extra care needs to be 
taken when researching with those with a reduced capacity’ (Cuskelly, 2005, 
p. 99), but as a sincere and serious approach to be conscious of the lack of 
homogeneity in the D/deaf population as described by Swanwick and 
Marschark (2010). Moreover, I take into account the fact that a large number 
of the D/deaf population present with multiple disabilities. 
Here, as I did in my MA research (McCall, 2015), I call to account my ethical 
position in carrying out research with this particular group of people. Several 
scholars (Farrell, 2005; Cuskelly, 2005) question the ethical position of those 
researching with children and young people who might be deemed to be 
vulnerable. Young and Hunt (2011), whose work specifically considers 
issues relating to researching with the D/deaf community, pose questions 
that are of particular pertinence to my research. Adding moral weighting to 
the lived experience, they challenge the very idea that there is ethical validity 
in hearing researchers, like myself, carrying out research with the D/deaf 
community at all. Whilst acknowledging this position, I take the viewpoint that 
empathy with participants is critical (Mukherji and Albon, 2010), but that to 
limit research with the D/deaf to deaf researchers is too restrictive. Also, I 
take into account Swanwick and Marschark’s (2010) view that given the 
heterogeneity of the D/deaf community, a deaf researcher may have life 
experiences that are just as detached from the deaf participant as a non-deaf 
researcher. In making film with young deaf people, it is my contention that I 
am not speaking for them, but alongside them. 
The film I made with the deaf boys does not make an empirical contribution 
to this thesis, rather it is central to my philosophical argument. As my work is 
 
20 Of particular significance to this study are the paragraphs under the heading, ‘Children, 
Vulnerable Young People and Vulnerable Adults’ (2018, pp. 6-7). 
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philosophical, I take into account the broader concept of ethics and 
recognise the values that permeate the lives of the young deaf people with 
whom I am working. The thrust of my research, in giving voice to the deaf 
boys, is not to hear their life stories, and not to collect them in the more 
traditional empirical narrative sense. Rather, the whole rationale for my 
research is concerned with acknowledging their right to have voice and the 
right to express what is important to them. My research shines a 
philosophical light on the lives that the deaf boys live; it moves beyond a 
narrow understanding of ethical, and is more related to social justice. 
 
2.6 Some practical considerations 
 
It is at this point that I turn to the making of the film. The philosophical 
importance of the film being made for the small screen, on handheld digital 
equipment, becomes clearer later in the thesis. However here, I focus on the 
practical. I undertook the filming, together with the two boys involved, 
Hashim and Tyrone, on three different kinds of camera: A Digital Single-lens 
camera (DSLR)21, small handheld devices22, and a mobile phone. The 
outside shots of Hashim playing football were filmed by me, on a DSLR 
camera. The shots of the boys that feature dates and times at the bottom of 
the screen, were filmed by the boys, on small handheld devices that I had 
given them. I shot the rest of the film on a mobile phone. What is key here is 
that for the purposes of this thesis, it is not my intention (nor my skill set) to 
contribute to the creative or technological advancement in the area of film 
making, but rather to use the film making process as a means to an end, in 
order to elicit stories from young deaf people.  
My initial decision was to use a DSLR for the entire shooting of the film. 
However, for the following reasons, small handheld devices were preferred. 
Whilst the introduction of the DSLR has undoubtedly made filming more 
 
21 Digital Single-Lens camera (DSLR) – A video camera which uses a digital imaging sensor 
as opposed to photographic film. 
 
22 I gave the boys inexpensive smartphone sized digital cameras so that they did not have to 
use their own phones or worry should they be lost or broken. 
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compact and portable, and perhaps less invasive than its predecessors, 
there remain concerns for its use in my particular context. I am not a scholar 
of film; I am making film to express a particular philosophical viewpoint. The 
DSLR, for my purposes is an overcomplicated machine. It is simply too 
sophisticated, and to do it justice would have required a level of training and 
investment of time which I really needed to invest in the main philosophical 
work of my thesis. Furthermore, when I have used the DSLR I have noted 
two issues. First, young deaf learners are a highly vulnerable group and to 
conduct filmed interviews using a DSLR mounted on a tripod pointing at 
them can feel intimidating for them. This is of particular importance for the 
ethics of my research. Second, using a highly visible camera in a school 
setting, surrounded by curious children, attracts attention that both distracts 
and detracts. It is for these reasons that I turned to the use of a smartphone 
for filming. It must be acknowledged here that using smartphones for filming 
presents its own difficulties: relatively low dynamic range, image quality and 
battery life et cetera. However, there are now technical solutions to some of 
these issues, and the use of accessories such as stabilisers and apps like 
Filmic Pro23 allows for a greater specification of film to be made. 
In addition to these practical advantages for my research, there are perhaps 
more important factors in the use of smartphones which are specific to 
researching with young deaf people. The young deaf community in any city is 
not confined to one geographical location, these young people are spread 
out, and isolated from their deaf peers. As a result, out of school time these 
children communicate through online video streaming through their 
smartphones. They are accustomed to filming themselves and each other so 
that they can communicate from home using British Sign Language (BSL) 
and text in English. In her work with young Muslim women in Copenhagen, 
Waltrop (2018) found a similar social networking effect in a minority and 
socially isolated group. I have already discussed how the participants in my 
research contributed to the making of the film. In her research on mobile 
phone film making as a participatory medium, Rabova (2014) makes the 
 
23 Filmic Pro – A smartphone application which enables the user to alter things like frame 
rate and shutter speed, that the standard smartphone camera does not allow.  
48 
 
case for placing the use of mobile phones for making films within the 
discourse of film making history, concluding that the accessibility of the 
technology does increase levels of participation and engagement. Covill 
(2018) argues that filming on smartphones opens up the possibilities of film 
creation. In the case of my research, I conclude that for technological, 
practical, and ethical reasons, filming with smartphones with young deaf 
people provides a unique solution for reasons specific to the context. It was 
simply the right tool for the job.  
 
2.7 Reflections on philosophy and film as ‘method’ 
 
In this concluding section of this chapter on philosophy and film as ‘method’, 
I return to my earlier discussion on the problem of philosophers and method. 
I referred earlier to Claudia Ruitenberg (2009), in a special issue of The 
Journal of Philosophy of Education, dedicated entirely to the problem of 
method and philosophy. In it, she acknowledges the challenges that 
philosophers themselves have in talking about philosophy. What she wrote 
about philosophers learning ‘to read and write, well, by reading and writing 
philosophy’ (p. 316), as I quoted earlier, has become my challenge and my 
goal in producing this thesis. 
I now consider the etymology of the word ‘method’ to reiterate what ‘method’ 
is for this research, and the claims I make for the approach I take in the 
thesis. 
method (n.) 
early 15c., "regular, systematic treatment of disease," from 
Latin methodus "way of teaching or going," from Greek methodos" 
scientific inquiry, method of inquiry, investigation," originally "pursuit, a 
following after," from meta "in pursuit or quest of" (see meta-) 
+ hodos "a method, system; a way or manner" (of doing, saying, etc.), 
also "a traveling, journey," literally "a path, track, road," a word of 
uncertain origin (see Exodus). 
Meaning "any way of doing anything, orderly regulation of conduct 
with a view to the attainment of an end" is from 1580s; that of 
"orderliness, regularity" is from 1610s. Meaning "a system or complete 
set of rules for attaining an end" is from 1680s. In reference to a 
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theory of acting associated with Russian director Konstantin 
Stanislavski (1863-1938), it is attested from 1923.24 
 
The word ‘method’ then is etymologically rooted in the Greek words ‘meta’ 
and ‘hodos’: ‘meta’ meaning in pursuit or in search of, and ‘hodos’ meaning a 
way out or path/ a journey. Etymologically then, it refers to a prescribed, 
systematic approach to inquiry, but also a way out of that prescribed way of 
thinking about ‘method’ – an exodus. The word ‘method’ then incorporates 
both these meanings, but traditional approaches to ‘method’ privileges one 
over the other. My claim here, is that I am looking to the way out. 
As I have discussed, empirical methods are selected, applied, and reflected 
upon in the conclusion. My claim is more radical. I do not select and integrate 
philosophy and film as method and apply them. My ‘hodos’, or way, is to 
generate and experience my ‘method’. Together with my participants, and 
the viewers of the film, we experience and create the ‘method’ together. It is 
not something that is done to them in the sense of traditional narrative 
























This central chapter of the thesis forms a discussion of the key concepts of 
accounting, translation, and voice. I present them in one extended chapter, in 
three sections, as opposed to three separate chapters because, as I hope 
will become clear to the reader, they are concepts that continually overlap 
and so cannot easily be seen in distinction from each other. In the first of 
these sections I will look closely at Cavell’s own life experiences as they are 
reflected in his writing on voice. I will provide a close reading of what Cavell 
has written on voice, perfectionism, and passionate utterance in relation to 
film. This will have a bearing on my subsequent philosophical reading of my 
own film. The second section moves from voice to account, providing an 
explanation of how ‘account’ is to be understood in Walden (Thoreau, 
1854/2014) and consequently, in The Senses of Walden (1992). The third 
section of this chapter turns to philosophy as translation, with the aim of 
explaining what is meant by a philosophical translation, and how this relates 
to the disruptive nature of film as introduced in the preface to the thesis. 
Having established my philosophical approach to this thesis in place of a 
traditional ‘methodology’ in the previous chapter, in this chapter I turn my 
attention to introducing the key concepts with which the thesis will engage. I 
will consider and explain the way in which I am thinking about my film in a 
philosophical context, and why I draw so heavily upon the philosophical 
works of Cavell. In this thesis, I look beyond traditionally accepted 
frameworks, as described in the previous chapter, and instead, I ask the 
question, as posed by Lederman and Lederman (2015, p. 593): ‘Why is your 
approach…feasible’? Thus, I turn to Cavell to synthesise my thinking on 
accounting, translation, and voice that has emerged from my work with 
young deaf people. That is to say, Cavell’s philosophy, or rather specific 
aspects of his philosophical writing on these concepts, provides a lens 
through which I am looking at my film.  
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Cavell has written extensively on film, and his publications on film and 
philosophy have been described as significant events in the history of film 
studies (Rothman and Keane, 1997). I introduce my key concepts and 
produce a reading of my own film against Cavell’s ideas, mirroring the way in 
which he reads philosophy against film in Cities of Words (Cavell, 2005a), 
and in Contesting Tears (Cavell, 1996). In his writing on film, Cavell, as an 
‘ordinary language philosopher’ (to which I return later), as Rothman and 
Keane (1997) explain, seeks to use common everyday words and language 
to allow a clear understanding to be reached. By appealing to ‘what we 
ordinarily say and mean’ (ibid., p.5), he draws our attention to differences in 
language of which we had not been previously aware and makes them 
understandable. He does something similar in The World Viewed (Cavell, 
1979), where he outlines the differences between photography and film from 
a philosophical perspective. 
This turn to Cavell may seem unusual in a thesis that sets its context in 
deafness, for he has little to say on deafness itself apart from (as I have 
already mentioned) his own hearing problems sustained as a result of a road 
traffic accident in childhood, and a brief reference to Beethoven’s deafness in 
a discussion on ‘What is it to hear music?’ (Cavell, 1994, p. 116). However, 
Cavell has written at length on the concepts of accounting, translation, and 
voice, through his reading of the Transcendentalist philosophers Ralph 
Waldo Emerson and Henry David Thoreau. These are concepts that are of 
direct relevance to the claims I shall make in this thesis. In the next three 
major sections of this chapter, I shall take each of these notions in turn. This 
will provide a close reading of Cavell’s work on these issues, which will afford 
a greater clarity and understanding to the reading of my own film in chapter 







3.2 Cavell’s life experiences reflected in his writing on ‘voice’ 
 
The concepts of ‘voice’ and film are central to this project. The first chapter of 
this thesis has already alluded to the challenging issues relating to young 
deaf people and ‘voice’. In this section, I turn to ‘voice’ not in these empirical 
terms where voice is understood thinly as expressing opinion, but to try and 
reach an understanding of ‘voice’ in philosophical terms. This is a richer 
conception of voice that Cavell’s philosophy affords.   
The rich breadth of Cavell’s understanding of voice cannot be overstated. His 
concept of voice is complex and not to be understood as one solitary idea. 
This is especially so when one comes to understanding the origins of his 
interest in voice, and how that is evidenced in what he goes on to write. In 
his authoritative study, Hearing Things, which addresses voice and method 
in Cavell’s writing, Timothy Gould (1998, p. xv) describes Cavell’s notion of 
voice as ‘epitomizing an entire region of questions about the means by which 
human beings express themselves and the depth of our need for such 
expression’. As such, Cavell explores voice not only in film, but in areas such 
as opera, poetry, Shakespeare, and the Transcendentalist movement. Gould 
goes on to identify three pathways by which voice comes in Cavell’s writing: 
 1. The voice is a condition of human expression and meaning to 
      be recovered from its philosophical neglect. 
 2. The voice is a way of conceiving the medium and the goal of  
      the philosophical method of appealing to ordinary language. 
 3. The sound of Cavell’s voice as a writer is an inescapable 
      feature of his presence in his work (Gould, 1998, p. xv). 
 
In this study, there is not the space to analyse these three routes in detail, 
indeed that could become a thesis in its own right. Instead, I use them to 
illustrate the importance of voice to Cavell, as an individual, and to his 
philosophy. I will, nonetheless, refer to each of these routes in applying 
Cavell’s philosophy to my work on young deaf people and film. In this 
section, I will draw upon Cavell’s writing about voice and film in order to 
move the understanding of ‘voice’, particularly in the context of young deaf 
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people, beyond that of circle time, student councils, and student surveys 
(Standish, 2004).  
For Cavell, ‘voice’ was important, and he acknowledged the repression of his 
own voice at a time when analytical philosophy was dominant. In doing 
philosophy through autobiography, Cavell felt shunned by a discipline 
(particularly his analytic contemporaries) who did not accept his approach 
and indeed, did not recognise his work as philosophy. In reaction to this, 
Cavell makes the claim that there are elements in philosophy that serve to 
suppress voice. Philosophy, he argues, makes claim to speak for all of 
humanity, which he describes as ‘its systematic arrogation of voice; its 
arrogant assumption of the right to speak for others’ (Cavell, 1994, pp. vii-
viii). In his writing about Cavell’s understanding of voice, expression, and 
experience, Ramaekers (2010, p. 59) concludes that ‘owning a voice, is 
‘having an expressed existence’. Cavell’s own life experiences are indeed 
key to his philosophy, and are reflected in what he wrote about voice and the 
importance of voice. He wrote of philosophy in relation to the voice, about 
‘the tone of voice and about my (his) right to take that tone.’ (Cavell, 1994, p. 
3).  
I also draw on Cavell’s engagement with Hollywood film and his writing 
(which reflects his own life experiences), to further explore this discussion of 
voice, which I will later develop in relation to young deaf people. In particular, 
I am concerned with Cavell’s reading of two of the four films he calls ‘The 
Melodramas of the Unknown Woman’ (Cavell, 1996, p. 3)25: Gaslight (1944) 
and Stella Dallas (1937). What he writes about these films reflects the 
repression and recovery (or reclaiming) of voice he experienced in his own 
life. Cavell explores the arrogation of ‘voice’ (that we are authorised to 
speak), the repression and the recovery of ‘voice’ through writing about film. 
Cavell describes ‘the ecstasy in finding and presenting a voice’ (p. 16), which 
I argue is of direct relevance to the reading of my own film, and the 
experiences of the young deaf people in the making of that film. In what 
 
25 The four films identified by Cavell as the genre of the unknown woman include: Letter from 
an Unknown Woman (Dir. Max Ophul, 1948), Gaslight (Dir. George Cukor, 1944), Now, 
Voyager (Dir. Irving Rapper, 1942) and Stella Dallas (Dir. King Vidor, 1937).     
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follows, I look in detail at these notions of voice being lost and subsequently 
recovered. 
In Contesting Tears: The Hollywood Melodrama of the Unknown Woman 
(1996), Cavell looks to film through the Hollywood melodramas of the 1930s 
and 1940s, to explore ideas of finding the self through the finding of one’s 
voice. In these films, Cavell identified a number of unifying ‘features’ (p. 4). 
The first of these features is that the films highlight two distinct periods of the 
female lead’s life. As Cavell writes, we see them in ‘a state of innocence, and 
a state of experience, years apart’ (Cavell, 2005a, p. 234). This common 
feature involves a woman’s search for a kind of education, which Cavell 
refers to as ‘her demand for an education’ (p. 13), not a formal one but an 
education into culture, that she achieves in finding herself through her own 
voice. The institution of marriage is central in the melodramas. The leading 
women are in search of a voice (and/or education) through marriage. The 
leading men, on the other hand, take on the role of life-coach to their wives, 
seeming to enrich their lives, guiding them towards something better that 
might be described in terms of a conversion. What transpires however, is the 
suppression of the wives’ voices through various means, followed by a 
transformation akin to the recovery of the women’s voices. In both these 
films, there is a kind of ‘vampirism; one life the sapping of another’s’ (Cavell, 
1996, p. 69) enacted by the husbands, leading to a sort of ‘decreation’ 
Fulford, 2009. p. 229) and inexpressiveness in the wives.26  Fulford goes on 
to refer to this action of taking away voice as ‘ventriloquism’ (ibid., p.229). In 
the recovery of voice however, the husbands are eventually rejected, and the 
marriage ends. Fulford (2009) describes the women in these films as being 
characterised by their ‘isolation and unknownness to the man [her husband]’ 
(p. 229), which leads to what Cavell describes as ‘the negation of marriage 
itself’ (Cavell, 1996, p. 6). This negation stems from ‘the negation of 
conversation’ (ibid., p.6) within the marriage and the denial of the women to 
have their voice heard, both beyond and within the marital relationship. For 
 
26 I do not infer here that there is a ‘vampirism’ that is happening to young deaf people in 
schools. Rather, I am using what Cavell has written about voice in film to illustrate the 




Cavell, the negation of marriage in the melodramas serves as, ‘a route to 
creation, to a new or original integrity’ (p. 6) which marks the recovery of 
voice. I use examples from two films from this genre to illustrate my 
arguments – Gaslight, and Stella Dallas. I will give an in-depth reading of 
Gaslight and Stella Dallas, moving between the two films to elicit common 
themes in relation to Cavell’s conception of ‘voice’. 
 
3.2.1 Reading Gaslight and Stella Dallas 
 
Gaslight (directed by George Cukor,1944, starring Ingrid Bergman and 
Charles Boyer) is emphatically concerned with the repression of voice 
(Fulford, 2009). In the opening scene of the film, we see a young woman, 
Paula, being led out of her dead aunt’s house in London. The events then 
move on ten years to several scenes that take place in Italy and it is in the 
first of these scenes that we see the importance of voice to this film. It starts 
with Paula using her voice. Paula is in the middle of a rather unsatisfactory 
singing lesson, accompanied on the piano by her husband to be (although at 
this point, they are not yet engaged), Gregory Anton. This man, we later 
learn, is in fact called Sergis Bauer and is her late aunt’s murderer. Guardi, 
the singing teacher is adversely comparing Paula’s voice to that of her aunt’s 
(Alice Alquist), a famous opera singer. Despairingly, and perhaps 
prophetically, Paula declares “I haven’t the voice, have I?”. The stage is set. 
Paula recognises that she has neither her aunt’s remarkable operatic voice, 
nor a satisfactory one of her own. She must set out in search of her voice. 
This, following the conventions of plot that Cavell identifies in the 
melodramas, occurs through marriage. Just two weeks after this scene, 
following a whirlwind romance, she marries Gregory Anton.  
In Stella Dallas, (directed by King Vidor, 1937, with Barbara Stanwyck and 
John Boles) we are immediately presented with Stella, the lead, as a young 
woman with a yearning for an education. This yearning for self-improvement 
sets her aside from her family. Even her brother (Charlie) says of her, 
“Taking a business course to improve herself. None of us are good enough 
for her anymore”. There is no presentiment here that Stella is heading for the 
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coercive controlling relationship endured by Paula. Indeed, she stands up to 
her bully of a father, and as Standish (2004) puts it, ‘gives as good as she 
gets’ (p. 96). The denial, or repression, of her voice though, will come later 
through her isolation; her ‘unknownness’ as Cavell (1996, p. 197) describes 
it. At first, we see that Stella is driven to better herself and the route she 
takes is through marriage. She becomes aware of Stephen Dallas, the 
eligible bachelor and owner of the factory where her brother works through 
reading a newspaper article. Setting her sights on him, she conspires to 
meet him at the factory by pretending to bring to the factory a packed lunch 
for her brother. Stella and Stephen end up sharing the lunch, and so begins 
a brief romance which results very soon in their marriage, causing much 
consternation to her family stuck in the dreary mill-town. Throughout these 
early stages of the relationship, Stella is constantly using language that 
heightens the importance of education and voice, “I wanna be like all the 
people you’ve been around. Educated, you know and speaking nice”. She 
longs to be accepted amongst high society, a group she refers to as ‘The 
Swells’, “I could learn to talk like you and act like you”, she says in 
acknowledgement of Stephen’s natural ease in this group. And so, Stella’s 
scene is set. Through education (not a formal education, but one more akin 
to a kind of induction into a culture), Stella sets out to find a voice that will be 
heard in a society (or community) that she little understands yet yearns to be 
a part of. Having established the importance of voice, or the lack thereof in 
both films, I turn now to the suppression of Stella and Paula’s voices before 
their eventual recovery that is characteristic of Cavell’s reading of the 
melodramas. 
In Gaslight, from the arrival of Gregory and Paula at Paula’s aunt’s house in 
London, where the married couple settle despite Paula’s unease, the 
repression of Paula’s voice builds with dramatic tension. At their arrival, 
Paula finds a letter from Sergis Bauer, addressed to her aunt, just two days 
before her murder. Gregory snatches the letter from her. From then on, 
Gregory seeks to destroy Paula’s confidence in her memory. Paula must not 
be allowed to make the connection between Sergis Bauer and Gregory 
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Anton. ‘In this melodrama the woman is meant to be decreated27, tortured 
out of her mind altogether’, writes Cavell (1996, p. 49). First of all, Gregory 
suggests that all her aunt’s furnishings and belongings, those things that hold 
memories of her aunt, are locked away in the attic, giving Gregory (who is 
actually Alice Alquist’s murderer) the chance to search for Alice’s jewels he 
craves. “No, no, Paula. Don’t look back. You’ve got to forget everything that 
happened here”, commands Gregory to reinforce the decreation of Paula’s 
past and present. Then on a trip together to the Tower of London, Gregory 
seeks further to destabilise Paula by pretending to put a cameo brooch into 
Paula’s bag. At one point, Paula realises that the brooch is not in her bag but 
assumes that the fault is hers. Earlier, Gregory has already suggested to her, 
“You have been forgetful recently”. Later, he asks her for the brooch, 
knowing full well that she has never had it and she replies, “Suddenly, I am 
beginning not to trust my memory at all”.  
Cavell (ibid. p. 51) refers to this manipulation of Paula’s memory as a 
‘process of controlled amentia’ that is intended ‘to render the woman of 
Gaslight stupid’. Indeed, Paula increasingly fails to understand what we the 
audience experience as obvious, that he is trying to persuade her of her own 
insanity (ibid., p. 51). Gregory regularly leaves the house in the evening, only 
to secretly re-enter the house through another route to gain access to the 
attic where he can continue his search for Paula’s aunt’s jewels. In doing so, 
he turns on the gaslight which reduces the gas pressure throughout the 
house, making it dim and flicker in Paula’s bedroom. How can Paula fail to 
make the connection between her husband’s leaving the house and the 
dimming of the gaslight and the sounds of footsteps in the attic above? Yet, 
we do not dismiss this as ‘self-stupefying [or] ordinary stupidity’ (ibid., p. 51). 
We understand that she has been driven by Gregory to a point of knowing 
and not knowing that renders her voice without meaning. 
Significantly, Paula is repeatedly shown standing alone in her bedroom 
under the fluctuating glow of the gaslight. There is also a metaphor here, the 
dimming of the gaslight is connected to the German word Geist, meaning 
 
27 I do not imply here, that there is any sense of ‘decreation’ of young deaf people in schools. 
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spirit or mind, and so Paula’s spirit is dimmed. These scenes emphasise her 
increasing isolation; an isolation that is controlled by Gregory both in and out 
of the home.  
In the home, Gregory has a relationship with the flirtatious maid, Nancy. This 
relationship undermines Paula’s standing as mistress of the house to the 
point where when Paula gives instruction to Nancy to light the fire, Nancy 
replies impudently, “He already told me that!”, rendering Paula’s voice 
ineffective; she has no voice in the household community. Paula is also 
denied access to the outside community as Gregory repeatedly contrives to 
thwart visitors from seeing Paula, whilst at the same time convincing Paula 
that it was actually her decision not to see them. Even when the couple 
venture out into society, Gregory ensures that the venture fails, and that the 
responsibility is Paula’s. One evening Paula and Gregory are invited to a 
concert at the home of Lord and Lady Dalroy, friends of the late Alice Alquist. 
At the opening of this scene, we see Paula at her brightest and strongest. As 
Cavell writes, the scene ‘gives a vivid picture of Paula in command of her 
faculties’ (ibid. p. 54). Recalling childhood memories with Lady Dalroy, she 
confidently shows that her memory is, in fact, intact. It is at this point, where 
Paula is behaving like the woman she might have been, that Gregory strikes 
a critical blow. Pulling out an empty watch chain from his pocket, he declares 
that his watch has gone. Paula suddenly looks anxious as Gregory looks at 
her accusingly and takes her bag, where he ‘finds’ the missing watch. In a 
public fall from grace, Paula breaks down, despite shouting, “I swear I didn’t 
put it there!”, and they leave the party. This scene is one of a sequence in 
which Paula is increasingly deemed to be insane and her voice goes 
unheard, or is at best considered unreliable. 
In Stella Dallas, having established earlier that Stella sets out to find her 
voice in a society she little understands, the film presents us with scene after 
scene of Stella’s disastrous attempts, and ultimate failure, to find her place in 
that community. Indeed, in his reading of the film, Cavell refers to Stella 
Dallas as ‘the most harrowing’ (Cavell, 1996, p. 200) of the melodramas and 
describes ‘the distress of witnessing over and over the events depicted in 
this film’ (ibid., p. 200). From the very beginning, Stella defies expectations. 
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Immediately after the birth of Stella and Stephen’s daughter, Laurel, Stella 
refuses to take rest at home and instead, despite Stephen’s reticence, heads 
out into society to a dinner at the River Club. Here, Stephen’s disapproval of 
Stella’s behaviour and her lack of society manners are evident as she 
contrives to befriend Ed Munn, a vulgar, loud-speaking man with a penchant 
for racehorses and the company of women. Ed Munn stands in stark contrast 
to the impeccably dressed and well-mannered Stephen ‘whose rigorous self-
pity or disappointment, snatches at nourishment for itself’ (ibid., p. 201). 
Cracks in the marriage appear as Stella repeatedly fails to act and talk like 
the community of which she seeks to be part, despite Stephen’s guiding role. 
This is the beginning of her isolation (her unknownness).  
In one possible reading of Stella Dallas, Cavell goes on to describe how 
Stella is repeatedly confronted with ‘ironic misinterpretations…by the march 
of respectable figures through her life’ (Cavell, 1996, p. 201), including her 
husband. She appears to have a total lack of self-awareness and seems 
oblivious to the regards of others (I will argue that this is not so, but rather 
constitutes an expression of her authentic voice). The schoolteachers on the 
train show disdain for Stella, declaring that, “women like that shouldn’t be 
allowed to have children”: as she misbehaves and laughs loudly, oblivious to 
the reactions of those around her. The residents and their teenage children 
at the fashionable resort hotel treat her with scorn and derision for the way 
she dresses and portrays herself in public, seemingly unaware of the 
“Christmas tree” look she has adopted. The cracks in the marriage grow 
wider and she loses Stephen to the sophisticated and wealthy Mrs Morrison. 
The marriage ends in divorce and Stella is seen to make the ultimate 
sacrifice when she gives up the most precious thing in her life, her daughter 
Laurel, to Stephen and Mrs Morrison. She turns and walks away from that 
part of society that has rejected and isolated her, just as Laurel marries into 
the establishment.  
Whilst these distressing events indisputably happen in the film, Cavell offers 
a more nuanced reading of the film which belies ‘Stella’s self-oblivion…her 
“pathetic inadequacy”’ (ibid., p. 206). Take, for example, the attention to 
fashion and clothing in the film. As Standish (2004, p. 98) argues, ‘the plot in 
60 
 
part turns on Stella’s reading of the codes that operate here’. The 
unquestioning reaction to Stella dressing like a “Christmas tree” would be to 
argue that she has no fashion sense or any notion of how to dress 
appropriately. However, this goes against the careful attention she pays to 
clothes throughout the film. Even Mrs Morrison, whose taste is beyond 
question, acknowledges Stella’s advanced tailoring skills and taste as she 
unpacks Laurel’s suitcase. Stella herself acknowledges that whilst Stephen 
may correct the way she speaks, she will not listen to him when it comes 
matters of dress. That Stella chooses to dress the way she does, argues 
Cavell, confirms that ‘Stella is capable of, and gifted for, theater’ (1996, p. 
204). Her performance, he argues, is a strategy; part of a plan, not for 
herself, but for Laurel. It is a plan that comes to fruition at the end of the film. 
Indeed we, the audience, are called to acknowledge her accomplishment 
and to listen to Stella’s voice (Standish, 2004). As Mrs Morrison reads 
Stella’s letter confirming that Laurel is to stay with her and Stephen, she asks 
“Laurel is here, who has accomplished this?” and “couldn’t you read between 
those pitiful lines?”. Stella’s voice is recovered in a way which is profoundly 
ontological; it is related to her ‘self’ (ibid., 2004). 
In the final scene of Stella Dallas, we see Stella looking through a window, 
witnessing Laurel’s wedding. The window is rectangular and bright, 
surrounded by darkness, looking very much, writes Cavell (1996), like a 
cinema screen. It is as if, he argues, Stella has placed Laurel into the fantasy 
film world like the films she watched with Stephen earlier in the film, before 
their own marriage. Initially, we the audience watch this film within a film over 
Stella’s shoulder and then ‘as Stella walks towards us, her gaze, 
transforming itself, looms towards us’ (Cavell, 1996, p. 216); we witness 
Stella’s transformation. This is the moment of the recovery of her 
expressiveness, her voice. She is neither sad nor dejected by what she has 
seen, rather she turns and smiles, walking towards the (unknown?) future. 
‘Cavell sees this state of mind, so transformed from early infatuation, as the 
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completion of her education’ (Standish, 2004, p. 100).28 Cavell concludes 
that Stella ‘learns that the world of the screen, whose education in the world 
of refinement had at the beginning made her cry with longing, is not for her’ 
(Cavell, 1996, p. 211). Whilst ‘not for her’ may raise an ambiguity here, 
Cavell explains away the perception that Stella has lost out in this ending by 
arguing that Stella has accepted her own barring from the world (her 
isolation, unknownness, and unheard voice), but at the same time belongs to 
it through gifting it to her daughter. She begins by seeking a voice, 
demanding an education, to be seen in a film-like world with the ‘swells’ and 
walks out of the film to an undefined future. 
In his reading of the melodramas, Cavell maintains a focus on the repression 
of voice through to its eventual recovery. This is true of his reading of Paula’s 
experience in Gaslight. Having reached a stage where she has, according to 
Cavell, lost ‘the capacity to count, to make a difference’ (ibid. p. 58), Paula 
begins a journey of recovery of voice, supported by the detective, Mr 
Cameron. In Cities of Words (Cavell, 2005a, p.27), Cameron’s role here is 
described as that of ‘friend’ or ‘voice coach’.  Cameron’s suspicions about 
Gregory’s behaviour towards Paula are aroused when he witnesses one of 
Gregory’s ‘disappearing watch’ tricks. Cameron begins surveillance of 
Gregory and sees him leaving the house, only to regain entry via the attic 
from the house next door. Cameron then goes on to build his relationship, as 
voice coach, with Paula as he shows her the glove that was given to him by 
Paula’s aunt; it matches the single glove in the glass cabinet and completes 
the pair. From this, Paula sees Gregory for what he really is, and in a ‘voice 
lesson from the young detective’ (Cavell, 1996, p. 59) she is encouraged to 
use her own words to describe the horrors that have happened to her. 
Encouraged by Cameron, Paula hesitantly uses her voice, describing in her 
own words what Gregory has done. Having been ‘deprived of words, of her 
right to words, her own voice’ (ibid., p. 57), Paula is almost startled as she 
hears the beginnings of the recovery of her own voice. Cameron is 
 
28 That is not to say that her education is complete in a teleological sense, but that this part 




‘reintroducing her to language…returns her to her voice’ (ibid., p. 58), not in 
the controlling way that Gregory behaves, but in a therapeutic way that 
enables her to reclaim her own voice. Like Stella she experiences a 
transformation, but her education is still not complete. Rather Paula and 
Stella are ‘on their own individual journey towards recovering their ‘voice’, 
sense of self’ (Skea, 2019, p. 92). Paula, most strikingly, goes on to use this 
voice in her ‘aria of revenge’ (Cavell, 1996, p. 59) against her husband 
Gregory. In the final scenes in Gaslight, Gregory has been captured by 
Cameron and tied to a chair in the attic. Looking directly at her husband, 
Paula declares “I want to speak to my husband, I want to speak to him 
alone”. Reclaiming her voice here, her right to speak, Paula is reclaiming 
herself. The recovery of voice, for Paula, is physical and related to her 
capacity for reason. In a scene reminiscent of Macbeth, Paula holds a knife 
before her husband toying with the notion of madness. She mockingly takes 
on the role of the mad woman he has been projecting on to her for so long, 
as she asks the questions (providing her own answers): 
Are you suggesting that this is a knife? I do not see any knife. You 
must have dreamed you put it there…Are you mad, my husband? Or 
is it I who am mad? Yes, I am mad…If I were not mad, I could have 
helped you… but because I am mad, I hate you, and because I am 
mad, I betrayed you … and because I am mad, I am rejoicing in my 
heart without a shred of pity, with glory in my heart. 
 
The tables have turned; it is her cogito ergo sum (ibid., p. 60), the reclaiming 
of her reason. Her ‘cogito’ (ibid., p. 60), her existence through the awareness 
of herself, through the speech act, is established. It is established, but not 
complete, for like Stella, this represents a transformation to the next stage. In 
the scene on the balcony, there is a conversation about the fog (which has 
been an ever-present feature of the film) which is beginning to clear. As 
Paula herself acknowledges, “this will be a long night”, meaning that there is 
still some way to go. In this sense then, the Cavellian understanding of the 
denial and recovery of voice is perfectionist rather than perfectible29, leading 
to some level of self-reliance. The next section of this chapter picks up on 
these notions of perfectionism and self-reliance being inextricably tied to the 
 
29 ‘Perfectionist’ here referring to a never-ending process to which I refer later. 
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notion of one’s sense of self, drawing on Cavell’s interpretation of the works 
of Ralph Waldo Emerson in relation to these two melodramas. 
 
3.2.2 Emersonian moral perfectionism and self-reliance 
 
In this section, I investigate Cavell’s interpretation of Ralph Waldo Emerson’s 
moral perfectionism and self-reliance in order to cast light on how the young 
deaf boys might come to see their own selves through the making of the film, 
and the dialogue that this creates with the viewer of the film. 
Born in Boston (USA), in 1803, Emerson was a founding member of the 
Transcendentalist movement; a movement which advocated a way of 
thinking about Nature and self-culture. The son of a Unitarian minister, he too 
was ordained and became a pastor but over a period of time, he began to 
struggle to uphold some of the tenets of Unitarianism, particularly that of the 
sacrament of the Last Supper (Tanner, 1995). In 1832, Emerson resigned 
from his position as a minister in the Unitarian church, instead focussing on 
and writing about Transcendentalism and its belief that people are at their 
best when they are truly self-reliant. Self-reliance, argues Standish (2004, p. 
101), ‘depends upon a subtle reading of the tensions between the 
independence implied in [Emerson’s] “Insist on yourself: never imitate 
(Emerson, 1982, p. 199)”’, and the question of how and through what we 
must find ourselves. In Cavell’s reading of the melodramas, this finding of the 
self is seen as a form of resistance to conformity or compliance, enacted 
through a perfectionist education with ‘Self-reliance as its aversion’ 
(Emerson, 1995, p. 26). In Cities of Words (2005a), Cavell focusses on 
Emerson’s essay ‘Self-Reliance’ (Emerson, 1995, p. 23), and in particular on 
the notions of ‘conformity’ and ‘aversion’ in relation to society. Fulford (2009) 
argues that Cavell sees Emerson’s essay as a rejection of conformity in 
favour of self-reliance. Cavell (2005a) suggests that aversion is turning away 
from a society which calls for conformity and argues that when society calls 
for us to conform, we must decide whether to obey or instead find the self-
reliance to turn way. In other words, it falls upon the self to make that most 
fundamental philosophical decision about how we choose to lead our lives. 
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However, this reliance on the self is not to be misinterpreted as individualism, 
rather it is the position of the individual in relation to society, to the ‘other’. 
Returning then to the melodramas, both Stella and Paula are forced into 
positions where they must decide whether to conform or to find the self-
reliance to turn away; Paula turns away from Gregory’s controlling demands, 
and Stella turns away from the demands of high society. In both these 
instances, self-reliance is presented as an example of the activation of one’s 
voice. In my film too, there are moments where the boys demonstrate self-
reliance and show an understanding of self-reliance. This is clear when 
Hashim says, “Okay, what’s different about me, is that I’ve got quite a strong 
personality, and I aren’t afraid, I aren’t of just telling people what I think” 
(13.40 mins). As viewers, we hear Hashim’s voice very clearly here. We 
understand his standpoint and begin to reach an understanding of him. A 
dialogue is established.  
In Cities of Words (2005a), Cavell argues against the received wisdom that 
Stella’s story is one of self-sacrifice, and that, in walking away at the end of 
the film, Stella is in fact walking towards self-reliance. Stella, he argues, has 
discovered that the society she sought to be part of is ‘not to her own taste’ 
(p. 278). He describes an Emersonian perfectionist image of Stella not in 
mourning for all that she appears to have lost (belonging, her marriage, her 
daughter et cetera), but in ecstasy for a new beginning. Stella, writes Cavell 
in Contesting Tears (1996), ‘has the right not to share their tastes, that she is 
free to leave’ (p. 217). That this transformation is perfectionist is important to 
Cavell. There is an imperfectability that is reminiscent of Emerson’s essay, 
‘Circles’ (Emerson, 1995, p. 146). In this essay, Emerson describes the life of 
a man as a ‘self-evolving circle, which, from a ring…rushes on all sides 
outwards towards new and larger circles, and that without end’ (ibid., p. 147). 
There is no final reading and no virtue which is final. Perfectionism here 
refers to a non-finite process whereby we seek to continually perfect 
ourselves rather than reach a state which is perfect. As Cavell, (1990, p. 9) 
writes in Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome, one is ‘on a path to one’s 
unattained self. I will call it the next self…’ There are ends but no final end. 
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The philosopher too is positioned as an endless seeker of truth, virtue and 
understanding. 
For Cavell, ‘the constant factor between the genres is that the women of the 
melodramas are also to be understood in terms of moral perfectionism’ 
(Cavell, 2005, p. 108) in that the female lead ‘seeks her unattained but 
attainable self otherwise than in marriage’ (ibid., p. 108). Having sought 
marriage at the beginning of the film Gaslight, losing and reclaiming her 
voice (indeed her self), Paula concludes: “Then there was from the beginning 
nothing”. There is a realisation that it is not through marriage that she exists, 
as she declares to Gregory in the final scenes, “Now I exist because now I 
speak for myself”, and she is free to move on to the next part of her life. 
There is a realisation of other possible selves. In the film made with the 
young deaf boys, there are also moments where the two boys show an 
understanding of other possible selves. This is particularly evident when they 
talk about their past, their present, and their possible futures. 
The making of the film with the boys (from a marginalised group) has allowed 
them to show themselves to the viewer, to have their voices heard, and to 
establish a dialogue with the viewer. Voice on film is powerful, and the boys 
have had the opportunity to talk about their possible selves, and to 
demonstrate self-reliance. In Cavellian philosophical terms then, the link 
between the recovery of voice and the finding of the self is clear and firmly 
established in the context of his writing on film. I return to his writing on film 
later in the thesis. Before this, however, I wish to take up Cavell’s invitation in 
Cities of Words (2005a), to visit ‘a still further philosophical location…’ (p. 
114). That is to say, I wish to turn from voice in philosophical terms to the 
speech act itself through Cavell’s philosophical reinterpretation of John 
Austin’s work on language. I wrote earlier that Paula recovers her voice in 
the speech act that constitutes her ‘aria’ (Cavell, 1996, p. 60) of revenge. 
Here, she deliberately chooses what to assert and the language she uses, in 
order to be taken seriously. If this is the case, then in giving the deaf boys a 
voice (through the expression of language) in film, I must pay attention to 
language and the speech act itself, and in doing so turn once again to Cavell 
and his work on language which is central to his philosophy.  
66 
 
3.2.3 Distinguishing between performative and passionate utterances 
 
A performative utterance is an offer of participation in the order of 
law…A passionate utterance is an invitation to improvisation in the 
disorders of desire (Cavell, 2005b, p. 19). 
 
In this part of the thesis I will look at the importance and power of the act of 
speech as expressed by Cavell, as an ordinary language philosopher, in his 
re-evaluation of Austin’s work on the ‘performative utterance’. In this re-
evaluation, Cavell takes Austin’s notion of ‘performative utterance’ and 
develops his own ideas of ‘passionate utterance’. In what follows, I will 
explore these philosophical studies of language and I will argue that there is 
an element of Cavell’s ‘passionate utterance’ that is of particular pertinence 
to my research. In doing so, I am especially concerned with the implications 
this has for the young deaf boys in making the film. 
It is not my intention in this section to provide an in-depth study of Austin’s 
theory of ‘performative utterance’, taken from How to Do Things with Words 
(1976) and Cavell’s chapter on ‘performative and passionate utterance’, as it 
appears in chapter seven of Philosophy the Day After Tomorrow (2005b). 
This has been done by distinguished scholars such as Munday (2009) and 
Standish (2004). Rather what I wish to argue, is that Cavell’s critique (or 
extension) of Austin’s writing is twofold. Firstly, Cavell argues that Austin 
gives insufficient attention to the emotional aspects of language. Secondly, 
that it does not sufficiently consider what words do and that it is ‘skittish’ 
(Cavell, 2005b, p. 156) in its treatment of passion, is significant to the words 
used by the boys in the film, and to which I will pay attention in my 
philosophical reading of the film.  
It is important to note here that what follows in this section may read like an 
exercise in linguistic analysis; it is not Cavell’s intention. Cavell is an ordinary 
language philosopher, wanting to reclaim ordinary (everyday) language for 
philosophy, and considering how that impacts on our understanding of the 
world. In The Claim of Reason, Cavell (1999a) refers to Wittgenstein’s notion 
of bringing back words from their metaphysical to their ordinary uses. 
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Rothman and Keane (1997) describe Cavell’s writing as ‘the language of the 
self’ (p. 15). That is to say, Cavell turns to himself and his own experience, 
and calls upon the reader to turn to themselves. The language of the self is 
(paradoxically) how we voice our ideas; it is not private but shared. As a 
common language, ‘the language of the self is the language of others’ (ibid., 
p. 15), and so is key to how we are in the world and how we relate to others. 
In Must We Mean What We Say? (2015), Cavell writes that he is less 
concerned with the linguistics/mechanics of ‘how we know what we say and 
mean’ (p. xviii), and more concerned with what our words say about ‘our 
relation to the world, and others, and myself’ (ibid., p. xviii). What he 
suggests is ‘understanding the philosophical appeal to the 
ordinary…uncovering the necessary conditions of the shared world’ (ibid., p. 
xix). In engaging with Austin’s How to Do Things with Words (1976), Cavell 
pays close attention to the philosophical language Austin uses, and 
acknowledges that he is in profit from it. However, as Munday (2009, p. 57) 
points out, Cavell sees the passionate utterance ‘as a missed opportunity or 
failing in Austin’s theory’.  
Cavell starts with Austin’s binary distinction in the speech act between 
constative and performative utterances. Put simply, constative utterances are 
statements of fact that are verifiable, and fail if they are untrue, unverifiable, 
or unclear. Performative utterances, on the other hand, are concerned with 
the notion that to say something is to do something or that in saying 
something one is actually doing something. An example of the performative 
utterance includes, ‘I do…’ in the marriage ceremony. Performative 
utterances are neither true nor false; they are not nonsense, but there are 
accepted circumstances for the performance of the utterance to work. For 
example, at the marriage ceremony there must be two people to be married 
(and they must act in accordance with the utterances made following the 
event), there must also be a celebrant, witnesses, et cetera. For Austin, 
these are the conditions in which the performative utterance can be said to 
be ‘happy’ or ‘unhappy’, or in felicitous or infelicitous conditions. Having laid 
out the binary distinction, Cavell develops his argument. It is at this juncture, 
in the proposition of the ternary distinction that Cavell first takes issue with 
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Austin’s theory and writes that ‘what I called a crisis was the breakdown of 
the performative/constative distinction’ (Cavell, 2005b, p. 172). This ‘crisis’ 
points to a flaw in his argument that Austin himself recognises. As Munday 
(2009) explains, Austin takes as one example what appears to be a 
straightforward constative, the phrase ‘the cat is on the mat’. However, ‘the 
cat is on the mat’ implies that the speaker believes this to be the case 
whether the cat is or is not, in fact, on the mat. His binary distinction 
becomes blurred. 
Austin then introduces a threefold explanation to further describe the binary 
distinction between constative and performative statements. He introduces 
the locutionary act (the physical act of saying something meaningful), the 
illocutionary force (the speaker’s intent in producing an utterance. For 
example, promising or advising), and the perlocutionary effect (the effect of, 
or what is done by, the words spoken). It is here that Cavell then points to, 
‘what I [Cavell] think of as catastrophe in his [Austin’s] theory (Cavell, 2005b, 
p. 172). Austin claims that all performative utterances are both locutionary 
and illocutionary. That is to say, somebody has physically said something 
and there was intent in saying it. What Cavell accuses Austin of doing here is 
ruling out the perlocutionary effect of the performative utterance as 
‘irrelevant’ (p. 172). As Munday (2009, p. 65) puts it, ‘due to their 
“unconventional nature”, perlocutions fail to fit in neatly with his conception of 
a performative/illocutionary utterance’. It is from this interest in the 
unconventional nature of the performative utterance that Cavell proposes ‘to 
extend Austin’s theory of performative utterances to take account of what I 
[he] shall call passionate utterances’ (Cavell, 2005b, p. 179). 
In ‘extending’ Austin’s performative utterances, Cavell is not rejecting them. 
As he writes in the discussion of his own passionate utterances, ‘so my idea 
of a passionate utterance turns out to be a concern with performance after all’ 
(ibid., p. 187). Cavell, however, does not provide a clear and neat definition of 
‘passionate utterance’. Rather, he discusses the concept in terms that 
indicate that passionate utterances are a form of perlocution, but not the only 
form. He then goes on to give examples of passionate utterances. As 
Standish (2004, p. 94) explains, ‘Cavell mitigates any tendency towards the 
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‘subliming’ of rules by throwing emphasis on the location of rule-following 
practices in the hurly-burly of the form of life’. The examples he gives are not 
examples of what somebody might say in the ‘throes of passion’ or in a 
moment of heightened tension (although they might be). The first example he 
gives is, ‘I’m bored’ (Cavell, 2005b, p. 177). Passionate utterances then, can 
be everyday expressions in the context of ‘ordinary exchanges’, and it is in 
these exchanges that there is an ‘awareness of the individual, both as self 
and other’ (Munday, 2009, p. 60). The pertinence of Cavell’s passionate 
utterance lies here in relation to my argument. There is a demand for a 
response that is at the heart of Cavell’s passionate utterance. ‘I am not 
invoking a procedure’, writes Cavell, referring to the performative utterance 
as defined by Austin, but rather ‘I am inviting exchange’ (Cavell, 2005, p. 
181). And, this invitation to exchange might be denied. As Fulford and Skea 
(2019, p. 75) argue, ‘in passionate utterance, one is moved to put one’s 
relationship with the other, at risk’, and as Cavell writes, himself, ‘each 
instance of [the passionate utterance] directs, and risks, if not costs, blood’ 
Cavell, 2005, p. 187).  
It is this element of risk that makes a connection here between passionate 
utterance and the articulation of one’s own voice. In telling their stories 
through film, the young deaf boys are risking their relationship with the viewer 
and vice-versa. The film, and what the boys say (or sign) about their lives and 
deafness, demands a response from the viewer; this is where the passion is 
to be found. The language used by the boys in the film may not be complex, 
indeed it is common, everyday, ordinary language. However, the sentiments 
and passions embedded in what they express leave them exposed, and yet a 
response is demanded at the same time. The response here is one that is 
demanded of the viewer of the film. The risks are high, this is no invitation to 
orderliness but an invitation to possible disorder. It is even possible that ‘you 






3.2.4 Reflections on voice 
 
Thus far in this chapter, I have focused on the rich conception of ‘voice’ as 
lived by Cavell, and as demonstrated in his writing, particularly in his 
philosophical writing on film. The repression and recovery of voice, the right 
to have a voice, are nuanced notions that will come to bear on my 
understanding of my film. So too are the notions relating to finding oneself 
through voice and the speech act itself. I wrote earlier in this chapter that I 
am not concerned with voice in terms of ‘the student voice’, as used with 
students at all tiers of the educational system. Rather I am concerned with 
the voice of young deaf people, in terms of them having the right to express 
their voice, to give account, and claim that they have the right to be heard. In 
the next chapter, I focus on the complexities of the Cavellian conception of 
‘account’ and its implications for my research. 
 




In this section, what I shall argue for my film is that it disrupts an easy 
understanding of what it means for a young deaf person to tell their story. 
Thus far, I have made my case for using Cavell’s philosophy in order to 
illustrate how his writing on repression and recovery of voice – the finding of 
the self through voice, and the power and demands of the speech act itself – 
are of relevance to my research with young deaf people. As I described in 
chapter 1 of this thesis, the ability to tell one’s story and, to give account is 
key to the understanding of self-identity and culture in the D/deaf world. As a 
development of this, I now turn my attention to the notion of ‘account’ and 
bring philosophical thinking and writing to bear on this issue. That is to say, I 
will develop the notion of the importance of giving voice, in order to be able 
to account for richer philosophical notions of accounting: giving account, 






Of particular relevance to my argument is Cavell’s reading of the work of a 
second (the first being Emerson) nineteenth century Transcendentalist 
philosopher and writer, Henry David Thoreau. In considering ‘account’, I 
draw upon the work of Thoreau, and Cavell’s thoughts on his seminal work, 
Walden (Thoreau, 1854/2014). I have to acknowledge here that what I am 
doing may seem strange. The approach I take may appear to be quite radical 
in terms of bringing together the work of a nineteenth century 
Transcendentalist philosopher, Cavell’s reading of his work, and the stories 
of deaf children. However, it is precisely what these philosophers have 
experienced, in giving account and telling their own stories through their 
philosophical writing, that illustrates the reading of my film as a disruption to 
that easy understanding of what it is for a young deaf person to tell their 
story. 
Not only must I draw attention to the original approach I take in making 
reference to Cavell’s The Senses of Walden (1992), a book about Thoreau’s 
Walden, and applying these concepts to my own writing, but I will provide an 
explanation of the complexities of layering that this entails for the reader. 
There is good reason to be cautious in writing like this (Standish, 2016), for 
as Cavell poses the question himself in the opening line of the preface of The 
Senses of Walden, ‘What hope is there in a book about a book?’ (Cavell, 
1992). As Standish (2006, p. 145) points out, many texts about another text 
often amount to nothing more than ‘eulogies to pet thinkers’. However, there 
is something else at play here. In considering Walden, Cavell is also thinking 
about his book about Walden, and this is where the difficulty lies. We are 
forced to consider layers of things. One can take Walden, simply as an 
account, Thoreau’s (rather long and boring in Cavell’s words) story of two 
years spent in the woods; except it is not only that. It is about his story, his 
account, but it is also about him calling himself to account, calling his 
American readers to account. Then, in another layer, there is Cavell writing 
about Thoreau on accounting, linked with his own project of finding his voice 
and telling his own story. That is to say, in reading and writing about Walden, 
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Cavell is called to account in terms of his own positioning in philosophy, and 
also in terms of what language can do. 
As I focused on the experiences of young deaf people in the first chapter, it is 
appropriate here to focus on the life experiences of both Cavell and Thoreau, 
and to draw upon parallels between the life experiences of both writers that 
are of significance to their thinking in giving their own accounts. It is 
important to begin with Thoreau, not only in order to comprehend the context 
within which he was writing, but why his writing became of such importance 
to Cavell. Furthermore, it will point to parallels in the life experiences of 
young deaf people in terms of the barriers they face in telling their own 
stories. To tell a story, however, is not to be taken at a simplistic level here. It 
is not just a matter of recounting a narrative of one’s life, as often happens in 
narrative research, but a giving of an account in such a way that one is 
accounting for oneself and what matters. This does more than a 
straightforward autobiography. 
I have already made reference to Thoreau’s prominence in the ‘circle of 
radical intellectuals called the “Transcendentalists,” for their belief in the 
higher ideas that “transcended” daily life’ (Walls, 2017, p. xiv).  Of 
significance here is the social activism and the defence of (N)nature30 that 
was fundamental to the behaviour of the group that put it at odds with 
contemporary society. In the conflict that characterised his relationship with 
society, ‘Thoreau often found his voice silenced and censored…In short, 
Thoreau struggled…to find a voice that could be heard despite the din of 
cynicism and the babble of convention’ (ibid., p. xxi). Like Cavell, all of 
Thoreau’s writings are, in some measure, autobiographical, and as such his 
work too represents his thinking in the context of his life-experiences. The 
echoes of Cavell’s own experiences can be heard all too clearly here.  
Even within the movement itself, Thoreau struggled to find his own writing 
style (his voice). Of pre-eminence in the early days of this group of 
intellectuals was Emerson, to whom Thoreau was a devoted friend, or as 
 
30 ‘Nature when it names a divine or holy essence…nature when the word is used…in a 
secular way’ (Wall, L. D., 2017, p. xxii). 
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Walls (2017, p. 82) puts it, ‘A Transcendental Apprentice’. Thoreau even 
spent a long period of time living with Emerson and his family, and it was in 
these circumstances, ‘under Emerson’s roof, that Thoreau consolidated 
himself as above all a writer’ (ibid., p. 122). This life-long relationship with 
Emerson, however, did not always run smoothly. So close was the 
relationship, that there were accusations from within the group that 
Thoreau’s writing could hardly be distinguished from Emerson’s own. 
Another member of the group, Ellery Channing, even went so far as to 
declare that, ‘Henry will never be a writer’ (ibid., p. 166). The accusation was 
that Thoreau had no original ideas, and that he did not have a voice of his 
own. This view that he was a mere parrot of Emerson led to him not being 
invited to lecture, in a form of censorship of his work. This censorship of 
Thoreau’s work was broader than this. In abandoning the Unitarian Church, 
the established church of the day, Thoreau was thought to be blasphemous, 
especially when writing and lecturing, with great sympathy, about the Hindu 
scripture, the Bhagavad Gita, which he held to be just as valid as any of the 
teachings of the Unitarian church. Such accusations however, left Thoreau 
undeterred. As Walls (2017, p. 302) writes, ‘the more Thoreau knew his own 
mind and spoke it aloud, the more the era’s outraged guardians of public 
morality sought to cut off his tongue’. It was then, precisely this criticism and 
censorship that led Thoreau from being a quiet, introspective thinker, to 
becoming an independent writer with the confidence to claim in Walden 
(Thoreau, 1854/2014, p. 6), ‘I have lived some thirty years on this planet, and 
I have yet to hear the first syllable of valuable advice from my peers’. In 
writing Walden then, Thoreau finds his voice, as did Cavell through 
philosophical autobiography. In a thought expressed by Thoreau that could 
equally be applied to Cavell, he writes, ‘if a man does not keep pace with his 
companions, perhaps it is because he hears a different drummer, (ibid., p. 
175). In stepping to the tune he hears, as Walls (2017, p. 243) explains, ‘the 
one project Thoreau completed at Walden Pond was, in effect, an essay on 
how to write’. 
For Cavell, the notions of finding one’s voice and giving account come out 
not only in The Senses of Walden (1992), but also in his book, A Pitch of 
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Philosophy (1994). In the latter, Cavell is giving account of the kind of 
philosophy he wants to do. It is a theoretical account of why autobiography is 
a proper way of doing philosophy. Autobiography is essentially the story of 
oneself, and if, as Cavell argues in Little Did I Know (Cavell, 2010), 
autobiography is philosophy, then the two cannot be separated. Arguing that 
the two things are interrelated, A Pitch of Philosophy becomes both an actual 
autobiography (telling his story), and an account of his own philosophical 
project. The context may be different, but the same can be said of Thoreau’s 
project. The telling of his story of the time spent at Walden cannot be 
separated from his Transcendentalist philosophy.  
It is clear that the repression of voice and the need to give account are 
common to the philosophy of Cavell and Thoreau. As such, there are 
implications in applying their philosophy to the deaf boys having their voices 
heard, as they give account through film. I return to this in my reading of the 
film. The vein in which I am writing is a rich and complex one. In order to 
unpick the concept of accounting, which is multi-layered, I shall separate out 
the concept into three notions that will make clear what Thoreau and Cavell 
can bring to bear in my thinking about my film. Firstly, I will focus on ‘giving 
account’, the story of what is going on in the two books. Secondly, I will turn 
to ‘being called to account’; the gauntlet thrown down by Thoreau, and 
Cavell’s response to this challenge. Thirdly, I will look at the ‘disruption of 
account’; the challenge from both writers. To achieve this, I turn now to a 










3.3.3 Giving account 
 
At face value, Thoreau’s book Walden (1854/2014) can be read as the 
account, written in the mid-nineteenth century, of one man’s sojourn over two 
years (condensed into one) in a cabin in the woods that he built himself, by 
Walden Pond. We read in great detail, of his day-to-day experiences as the 
seasons pass, and as he leads the simple life, close to nature. We read 
about the crops he planted, the animals he encountered, and the 
environment in which he had deliberately chosen to live. He sets out his 
intentions in the chapter of Walden titled, ‘Where I Lived and What I Lived 
For’:  
I went to the woods because I wished to live deliberately, to front only 
the essential facts of life, and see if I could not learn what it had to 
teach, and not, when I came to die, discover that I had not lived 
(Thoreau, 1854/2014, p.51). 
 
And yet, it is much more than this. Here, I focus on Cavell’s consideration of 
Thoreau’s work which adds another dimension to our understanding of 
Thoreau’s account of his time spent in the woods. Despite declaring that 
‘Walden sometimes seems an enormously long and boring book’ (Cavell, 
1992, p. 20), his own close reading of the text has indeed reached a great 
understanding of the book, in Thoreau’s own terms, which bears further 
discussion. Cavell understands that Thoreau’s work is not about the mastery 
of accounts, but that he is accounting for himself, his life, and for what 
America had become. 
In places, Thoreau presents the reader with excerpts from his financial 
accounts. Thoreau gives these detailed lists (down to the half cent), of his 
accounts for the building of his hut, ‘Two second-hand windows with glass, 
$2.42…Mantle-tree iron, $0.15’ (p. 28). He even closely itemises expenses 
on food for a period of eight months, ‘rice, $1,73-1/2…One watermelon, 
$0.02’ (Thoreau, 1854/2014, p. 33). Cavell understands that this is not a set 
of accounts for the economics of life, but an account of the economy of the 
self. In presenting the reader with these columns of accounts, Thoreau is 
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inviting the reader to be ‘the auditor, not only of this balance sheet but of his 
account as a whole’ (Standish, 2006, p. 147). 
From the very first page, Thoreau emphasises the importance of not only 
giving his own account, making no excuses for writing his own account in the 
first person, but also encouraging all writers to give a ‘simple and sincere 
account of his own life.’ (Thoreau, 1854/2014, p. 3). However, the language 
Thoreau is deliberately choosing to use here is not as straightforward as we 
think. It is unsettling. Thoreau is wrong-footing us, his readers. Throughout 
the first chapter of Walden, entitled ‘Economy’, it becomes clear that Thoreau 
is giving an account (noun) and accounting (verb) for his financial affairs on 
two levels, through the use of ‘puns and paradoxes’ (Cavell, 1992, p. 16). He 
is both writing an account, that is writing the story of his time spent in the 
woods, and giving account, meaning that he is accounting for the life he has 
led. In this chapter, the language that is used is that of economics, business, 
and accounting. Yet, he is not referring merely to the cost of building his 
cabin when he writes: 
My accounts, which I can swear to have kept faithfully, I have, indeed, 
never got audited, still less accepted, still less paid, and settled 
(Thoreau, 1854/2014, p. 11). 
 
In giving his own account, his own story of his experiment in living in the 
woods, Thoreau is holding his life to the light for others to inspect (audit) and 
judge, just as he wants others to do (an idea that I will develop when I 
discuss ‘calling to account’). Furthermore, as Standish (2006) argues, in 
writing Walden, Thoreau produces not just an account of the time he spent 
there, but similarly an account of himself, showing us at the same time what 
counts for him. For the deaf boys in my film, the process is not just telling 
their story or giving their account, for they too will lay bare what counts for 
them. In the film, they are very open and frank when talking about difficulties 
they have experienced in the past, what they think of their lives in the 





3.3.4 Calling to account 
 
Thoreau’s Walden (1854/2014) may be an account of his time spent at 
Walden Pond, but it is also a calling to account. It may appear to be a book 
about an individual, and it is indeed a very individualistic reading. It would be 
a mistake, however, to overemphasise ‘Thoreau’s hermit-like individualism’ 
(Standish, 2006, p. 147), for Thoreau is but a mile away from the town and 
receives regular visitors. He wants the townsfolk to bear witness to his 
experiment, so that it may serve as an example. Walden (1854/2014) can be 
read simply as an account of his experiment in living. However, to accept it 
on this level would be to miss the point. It is his story and an account of his 
financial affairs, whilst at the same time he is writing about the political 
context of his time. He is holding America and Americans themselves to 
account for their beliefs and values31. For as he wrote as an epigraph to the 
first edition of Walden, ‘I do not propose to write an ode to dejection, but to 
brag as lustily as the chanticleer in the morning, standing on his roost, if only 
to wake the neighbours up’. When he writes, ’if only to’ what he is really 
saying is, ‘in order to’; his act is deliberate here. Thoreau presents us with his 
experiment of living for us to consider, and he calls on others, at an individual 
and political level, to do the same. In a similar way, the boys in my film give 
an account of D/deafness that demands a response from the viewer in the 
manner of a passionate utterance. 
In his chapter on ‘Sounds’ in Walden, Thoreau gives us a rich description of 
the noises he can hear from his cabin, from the ‘rumbling of wagons over 
bridges’ (Thoreau, 1854/2014, p. 70) to the ‘braying of dogs’ (ibid., p.70), but 
in his reference to the sound of the chanticleer, the cock crowing, there is an 
unsettling meaning. As Cavell writes, ‘the purity of the Chanticleer’s 
prophecy is that he can speak only to waken and to warn’ (Cavell, 1992, p. 
39). Like the chanticleer, Thoreau is calling for America to awaken from its 
slumbers, and warning them of the problems presented by their politics. He 
is awakening America to the lack of their own cultural heritage, and is critical 
 
31 It is interesting to draw the parallel here, that Cavell was writing The Senses of Walden in 
1971, just as the Vietnam war was coming to an end, an era of political upheaval and 
national shame for America. 
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of the increasing industrialisation, epitomised in his disdain of the railroads 
and the felling of the New England Forests. Thoreau was witness to great 
change, and he was alerting the world, in particular America, to the demise 
of the old and the birth of the new. In this sense, Walden is a longer version 
of calling society to account as he presents it in ‘On the Duty of Civil 
Disobedience’ (Thoreau, 1854/2014), and his account of the night he spent 
in jail. He is not unlike the chanticleer himself, in crowing for the liberation he 
feels in exercising his powers through giving his account. As Thoreau is 
writing Walden, in 1854, the railway lines already pass directly by Walden 
Pond, and it is as if by building his cabin there, Thoreau wants ‘to confront 
the railroad as part of his reality’ (Walls, 2017, p. xvi). What he writes, and 
the language he uses too, is confrontational. There is something in the 
language Thoreau uses that is unusual. Each reckoning, writes Cavell, is a 
‘mark of honesty’ (Cavell, 1992, p. 30). The accounts are full, detailed, and 
nothing is left out. Cavell is deeply aware that this is not just a story; there is 
something else going on here, with the parodies acting as a device, and the 
language disrupting what we think of as ‘accounting’.32 The process of 
reading Walden (1854/2014) is then, a calling to account in itself, and what I 
shall argue for later in this thesis is what that might mean in relation to 
watching the film. 
 
3.3.5 Disruption of account 
 
In the second chapter of Walden, titled ‘Reading’, Thoreau introduces the 
concepts of what he calls the ‘mother tongue’ and the ‘father tongue’ 
(Thoreau, 1854/2014, p. 57). They are concepts mentioned only in one 
place, but Cavell focusses on them (particularly the father tongue) intently. 
What Thoreau is writing about here is reading and how we read things that 
are very familiar to us in a way that pays little attention to the language. 
However, in reading there are moments when we question what a word 
actually means or how we should take it as a reader. The experience stops 
 
32 I will return to this theme when I look at notions of translation in philosophical terms in the 
next section of this chapter. 
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us in our tracks and profoundly unsettles our familiar relationship to our 
words. This is illustrative of what Thoreau means by the ‘father tongue’. The 
‘mother tongue’ is that familiarity of language (that we learn at our mother’s 
knee), but the ‘father tongue’, argues Cavell (1992) without any sense of 
hierarchy or patriarchy, is precisely that moment when we have to decide 
what words mean. There is an interesting link here in terms of language 
acquisition. I wrote earlier about the difficulties young deaf learners 
experience in acquiring language as a development or progression through 
identifiable stages. What Cavell does here is to destabilise this notion that we 
simply progress from an easy use of language, to a more complex and 
articulate one. Rather, we experience the one language in two different 
ways. The two ‘tongues’ represent a duality in our relationship with language 
which Cavell expresses through the ‘mother’ and ‘father’ tongue. It might be 
that in my film, the language (signing) that the boys use may be more readily 
associated with the ‘mother tongue’. However, what I am arguing here is that 
whilst the ‘father tongue’ might normally be associated with reading the 
written word, it could equally be associated with the signed (BSL) word. The 
viewing of my film is a being called to account. There is a possibility of a 
father tongue experience.  
In Walden, Thoreau comments that, ‘books must be read as deliberately and 
as reservedly as they were written’ (Thoreau, 1854/2014, p. 15). In The 
Senses of Walden, Cavell considers the position of the reader of Walden and 
encourages us to read the book in a ‘high sense’ (Cavell, 1992, p. 5) which 
would require us to be open to the father tongue. To read the book in a ‘high 
sense’ is to be sensitive to it as a scripture, and to experience the ‘father 
tongue’. It demands of us that we read it in a certain way, or that we are 
sensitive to the transformatory possibilities of language, and it has the 
potential to disrupt our familiar (motherly) relationship to our words. Cavell 
explores the idea of reading and writing as presencing, ‘it is the ground upon 
which they [the reader and writer] will meet’ (ibid., p. 62). In one sense, the 
reader’s position is that of a stranger to the words. In another sense we are 
not, we know the words, yet we are outside their meaning. The reader is at 
‘bent arm’s length, and alone with the book’ (ibid., p. 62), alone with the 
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language in a state of translation. I go further here, in suggesting that a 
father tongue relationship with our words also entails being in a state of 
translation in relation to them, and the life they suggest for us. It is through 
this presencing that we are destabilised and forced into translation. In the 
experience of the father tongue, we are forced back onto our own words. We 
are obliged to decide for ourselves what Thoreau means in the language he 
uses in his account. Take for example, Thoreau’s account of hoeing, which 
he uses, as Cavell explains, as a metaphor for writing. Thoreau writes, ‘it will 
bear some iteration in the account, for there was no little iteration in the labor’ 
(Thoreau, 1854/2014, p. 89). Here, in talking of the repetitive nature of his 
work hoeing in the fields, he is also making reference to the repetitive nature 
of his revisiting what he has written. He then takes this metaphor a step 
further when he describes, ‘making invidious divisions with my hoe’ 
(Thoreau, 1854/2014, p. 89). Here, the use of the father tongue points to 
Cavell’s deduction that, ‘the writer’s power of definition of dividing, will be 
death to some, to others birth’ (Cavell, 1992, p. 22). Or, as Fulford (2016, p. 
526) further develops, ‘just as the hoe cuts into the soil, so writing is a kind of 
cutting; of ideas onto the page’. By turning the soil, Thoreau is exposing new 
earth to the air in the same way he exposes words to the reader in his 
writing.  
In a close reading (reading in a high sense) of Walden (1854/2014), the 
sensitive reader experiences the ‘father tongue’. The father tongue, ‘the 
noblest thoughts of man’ (ibid., p. 56) is, according to Thoreau, understood 
by very few scholars. Accounts written in the ‘father tongue’ must be read 
deliberately for a deeper understanding. By implication, he is pointing here to 
the need for his account to be read closely in order for it to be properly 
understood, highlighting that it might not be understood by all. This is exactly 
what Cavell does in Senses of Walden. And for Cavell, his experience of the 
‘father tongue’, an encounter with words, is likened to a scimitar with the sun 
shining on both its surfaces, ‘its sweet edge dividing you through the heart’ 
(Cavell, 1992, p. 17). The language Cavell is using here may appear as 
hyperbolic, but what he is trying to convey is that, sometimes, we have to 
decide what a word means to us and how we might be affected by it. For 
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Cavell, these are life-changing, visceral experiences. In the same way, I 
consider that in watching the film, we may have a father tongue experience 
that could be life-changing and visceral. 
The ‘father tongue’ disrupts our common understanding of words, it is not a 
new language which we are literally to translate, but one which we need to 
revisit and re-understand: acquiring the ‘father tongue’ necessitates 
discursive translation. Thoreau’s words are deliberate. Cavell comments that 
‘the “father tongue” is not a new lexicon or syntax at our disposal, but 
precisely a rededication’ (Cavell, 1992, p. 16). This is illustrated in Thoreau’s 
account of borrowing an axe from a neighbour. This is not simply about 
borrowing an axe for the building of his hut, that he returned ‘sharper than I 
received it’ (Thoreau, 1854/2014, p. 23), but about borrowing words. We can 
only use words that we borrow from our inheritance and return them sharper: 
this is what it means to be open to the father tongue. In the same way, it is 
my intention to return the word ‘deaf’ sharper to the community after 
watching the film. This relationship with the word is not fixed in time. It is in 
continuous translation, and ‘once in it, there seems no end; as soon as you 
have one word to cling to, it fractions or expands into others’ (Cavell, 1992, 
p. 13). As Thoreau’s words are deliberate, so are Cavell’s, and as Cavell 
himself implies, ‘a purpose of writing The Senses of Walden was to make 
Walden more difficult’ (Saito, 2007, p. 264). 
 
3.3.6 Reflections on understanding of account 
 
This Thoreauvian iteration of ‘account’, and Cavell’s reading of it, are of clear 
significance to the deaf boys in my film. In making the film, they too are 
giving account, calling the viewer to account, and disrupting our easy 
understanding of D/deafness. In reflecting on what I have written about 
‘account’ in relation to my film, I have a final consideration. In line with what 
Cavell has written about Emerson’s moral perfectionism as discussed earlier 
in this chapter, Thoreau’s account is also not to be seen as a final account. 
As he prepares to leave Walden Pond, Thoreau writes about the migrating 
buffalo, seeking pastures new in a different latitude. The giving of one 
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account prepares the ground for new accounts to come. On reflection on his 
time in Walden, he writes, ‘I left the woods for as good a reason as I went 
there. Perhaps it seemed to me that I had several more lives to live’ 
(Thoreau, 1854/2014, p. 175). In this sense, his notion of accounting is a 
series of beginnings. As I referred to earlier in this chapter, Cavell (1990, p. 
9) writes in Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome, that one is ‘on a path to 
one’s unattained self. I will call it the next self…’ There are ends but no final 
end. I wrote earlier about the risk involved both for the deaf boys in 
articulating their voice in film, and for the viewer in watching the film. I argue 
here that there is an equal, but slightly different risk, in giving one’s account 
in Thoreauvian terms. In giving account, the boys are exposed by what they 
express and the language they use. In the same way that the passionate 
utterance demands a response, their accounts hold others to account, 
putting the relationship between the boys and the viewer at even greater risk. 
It is perhaps possible that the viewer may see the film as a final account and 
not one ‘in a series of turning-points in the middle and midst of life’ (Standish, 
2018, p. 431). 
So far in this chapter, I have made my case for using Cavell’s philosophy in 
order to illustrate how his writing on the repression and recovery of voice, 
and the importance of accounting and giving account, have great bearing on 
my film making research with young deaf people. This is particularly so in the 
context that a good deal of his philosophy is embedded in film. My attention 
will return to these elements in reading my film. In the next section, however, 
I will focus my attention on ‘translation’. This is not in the empirical sense, as 
I discussed in the first chapter of this thesis, but in the philosophical sense of 
unsettlement or disruption. Again, I shall use Cavellian philosophy as a lens 
through which to look at translation in its philosophical sense, as a 
development of what I have said about the power of words to put us into a 
state of translation, in order to explain elements of the reading of the film 
later in the thesis. Of continued relevance to my argument is Cavell’s 
autobiographical philosophy, but also the work of the Japanese Cavellian 








In the first chapter of this thesis, I reached initial conclusions that point to 
concerns I have with narrative methodology in some empirical research. 
These are, I argued, specific to researching with young deaf people. One of 
these conclusions was that there are difficulties in translation, in a literal and 
empirical sense, which may affect one’s ability to reach any ‘truth’ (if that can 
indeed be claimed to be the aim) in the research, if what the respondents are 
saying has to be firstly translated by a BSL interpreter, and then reinterpreted 
by the researcher. There is a double distance that does not necessarily occur 
when researching with other groups. In Cavellian terms, the respondents are 
very much at ‘bent arm’s length’ to the research. In this part of the thesis, 
however, I turn from a conventional understanding of translation (as in 
translating from one language to another), to the idea of ‘translation as a 
philosophical and educational theme’ (Standish and Saito, 2017, p. 1) that is 
especially pertinent to Cavell’s philosophy. In this section, I develop what I 
have written about the power of words (through Thoreau and Cavell) to put 
us into a state of translation that is disruptive and unsettling. I then turn to the 
potential of film to both philosophically disrupt, and to educate, in a way that 
is central to my aims in making a film with young deaf people. 
 
3.4.2 What is meant by ‘translation’? 
 
It is important to take some time here to consider what is meant by the word 
‘translation’ in this section. It is not used, as I have stated, in the ordinary 
sense of simply translating from one language into another, though even this 
is not always easily settled. Take, for instance, the French word ‘flâner’, for 
which there is no direct English translation. It refers to the act of wandering 
around a city for no specific destination or purpose, but simply for the 
pleasure of it, and experiencing the atmosphere. Rather, what is meant by 
’translation’ here in this chapter, is the state we experience in relation to 
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language, as Thoreau demonstrates when he uses the word, ‘account’, as I 
described in the previous section. Indeed, there is a strong link between the 
‘father tongue’ and the concept of ‘translation’ as I use it in this section. 
Being ‘put into translation’ can be expressed as a metaphor for experiencing 
the ‘father tongue’. What I am introducing here is not an entirely new concept 
but a progression of the same idea. We are thrown by meaning in language 
in a way that disrupts us. There is an unsettledness in the state of 
‘translation’, and unsettledness is imbued in this concept. As Naoko Saito 
(2016) writes, by re-reading Henry David Thoreau’s Walden, Cavell shows 
us that:  
Translation is not simply a matter involving two different language 
systems but rather that it permeates our lives as a matter of human 
transformation - a path from loss to rebirth (Saito, 2016. p. 436). 
 
The concept of translation, however, is of little interest to philosophy if it is 
simply a metaphor. Building upon this notion of ‘human transformation’ in the 
quote above, Standish and Saito (2017, p. 2) point out that there is a danger 
of translation becoming ‘a somewhat vague metaphor for transformation or 
change of one kind or another’. However, there is something much more 
important going on, and whilst acknowledging the relationship of the ‘father 
tongue to ‘translation’, I will also point to how they differ. The ‘father tongue’ 
is, I have explained, related to language. ‘Translation’, on the other hand is 
more ontological. Translation should be regarded here, as a ‘metonym of our 
lives’ (ibid., p. 2). That is to say, if language is an integral part of how a life is 
lived, then any change in meaning becomes a change in our lives. It is, as 
Standish and Saito argue, part of our education, and any ‘conception of 
education that was insensitive to this would…be significantly deficient’ (2017, 
p. 2). It is in this connection between translation and its potential to be 
educative that I wish to situate my film. Where there is the possibility of 
dynamic transformation, then philosophy as translation cannot be separated 
from education. Later in this section, I look at examples of film and its latent 
ability to educate through disruption and transformation. This will also come 
out in the reading of my film and make clear my intentions in making it. 
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3.4.3 Disruptive temporality in Cavell’s autobiography 
 
With regards to Cavell’s work too, this richer notion of translation as 
metonym can be applied. In referring to Thoreau writing about the volatility of 
words, in The Senses of Walden (1992, p. 27), Cavell picks up on the idea 
that ‘their truth is instantly translated’. Cavell is not simply ‘talking about 
interlingual translation as conventionally understood’ (Standish and Saito, 
2017, p. 3), for if that were so, the accusation of translation as metaphor, as I 
discussed earlier, could be equally argued. What Cavell achieves in writing 
about Walden is an acknowledgement of ‘the change from one form of one 
life to another’ (ibid., p. 3). In this sense then, this focus on the power of 
‘translation’ to affect how we live our lives describes an unsettledness and 
fluidity. If we accept that translation is metonymic of our lives, and is 
therefore more ontological, then it is important here to draw out something 
else that is distinctive about this conception that comes out in the work of 
both Thoreau and Cavell; translation is linked to the idea of change. For 
Thoreau, it is a sense of journeying without a final destination in mind. Even 
as he reflects upon his departure from Walden Pond, he remarks that ‘I left 
the woods for as good a reason as I went there. Perhaps it seemed to me 
that I had several more lives to live’ (Thoreau, 1854/2014, p. 174). Here, 
Thoreau points to a way of living life that sees its expression in Emersonian 
moral perfectionism, in that there is never a final telos in our lives; we reach 
one destination but there is always another place to go. For Cavell too, there 
is a constant sense of departure (not at homeness) in his autobiography that 
he presents in a manner which unsettles the reader. 
To consider here Cavell’s autobiography, his account of how he lived his life, 
I turn now to Cavell’s autobiographical book, Little Did I Know (2010). It is 
worthy of note that whilst I acknowledge that I may appear to be moving to 
and fro between Cavell’s books rather haphazardly, it is deliberate and 
intentional. Cavell’s works are not linear. They do not focus on one or two 
concepts with a sense of ending at the concluding chapter, and then picking 
up on a new concept in the next book. Rather, he revisits concepts, refers to 
previous writing, and questions his life and the way he has lived it, in a way 
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that is disturbing to the reader. In Little did I Know, Cavell presents us with 
reflections on his own education in thinking about disruption. It is a form of 
translation through recollection. Like Thoreau’s Walden, it destabilises the 
reader by not simply giving a straightforward account of his life. Rather, he 
takes an unusual approach to autobiography as philosophy, for he claims 
that philosophy is an abstraction of autobiography. For Cavell, philosophy is 
reflected and intertwined with autobiography, and he asserts his right to write 
in this manner. In ‘Part 1’, echoing Thoreau’s use of metaphor, he refers 
back to Walden, comparing his understanding of autobiography as 
philosophy to Thoreau’s reusing the timber of an old shed to build his own 
cabin. In writing about another of his own books, A Pitch of Philosophy 
(Cavell, 1994, p. 2), he writes, ‘I have sought explicitly to consider why 
philosophy, of a certain ambition, tends perpetually to intersect the 
philosophical’. Here, as in Thoreau’s work, the language is deliberate and 
explicit. Cavell is fully aware of criticisms of the language he uses in his 
writing, that he, ‘cultivated too much complexity’ (ibid., p. 14), but he makes 
no apology for it. Rather, it is his intention to challenge and to disrupt the 
reader. 
In a ‘traditional’ autobiography, the writer might start at the beginning (birth), 
and in a chronological order, bring the reader up to a point nearer the 
present (that has already passed). In Cavell’s autobiography, he further 
disrupts the reader by having two timelines running through the book in order 
to ‘keep separate the two necessary temporal registers in a narrative’ (ibid., 
p. 60), that is to say, the time the events happened, and the time he is writing 
about them. In Cavell’s autobiography, the chronology is disrupted; things 
that ought to come at the beginning do not. He annotates and dates the 
times of writing in his autobiography, yet within each section the reader is not 
presented with a sequential account of his life, but one which jumps, without 
explanation, back and forth in time and place. On pages 10 and 11 for 
example, under the heading ‘July 6, 2003’, he begins by telling the story of 
meeting a toothless man in his father’s shop in Sacramento, jumps forward 
to his return from Berkeley to Harvard to defend his PhD, and then back to 
the Jewish diaspora of the 1940s. It is as if ‘the present self and the past self, 
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childhood and adulthood, call upon each other’ (Saito, 2017, p. 163). This 
makes for a deliberately uncertain reading of the text, and one which is not 
fixed in time. This is not an easy account to read, as Cavell takes what he 
describes as ‘Freud’s detours on the path to death’ (Cavell, 2010, p. 60).  
It is my intention that the unsettling effect of this deviation from the 
chronological can be experienced in watching my film, in which temporality is 
not linear. This is deliberate both in the editing, and in the way in which the 
boys give their accounts. In the next section I will apply the philosophical 
understanding of translation I have described, and further develop the notion 
of disruption as education in order to address the educative potential of film. 
 
3.4.4 An education of disruption and translation through film 
 
In beginning to think about film as disruption and as education, I look to the 
esteemed Japanese Cavellian scholar, Naoko Saito, who has written 
extensively on philosophy as translation in the context of film. Saito (2016) 
writes that, ‘film… will serve as a medium to rethink the intersection of 
culture, language and human transformation’ (p. 436). In this section of the 
thesis, I explore the possibilities for disruption and translation (in terms used 
by Cavell and Thoreau), which are made available through viewing film, in 
the process of film making, and considering the implications for my own film.  
In her treatment of Terrence Malick’s film The Tree of Life33, Saito (2017) 
draws upon Cavell’s Little Did I Know to investigate the process of unsettling 
that Cavell refers to, and that appears also in the film. It should be noted 
here that Malick was one of Cavell’s students, and that is not without 
significance in terms of the experience of watching his films. The Tree of Life 
is a narrative film about a middle-aged character, Jack O’Brien. Jack looks 
back over his life, focussing in particular on the impact of the untimely death 
of one of his younger brothers in childhood. The account of his life is given in 
a series of flashbacks. The narrative, however, is not presented in a linear 
 
33 The Tree of Life (2011, directed by Terrence Malick) is an American experimental drama 
film, starring Brad Pitt and Sean Penn. 
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fashion, with the story jumping back and forth in time. This, as Saito writes, 
creates a story where ‘the identity of this narrator is disrupted, discontinuous 
and unstable’ (ibid., p. 165), placing the viewer into a state of translation. We 
are challenged in our understanding of time. The film, like Cavell’s 
autobiography as philosophy, challenges us to look at our present self 
through our past self in a way that is unsettling and unfinished. For Cavell, 
writes Saito, ‘philosophy in part involves a recovery and reappraisal of the 
past, not to make some kind of final statement’ (ibid., p. 161). Nor is there 
any final statement in the film: instead, we see the adult Jack pass through 
an archway into some unspecified time (the future?). The potential for film to 
be disruptive and unsettling is clear here: it disturbs not only our sense of 
narrative, in terms of how the story is told to a viewer, but it also unsettles 
our own human relation to our ‘selves’. It brings into question what it means 
to give account of our ‘selves’, and our lives. 
Of further relevance to my argument here is Saito’s (2016) paper on Sofia 
Coppola’s film Lost in Translation34. This is a film about coming face to face 
with a different culture that mirrors my intentions to give an account of deaf 
culture through film. This film, set in Tokyo, is based on the premise of two 
Americans on a visit to Japan, Bob and Charlotte (accompanied by her 
husband, John), and their sense of alienation in a foreign culture. In her 
paper, Saito provides us with several ways of viewing the film. On one level, 
we see the protagonists literally Lost in Translation, as the services of an 
inadequate translator provides scenes of comic miscommunication, 
representing, ‘a Western caricature of Japanese culture and people’ (ibid., p. 
437). As Bob and Charlotte develop a relationship throughout the film, it 
could also be viewed as a love story, for which the setting is irrelevant, ‘if 
they do not learn from Japanese culture, what is the point of setting the 
scene in Tokyo?’ (ibid., p. 438).  
On another level, there is a much richer reading of the film, and Saito refers 
us back to Cavell and Thoreau’s emphasis on the responsibility of the reader 
to find meaning in the words and to situate that meaning within ourselves. 
 




Bob and Charlotte are indeed lost in the language and culture of Japan; they 
have a sense of loss which is destabilising. But, for transformation to occur, it 
is imperative that we lose ourselves. For, as Saito points out, ‘self-
possession requires dispossession’ (ibid., p. 440). In watching this play out, 
we the viewers, are forced into a position where we have to experience what 
is happening in the film, and so we too are destabilised and placed into 
translation. Then, as the film progresses and the relationship between 
Charlotte and Bob develops, there is a transformation: one that is 
experienced by the characters and the viewer. The characters come to 
accept themselves and each other, in an acknowledgement of their 
unfamiliar surroundings. We see this, for example when Bob announces that 
he is trying to organise a ‘prison-break’, and he and Charlotte go on a 
voyage of discovery that takes them beyond the confines of the hotel bar. In 
their conversation too, we hear transformation. Charlotte starts from not 
being sure what she is doing there, but is encouraged by Bob to know herself 
if she is not to be upset by the unknown. In the final scene, we see Bob and 
Charlotte kissing and separating. This is not to be read as a final 
transformation but is akin to Cavell’s interpretation of Stella Dallas having 
completed her education. As Saito writes, Bob and Charlotte have been in a 
state of ‘perfecting one’s own culture in encountering the other – to keep 
moving on (ibid., p. 442), and this has been the experience of the viewer. 
The educative and transformational possibilities of film to expose viewers to 
foreign culture, in my case deaf culture, are very powerful here, inviting the 
viewer to ‘the experiment of translation’ (ibid., p. 443). 
 
3.4.5 Reflections on philosophy as translation 
 
In this part of the chapter, I have considered a philosophical understanding of 
translation, in which, as Munday (2017, p. 89) explains, ‘English is translated 
into English’. I have described and made claim for its ability to disrupt and 
unsettle and pointed to how this might form part of our education. I have 
done this in the context of Cavell’s writing on language (as an ordinary 
language philosopher) in his autobiographical work, and in the context of 
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film. I have also begun to explore how this might be of significance to my 
reading of my own film. Cavell has never written explicitly about education, 
and certainly not about education as a notion of schooling. He has though, 
referenced his own education in detail, and has been ‘struck by the 
recurrence of education as a preoccupation in his writings’ (Standish and 
Saito, 2017, p. 3). In the next chapter of the thesis, I will look more intently at 
the claims Cavell makes for film, and then consider what significance this 








In this chapter, I will argue that for Cavell, what is ‘educative’ is perfectionist. 
In chapter 3 of this thesis, I introduced the concept of Emersonian moral 
perfectionism in relation to the recovery of voice in Cavell’s reading of the 
films he calls the ‘Melodramas of the Unknown Woman’. In this part of the 
thesis, the argument builds upon the concept of perfectionism to explain 
Cavell’s ‘education for grownups’, and argues that a Cavellian conception of 
education is one that is transformational. It is not my intention to focus on 
defining concepts of ‘education’, just as Cavell (1990) does not seek to 
define perfectionism or propose it as a theory of the moral life. Rather, I seek 
to demonstrate the ways in which Cavell exemplifies a perfectionist 
education that can be found in film. I will also refer to Cavell’s reading of 
another genre of Hollywood film that he calls the ‘Comedies of Remarriage’ 
(Cavell, 1996, p. 5), and the Cavellian notion of the ‘education of grownups’, 
to argue that the ‘educative’ in perfectionism demands change in our lives. 
Central to Cavell’s perfectionist education, developed from Thoreau’s idea of 
‘uncommon schooling’ (Thoreau, 1854/2014, p. 61), is the experience of 
‘crises’35 in our lives. These are experiences that demand a reappraisal of 
the self, through which we may gain self-knowledge. In this chapter, I will 
argue that there are unique qualities to film which can be presented as 
‘crises’, and which can be transformative in ways that we cannot anticipate. I 
will argue that film is more than ‘educational’, it is ‘educative’36. I will also 
contend that film makes a claim on us as part of that crisis. The chapter 
concludes that these philosophical educative potentialities of film can be 
applied to my film. The film is educative because the deaf boys have 
 
35 This is a use of the word ‘crises’ that is peculiar to Thoreau and Cavell that I will explain 
later in the chapter. 
 
36 I use the word ‘educative’ here, in terms of an education of the self. 
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confronted their own lives through signing (BSL) their experiences, and 
because the film has the power to transform the lives of the viewers. 
As Standish and Saito (2017) note, Cavell does not write extensively about 
formal educational institutions, or indeed formal education or schooling. 
Rather, his accounts are of his personal experiences at Harvard and 
Berkeley universities, and include several disparaging descriptions of 
incidents that happened to him at school (Cavell, 2010). However, Standish 
and Saito (2017) also point to the fact that Cavell has often remarked that he, 
himself, has been struck by education as a recurring preoccupation in his 
writings, and especially so in his writings about film. Cavell does not write as 
an educational theorist who wants to influence what happens in classrooms; 
as Saito (2012, p. 185) puts it, ‘the education that concerns Cavell cannot be 
translated immediately into classroom instruction – neither is this his 
intention’. ‘He is not concerned with ‘educational theory, yet all his work is 
concerned with a kind of education’ (Standish and Saito, 2012, p. 1). 
 
4.2 From ‘uncommon schools’ to the ‘education of grownups’ 
 
In this section of the chapter, I return to Cavell’s reading of Walden and focus 
specifically on the way in which Cavell picks up on Thoreau’s brief, almost 
passing, reference to something he calls ‘uncommon schools’. Not equating 
‘education’ with ‘schooling’, Cavell takes Thoreau’s idea and develops it and 
presents a much broader concept of education that is not (necessarily) linked 
to institutions at all. In Walden, Thoreau writes: 
We have a comparatively decent system of common schools for 
infants only; But…no schools for ourselves…it is time we had 
uncommon schools, that we did not leave off our education when we 
begin to be men and women. It is time that the villages were 
universities, with leisure…to pursue liberal studies the rest of their 
lives. Shall the world be confined to one Paris or Oxford for  
ever? (Thoreau, 1854/2014, p. 61). 
 
This sole reference to ‘uncommon schooling’ in Walden (1854/2014, p. 61) is 
taken up by Cavell in The Senses of Walden (1992), where he sees a 
connection between uncommon schooling and Emersonian perfectionism. It 
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is not a relationship that is seen in Thoreau’s work, but one that is strong in 
Cavell’s writing. What Cavell argues for is not some reductive form of life-
long learning, attending one course after another. What he argues for, is 
learning beyond institutions. Rather, as Standish (2006, p. 148) argues, 
‘Thoreau’s experiment enacts a possibility of living that is tantamount to a 
kind of lifelong learning’. It is the experiment of living, and not any form of 
educational institution or educational course, that is important here. Indeed, 
Cavell takes a stance that is almost in opposition to formal schooling. In Little 
Did I Know (2010), his disappointment with his own education is, at times, 
stark. He relates one example from school when, at the age of eleven, he is 
so immersed in reading Victor Hugo’s Les Misérables in the playground, that 
he fails to hear the bell that signals the end of lunchtime and is late in 
returning to class. As a result, he is admonished by the teacher, and when 
this happens a second time, he is told to leave his book at home. Later in 
Little Did I Know (2010), Cavell exemplifies his understanding of teaching 
and learning, in contrast to formal learning, through relating stories of 
learning ‘the poetry of pawnbroking’ (p.120) whilst working alongside his 
father in his pawnbroker’s shop, at the age of 14 or 15. 
 
So for Cavell, what is educative is not necessarily, and sometimes definitely 
not, related to notions of schooling. What he develops from Thoreau’s idea of 
uncommon schooling is a transformative idea of what is educative, and this 
he refers to as the ‘education of grownups’ (Cavell, 1999a, p.125). It is 
important not to be misled by Cavell’s use of the word ‘grownups’ here, for as 
Saito (2012) reflects: ‘Cavell’s thinking is not restricted to the education of 
adults – education for those who have already mastered the education of 
childhood in “common schools.” “Education is sadly neglected”, already in 
childhood, still in adulthood’ (p. 185). It is also important to note here 
however, that Cavell’s use of the word ‘grownup’ is deliberate. Standish and 
Saito (2012), in asking themselves what Cavell means by ‘grownup’, 
conclude that he specifically chooses the childish word ‘grownups’ to deflate 
any pomposity in the notion that because we have reached a certain age or 
size, our education is complete. In order to further explore and explain the 
idea of the ‘education of grownups’, in the following sections of this chapter, I 
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will break down the idea into two strands that will develop an understanding 
of what is educative, that I will then go on to apply to my film. The first of 
these strands is that the ‘education of grownups’ is a perfectionist idea of 
transformation of the self. The second strand is that the ‘education of 
grownups’ is a form of self-culture that Cavell achieves through 
autobiography. 
 
4.3 The ‘education of grownups’ as a perfectionist idea of transformation 
 
In The Claim of Reason (1999a) Cavell writes: 
At an early point in a life the normal body reaches its full strength and 
height. Why do we take it that because we must then put away 
childish things, we must put away the prospect of growth and the 
memory of childhood? The anxiety in teaching, in serious 
communication, is that I myself require education. And for grownups 
this is not a natural growth but change [author’s italics]. Conversion is 
a turning of our natural reactions; so it is symbolised as rebirth 
(1999a, p. 125). 
The words ‘conversion’ and ‘rebirth’37 that Cavell uses here, are key to 
understanding this strand of the ‘education of grownups’ as a perfectionist 
idea of the transformation of the self.38 As he writes in The Senses of Walden 
(1992, p. 60), ‘for the child to grow he requires family and familiarity, but for a 
grownup to grow he requires strangeness and transformation, i.e., birth?’ 
Cavell’s conceptualisation of the educative is not linear. Rather, ‘educative’ is 
perceived as a series of rebirths or conversions, but not in an otherworldly 
sense that transcends our everyday lives, and nor does it have an end goal. 
Saito (2012) talks of the education of grownups as a journey towards a state 
 
37 The religious connotations of the words ‘conversion’ and ‘rebirth’ are important for both 
Cavell and Thoreau. Indeed, at the end of the preface to The Senses of Walden (1992), 
Cavell quotes Martin Luther on baptism. In ‘conversion’, etymologically, there is a sense of 
turning (version - vertere) together (con) that suggests new beginnings. In ‘rebirth’, there is a 
relation to Christian baptism. Thoreau describes how he washes daily in the waters of 
Walden pond, which is akin to a baptism. Cavell (1992) takes up this idea and contrasts 
Christian baptism, as a once and for all act, with being baptised daily in words, ‘This is 
immersion not in the water but in the book of Walden (Cavell, 1992, p. 17).  
 
38 I use the word ‘idea’ purposefully here, for what Cavell proposes is not, for example, a 
Piagetian developmental ‘model’. The ends within perfectionism are not ends or a set of 




of being different; embracing otherness. In Conditions Handsome and 
Unhandsome, Cavell himself writes that a perfectionist idea of transformation 
is not about perfectibility or reaching some perfect self. Instead it should be 
seen as ‘a process of moving, to and from, nexts’ (1990, p. 12).  
Having established that, for Cavell, what is educative is transformational and 
can be experienced beyond school, I turn now to consider what experiences 
may trigger, or serve as catalysts for, these ‘rebirths’ or ‘conversions’. Here, 
Cavell returns to Walden (1854/2014), where Thoreau describes the notion 
of ‘crises’ in our lives that mark the possibilities for a transformation of the 
self. The word ‘crisis’ is not being used here as we would normally 
understand it today. It is not necessarily linked to any catastrophic or 
negative experience in our lives. The word ‘crisis’ is used by Thoreau, and 
subsequently Cavell, in a positive sense. They are experiences which make 
us re-evaluate ourselves, and ourselves in relation to others. Cavell observes 
that in Walden, birds often have prophesy in them. I have already made 
reference to the importance of the chanticleer. Here, Thoreau uses the 
metaphor of the moulting fowls to explain the notion of ‘crisis’. Thoreau 
writes, ‘Our moulting season, like that of the fowls, must be a crisis in our 
lives, also the snake casts its slough…’ (p. 14).39 This serves as a metaphor 
for the start of the perfectionist journey; one with no final destination. We 
each come across these crises in our lives, and in fact they are a necessity. 
They are not something that will happen only once in our lives. The crises 
are a moment when we have a choice, a moral dilemma as it were, as to 
whether we continue on the perfectionist journey or not. To experience crises 
may be unsettling, but it is precisely these crises that can lead to ‘rebirth’ or 
‘conversion’. These crises are transformative. 
In the next section of this chapter, to further explain Cavell’s understanding 
of what is meant by educative, I will describe and explain the second strand 
of the ‘education of grownups’ that refers to ‘self-culture’. This will then be 
connected to Cavell’s broader philosophical project in order to argue that film 
 
39 Whilst there is no notion of the catastrophic in the use of the word ‘crisis’, there is an 
element of vulnerability here in the use of this metaphor. As the snake is vulnerable to 
predators at the moment of shedding its skin, so are we exposed at the moment of crisis. 
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is transformational and educative, and that my own film has the potential to 
educate and transform. 
 
4.4 The ‘education of grownups’ as a form of ‘self-culture’ 
In the quote from The Claim of Reason (1999a) that starts section 4.3 of this 
chapter, Cavell acknowledges, as an adult, that he himself requires an 
education. In this section, I argue that, for Cavell, his own (grownup) 
education is achieved as a form of self-culture that he attains through 
autobiography. I will, later, extend this understanding of telling one’s story as 
being educative, to the experience of the boys in my film.  
In the previous chapter, I explained that Cavell argues that autobiography is 
a proper way of doing philosophy, and that the two are interrelated. To some, 
this may appear to be an absurd claim, but for Cavell, the two cannot be 
separated. Whilst there are two things at play here, autobiography and 
philosophy, I argue that I also need to introduce a third element in terms of 
what is ‘educative’. That is to say, in undertaking his philosophical project, 
which Cavell does autobiographically, there is the potential for transformation 
and self-culture. It has, therefore, the potential to be educative.  
This relationship that Cavell builds around autobiography, philosophy, and 
what is transformational is a complex one. In his reading of Cavell’s 
autobiographical works, Vincent Colapietro (2012, p. 124) argues that for 
Cavell, ‘philosophy is education for adults, in part, because it is a 
recollection, and a re-enactment of childhood’. Similarly, Espen Hammer 
(2002, p. 178), comments that ‘philosophy is best understood as an 
advanced [grownup] form of self-reflection’. Whilst I accept that both these 
appraisals of what is at stake in Cavell’s writing are reasonable, I think there 
is even more at stake here. To take part in self-reflection and recollection 
alone is not necessarily transformative or educative. In order for 
autobiographical philosophy to be potentially educative, there needs to be 
consideration of our experience of the human condition, and what we learn, 
in order to go beyond self-reflection into self-culture.  
97 
 
Cavell establishes philosophy (through autobiography) as education. In his 
writing, he considers the ordinary, the everyday, but in doing so he asks 
questions about teaching and learning. Again, this is not in the traditional 
context of schools and other educational institutions. For Cavell, learning 
never to accept an engagement ring as a deposit in his father’s pawn shop 
(Cavell, 2010) is perhaps of greater importance than that which can be 
taught in schools. As Standish and Saito (2012, p. 2) argue, ‘he is also 
preoccupied with what it is to teach and learn – with the kinds of 
transformation that these might imply and with the inseparability of these 
from what human life is’. What Cavell achieves here, is a disruption of what 
we understand philosophy to be, and this goes beyond what might simply 
appear to be a personal narrative. The three elements then, philosophy, 
autobiography, and transformation, constitute Cavell’s own perfectionist 
education. Later, I come to claim that if the education of grownups through 
the telling of one’s own story, through autobiography, is one iteration of self-
transformation, then the deaf boys’ telling of their stories on film is another. 
Whilst I have so far identified some markers of what a perfectionist education 
might be, such as notions of rebirth, conversion, self-culture, and reflections 
on society through philosophical autobiography and notions of 
transformation, Cavell provides no clear definition of perfectionism himself. In 
Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome (1990, p. 4) he writes, ‘a definition 
of what I mean by perfectionism, Emersonian or otherwise, is not in view in 
what follows. Not only have I no complete list of necessary and sufficient 
conditions for using the term, but I have no theory in which a definition of 
perfectionism would play a useful role’40. For Cavell, there is no closed list of 
features to perfectionism, but he does provide a long list of films, plays, 
books, et cetera which serve to exemplify what he understands perfectionism 
to be. In the next section of this chapter, I refer back to some of the films that 
Cavell claims exemplify his version of a perfectionist education, in order to 
develop an understanding of the distinction between the ‘educative’, rather 
than the ‘educational’, potentialities of film.  
 
40This, perhaps, is an example of what Mahon (2009, p. 748) refers to as the testing difficulty 
in Cavell’s writing that makes it resistant to ‘easy or uncontested paraphrase’.  
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4.5 Film as ‘educative’ rather than ‘educational’ 
That film can demonstrate and exemplify the qualities of a perfectionist 
education is important to my argument concerning the educative 
potentialities of film, and particularly in relation to my own film. In this section, 
I consider again Cavell’s reading of some of the films from the 1930s and 
1940s, in order to preface the educative potential that I argue exists when we 
are confronted with film, and I will then consider this with specific reference 
to my own film. The importance of film to Cavell’s philosophy cannot be 
denied. Re-claiming his belief in education beyond schooling in relation to 
film, in A Pitch of Philosophy (1994, p. 131), he writes, ‘when a few years 
ago I was asked how as a philosopher I became interested in film’ he replies 
that his education ‘had been more formed by going to the movies than by 
reading books’. I wrote in chapter 2 of the thesis about the importance of film 
to philosophy and about film doing philosophy. Cavell echoes this when he 
writes about the importance of philosophy to film and American culture. In 
Contesting Tears, Cavell writes that ‘film has the space, and the cultural 
pressure, to satisfy the craving for thought, the ambition of a talented culture 
to examine itself publicly’ (1996, p. 72). It is also important to note here, the 
potential for presenting reality that Cavell believes is within the power of film 
to expose. In The World Viewed (1979), he writes that in viewing a film, we 
are not merely seeing a projection, but we are experiencing what we see as 
a reality. After all, he writes, you cannot ‘tell me that I do not see myself in 
the mirror but merely see a mirror image of myself’ (p. 213). The 
potentialities for film are, for Cavell, not to be underestimated. It is with this in 
mind that I return to Cavell’s philosophical reading of films to explore the 
educative (the transformational) in film. The crisis and unsettlement in 
experiencing film is, I argue, educative. I do not mean ‘educational’41 here, in 
 
41 Whilst I have stated that I do not intend to define what we mean by ‘education’ in this 
chapter, the roots of the word might help my argument here, as this unsettling experience of 
the educative in film is close to the etymological origins of ‘educate’ from the Latin, educare, 
meaning to lead out or to experience a bringing forth. Educate (v.) mid-15c., educaten, 
“bring up (children), to train, “from Latin educatus, past participle of educare “bring up rear 
educate2 (source of Italian educare, Spanish educar, French éduquer), which is a 
frequentative of or otherwise related to educere “bring out, lead forth, from ex- “out” (see ex-) 
+ ducere “to lead,” from PIE root *deuk- to “lead.” (Online Etymology Dictionary). Skea 
(2019, p.124) describes this unsettling experience as ‘being led out of conformity and 
bringing forth a different way of accounting for oneself’. 
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the sense that the viewer of my film is gaining knowledge about deafness 
(although this may be an unintended outcome), but I use the term 
‘educative’, in the richer philosophical sense of unsettlement and the 
transformation of the self. 
In chapter 3, I wrote in detail about the female leads, Stella and Paula, 
pressing the question of a woman’s interest in knowledge and being led out 
of conformity, as in Cavell’s reading of Stella Dallas and Gaslight. This was 
done in order to explore Cavell’s ideas on the loss and recovery of voice that 
prevail in the ‘Melodramas of the Unknown Woman’. I argue that this also 
relates to the lack of voice experienced by the deaf boys in my film. Here, I 
do not intend to go into detail about any one film in particular, but I will refer 
to the films that Cavell defines as the ‘Comedies of Remarriage’42. This is 
another group of films, from the 1930s and 1940s, that make no claim to be 
philosophical, but for which Cavell makes philosophical claims. Cavell sees 
these films as having a common set of characteristics, but these features are 
different from those of the ‘melodramas’.  
The ‘Comedies of Remarriage’ commonly begin or climax with the 
threatened end of a marriage and the threat of an impending divorce. The 
thrust of the narrative is to reunite the pair through reconciliation – a form of 
remarriage. Whereas in the ‘melodramas’, Cavell sees incidents of a 
woman’s perfectionist education, for example, we see Stella at the end of 
Stella Dallas walking away from her old life to begin anew, the reading of the 
‘remarriages’ is different. Gibbs (2019, p. 85) argues that ‘the concept of 
remarriage, as a concept of moral philosophy, might usefully find a 
translation in the field of education, as re-education’. Neither group of films 
have philosophy or education as their theme; rather, they have in common 
the education of a woman brought on by a series of incidents (crises?) in her 
life. As Cavell writes, ‘the philosophical impulse in adults is characteristically 
 
42 The ‘comedies of remarriage’ include, It happened one night (Dir. Capra, F. 1934), The 
awful Truth (Dir. McCarey, L. 1937), Bringing up Baby (Dir. Hawks, H. 1938), His Girl Friday 
(Dir. Hawks, H. 1940), The Philadelphia Story (Dir. Cukor, G. 1940), The Lady Eve (Dir. 
Sturges, P. 1941), and Adam’s Rib (Dir. Cukor, G. 1949). 
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brought on by a crisis in one’s life’ (Cavell, 2008, p. 59). For Cavell then, film 
is both philosophical and educative.  
In Contesting Tears (1996), Cavell points to a contradiction between the 
education and creation sought in remarriage comedy, and the destructive 
decreation of Paula in the melodrama Gaslight. This is indeed a sharp 
contrast to what Gibbs (2019, p. 87) describes as ‘the ongoing dialogue 
between the marital pair’ that is essential to the comedies of remarriage. One 
might also point out the apparent contradiction of the negation of marriage in 
the melodramas, and the recreation of marriages in the remarriage 
comedies. However, the contradiction that Cavell points to in education is 
only in the context in which that education takes place. Inherent in both 
genres is the woman’s demand for an education, and this is imbued with 
Emersonian moral perfectionism. 
I have established that a perfectionist education can be seen in film, and I 
have written in chapter 3 about the power of film to unsettle, that is, to put the 
viewer into a state of translation. It would seem valid then, to argue the case 
that film can be part of the education of the viewer. The watching of the film 
might be described as a ‘crisis’, an experience that forces the viewer to re-
evaluate their understanding of, and relationship to deafness. Our 
encounters with film, as Munday (2017, p. 95) writes, ‘provide exemplary 
instances of cases of where this kind of translation or configuration may take 
place’. Indeed, I make this claim based my own experience of watching 
Terrence Malick’s film, The Tree of Life (2011), as I described in the preface 
to the thesis. Watching the film, I was jolted by the troubled relationship 
between Jack and his mother and father; this made me reconsider my own 
attitudes towards parenting. As Cavell writes in The World Viewed (1979, p. 
7), he establishes ‘a significant fact about movies: that there is always 
something to find, often enough to justify a hundred minutes of speculative 
solitude’. This was my experience of ‘crisis’ or unsettlement in watching the 
film. It was also a moment of translation; a father tongue moment. I was 
jolted by what I saw, this sent me into ‘speculative solitude’, and thus my 
ideas on parenting changed. The experience was, indeed, transformational.  
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There is also something else at stake here that relates to Cavell and 
Thoreau’s philosophy. In The Senses of Walden (1992), Cavell writes in 
considerable detail about Thoreau’s notions of the mother tongue and father 
tongue. The ‘mother tongue’, as I described in an earlier chapter, is the 
tongue that we learn at our mother’s knee. ‘This’, writes Standish (2006), ‘is 
our common schooling, our schooling into community’ (p. 150). However, as 
we become adults, we need to acquire the father tongue ‘we must be born 
again in order to speak’ (ibid., p. 150). Cavell argues that the father tongue 
has the potential to stop us in our tracks in relation to language. What I would 
argue for here, is that, in watching a film, one may experience a crisis that 
could be described as a father tongue experience in relation to both the 
visual stimulus, and what is being said (or signed) on screen. I am aware, 
however, that I need to exercise caution here, and remind myself that I am 
arguing for the educative ‘potentialities’ of film, and not educative 
‘certainties’. There was no intention in the making of my film to shock, or 
provoke a reaction from, the audience (although this might be yet another 
unintended outcome). Equally, there may be those viewers who have no 
reaction to the film at all, in which case, I return to the notion of the father 
tongue. Of the father tongue, Cavell writes, ‘let it speak for itself; and in a 
way that holds out its experience to us, allows us to experience it, and allows 
us to tell us all it knows’ (1992, p. 16). The experience of the father tongue 
then, is only probable to us, but in order to experience it, we must be open to 
it. Standish (2006) describes this experience as allowing yourself ‘to be 
struck [author’s italics] by something new’ (p. 152). Or, as Cavell explains, 
‘Like the writer of Walden [I am] not counting on being believed’ (ibid., p.19), 
the viewer may not be struck at all by my film. Perhaps, Vlieghe (2017, p.83) 
helps to summarise this element of my argument when he writes, ‘only 
beings that can begin anew at any time and that can be transformed 
profoundly without being fully determined by a fixed destiny are educable 
beings’. 
I turn now to Gibbs (2017b) to make a final distinction between what I see as 
the ‘educative’ in film rather than the ‘educational’. He argues that film in 
educational settings is used in two ways. Either it is used to exemplify other 
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ideas, or it is the focus of empirical and theoretical studies. That is to say, he 
sees the common function of film here, to be ‘educational’ in that it is 
pedagogically instructive. What is not seen often enough, he argues, is a 
consideration of how film can be used to be ‘educative’; that is to say, how 
film can teach its audience. He is not trying to say that the illustrative function 
of film as an ‘educational’ tool is without value. Rather, what he is arguing for 
is that where film is seen as ‘educative’, we may be able to ‘see meaning 
anew as it presents itself to our immediate experience’ (Gibbs, 2017b. p. 
688) of film. It is this emphasis on the idea of the educative potential of the 
experience of film that, I feel, supports my claim. Whilst seeing value in the 
‘educational’ in film, he draws upon Wittgenstein’s argument that by 
explaining the meaning of a film, we in fact set ourselves at a distance from 
the experience of film, and of the world. Our experience is stifled. What 
Gibbs (2017b) is arguing for is acceptance. We have to accept the reality of 
the world as presented in film before we go on to explain it. In this way, film 
is ‘educative’ in an experiential sense rather than an empirical one.  
It is at this point that I now turn to a ‘reading’ of the film that I made as part of 
this philosophical enquiry. I do not intend to write an empirical analysis or 
explanation of the film. I have not produced empirical data to support the 
viewer’s reaction, or otherwise, to the film. This is my philosophical project. 
To that end, I will write a philosophical discussion, supported by the works of 
Thoreau and Cavell, in order to come to a philosophical understanding of 
what it means to make and watch the film. 
 
4.6 Reflections on the educative potentialities of film 
 
In writing this chapter, I set out to argue that for Cavell, what is educative is  
perfectionist, and that a Cavellian conception of education is one that is 
transformational. In doing so, I make a claim for the educative potentialities, 
not certainties, of film, whilst accepting the reality of film as described by 
Cavell. I have also argued that a ‘receptiveness or openness’ (Standish, 
2006, p. 152) is required if we are to engage with that which is educative. In 
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watching film, we are educable in the sense of a Cavellian perfectionist 
education that is transformational. We experience crises in our lives that can 
lead to that transformation. I have argued that the experience of film has the 
potential to be an experience of crisis in our lives, which can similarly lead to 
transformation. I have also argued that there is something of philosophical 
importance, to the viewer, in the experience of film. A consideration of this 
experience will form the basis for the philosophical discussion of the film, that 



























Chapter 5. A ‘philosophical reading’ of the film, ‘What’s 




Throughout this thesis, I have made reference to a ‘philosophical reading’ of 
the film that is core to this project. In this chapter, I further reflect upon how 
we ‘do’ philosophy and come to the point where I explain what I mean by a 
‘philosophical reading’ in the specific context of this study, and I present it to 
the reader. As I intend to take a rather unusual (perhaps even challenging, to 
both reader and writer) approach to this exercise, in the first section of this 
chapter I present a rationale for the route I take. The second part of the 
chapter focuses on the ‘philosophical reading’ of the film, which takes the 
form of an imagined dialogue between Henry David Thoreau and Stanley 
Cavell after having watched the film. I end the chapter with my own 
reflections on the film that serve as a form of coda to the dialogue. Before 
proceeding, I wish to refer back to, and expand on, a quote from Richard 
Smith that I used in chapter 3, and ask of the reader to keep an open mind, 
for I am aware of no set ‘method’ for presenting a ‘philosophical reading’: 
 
In doing philosophy we need to be aware of the awkwardness of 
thinking in terms of having a ‘methodology’. Instead we might consider 
the different ways in which philosophy has been conceived in terms of 
contrasts: for example between the written and the spoken word 
(Smith, 2009, p. 437). 
 
5.2 A rationale 
 
Before embarking on an argument for the approach I take in this chapter, I 
need to make it clear why I am not taking the more traditional, empirical path 
that might be expected. At this stage in a typical empirical thesis, this chapter 
might have the heading ‘data analysis’ and present a detailed examination of 
the film. Such a methodological approach (presenting a thematic analysis) as 
I have described is not without value, and it might usefully provide insights 
into the lives of the boys, as participants, involved in the making of the film. 
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However, as I argued in chapter 2, I perceive that there are a number of 
challenges in using narrative methodology that are specific to carrying out 
research with young deaf people. More than this, I have questions that such 
an approach would not be appropriate, or even sufficient, to answer. 
Furthermore, in chapter 2, I established why a philosophical approach lends 
itself better and more appropriately to my investigation into the educative 
potential of film when looking at accounting, translation, and voice in the 
stories of young deaf people. And so, I turn once again to philosophy, in 
particular the philosophy of Thoreau and Cavell in order to ‘read’ the film. 
 
In the quote above, Smith (2009) draws a distinction between the written and 
the spoken word as conceptualisations of philosophy. He does so, not to 
create a division or to favour one approach to philosophy over the other, but 
rather to point to the potential of philosophy beyond ‘method’. He 
acknowledges a ‘systematic and edifying’ value in writing philosophy in 
‘producing a philosophical corpus or record of philosophical achievement’ 
(Smith, 2009, p.438), but also points to the possibilities of philosophy as 
dialogue. ‘Being dialogue’, he writes, ‘it has no discernible “method”: it goes 
where it goes’ (ibid., p.438); furthermore, I have already established my 
argument against philosophy being described as a ‘method’ in chapter 2. The 
dialogical approach that I am taking is not new and can be traced back 
through the history of philosophy to Socrates and Plato43. As such, I have 
chosen, in this chapter, to create a dialogue between Thoreau and Cavell, as 
philosophers, in reaction44 to watching my film.45 There are echoes here, of 
Cavell’s account of Plato’s The Republic, in which he talks of philosophy as 
response. In Cities of Words, Cavell writes, ‘philosophy’s first virtue, as it 
 
43 I refer here to the elenctic dialogues which portray the Socratic approach to questioning in 
dialogue to promote critical thinking (Apology, Gorgias, Hippias Minor, Ion, Laches, et 
cetera).  
 
44 I use the phrase ‘in reaction to’, carefully here. Throughout the thesis, my focus has been 
on the viewer’s experience of watching the film. It is not about what I think about the film, but 
the potential for unsettlement or disruption that give film its potential to be educative in the 
way that I have described in chapter 4.  
 
45 I acknowledge here, that this could never have happened in reality. It does, however, 
perform an important function in this thesis. 
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matters most to me, is responsiveness’ (Cavell, 2005a, p. 324). The 
philosophy here, will be the response to the dialogue. 
In writing this imagined dialogue, I am not using creativity for creativity’s 
sake. Rather, I am taking the philosophical rationale I have outlined above as 
an authentic way to bring life to the three key themes of the thesis, namely; 
accounting, translation, and voice. Nor do I intend to create some glib 
mimicry, putting words into the mouths of Thoreau and Cavell. Through a 
careful reading of their texts, I intend to be faithful to their philosophy and 
their words ‘as deliberately and reservedly as they were written’ (Cavell, 
1992, p. 15). This is, I feel, a process which is true to the Cavellian approach 
I take in this thesis. In what might be regarded as being a bold move, I am 
asking the reader to imagine that Thoreau and Cavell are in a world that, to 
all intents and purposes, is similar to the one in which this thesis is being 
read. I am asking the reader to imagine that Thoreau and Cavell, as 
philosophers, are alive now and have experienced, and are accepting many 
of the features of our world. The purpose is to imagine how Thoreau and 
Cavell would experience the film as a series of crises which demand a 
response. That is to say, in watching the film, there are experiences in the 
boys’ lives which they share, and to which they can respond philosophically. 
This imagined dialogue, in which Thoreau and Cavell are exposed to the film, 
is unique and authentic to the values that underpin my thesis, in turn 
enabling this ‘event’ to take place. 
In presenting a ‘philosophical reading’ of the film through this dialogue, I 
have the opportunity to speak to the key themes of the thesis in three ways. 
First, I am able to give a philosophical appraisal of the boys giving accounts 
of their own lives on film, and holding their accounts to the light. Indeed, the 
film itself will be held to account through the responses of Cavell and 
Thoreau. Furthermore, through philosophical dialogue, I am able to have 
Thoreau and Cavell call each other to account. Second, presenting the 
reading of the film in an unusual way makes demands upon, and challenges, 
the reader. Reading this dialogue is a ‘father tongue’ experience, in that ‘it 
[the dialogue] holds out its experience to us, allows us to experience it’ 
(Cavell, 1992, p.16), and in doing so disrupts the reader into a possible state 
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of translation. Third, there is voice in dialogue. The film gives voice to the 
boys, and subsequently, Thoreau and Cavell are similarly given voice 
through the dialogue. 
When he writes about readings of film in The World Viewed, Cavell (1979b, 
p. 9) acknowledges that ‘there is a problem about the idea of “reading a 
movie”’, in that he feels there is a lack of rigour compared with, for example, 
readings of poetry or books. In writing about his own reading of films, he 
proffers a seemingly contradictory conclusion which will shape some of the 
dialogue I write. Cavell explains, ‘I for the most part read only in fragments’ 
(ibid., p. xiv), but then concludes that what he goes on to write is actually ‘a 
fragmented reading of a whole film’ (ibid., p. xiv). This relates to the way in 
which, as viewers, we are struck by particular aspects of a film in different 
ways, and how they resonate with (different aspects of) our interests. This in 
part, leads to a fragmentary reading, but it also points to the ways in which 
film may be educative, given that it is unsettling and disruptive in the ways I 
described in the previous chapter. All of this suggests to me that any 
Cavellian reading of a film, like his autobiography, would not conform to any 
norms of temporality or linearity, and that this needs to be reflected in the 
structure of the dialogue.  
In the dialogue, I focus on Cavell and Thoreau’s philosophical voices rather 
than the way they speak. However, I attempt to present their patterns of 
speech in such a way that this does not detract from the philosophical 
content of the discussion. In terms of linguistic fidelity to the speakers, I draw 
on Thoreau’s writings as a reflection of his speech traits and style, 
particularly from Walden (1854/2014) and The Journal (2009). For Cavell, 
however, I am fortunate to have access to video recordings of him; one in an 
interview at Duke University, USA (2017), and another in discussion at the 
University of California (Berkeley), USA (2002). In addition, I have access to 
the transcript of Stanley Cavell in Conversation with Paul Standish (2012). It 
is in the conversation at Berkeley, however, that Cavell revealed to me as 
the writer of this thesis, the reason why the dialogue was the only way I could 
approach this philosophical reading of my own film. In conversation (2002), 
Cavell reminds us that his philosophical writing about film is specific to the 
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experience of the big screen in a specific time period. He does not know 
whether what he has written is readily transferrable to new technologies of 
both film making (anyone can make film now on a digital device) and of film 
viewing (more likely to be in a domestic setting, and perhaps alone, rather 
than the collective experience of the cinema). What this dialogue allows me 
to do, is to give Cavell the opportunity to look at the film I have made with the 
boys using modern technologies. It also gives him the chance to look at the 
film through his own philosophical lens while further testing his reading of 
Thoreau. Then, both Cavell and Thoreau are given the chance to explore 
whether their philosophical writing is transferrable to a technology which 
neither have experienced in their lives.  
In the following dialogue, Thoreau and Cavell have watched the film, ‘What is 
special about me?’ that forms part of this thesis. During the conversation, the 
two philosophers will make reference to specific parts of the film, which I will 
illustrate with subtitles from what the boys have said in the film. I feel that it is 
important that the voices of the boys are present in this way. The boys each 
speak for themselves, and they each transmit a different voice. I am not 
attempting to present a unified voice here, but it is clear in the film that there 
are shared experiences within the deaf community. The film and the dialogue 
both expose how the boys’ individual stories relate not only to their 
immediate circle of family and friends, but also to the deaf community and 
society at large. For both Cavell and Thoreau, one’s own story or account 
(one’s own voice even) can never be purely individualistic. It is always tied to 
community (I will say more on this in the next chapter), and so it is always a 
political voice. The boys’ voices are political in that they are tied to the 
communities to which they belong. At the end of the dialogue, I will provide 
some of my own reflections. Although I do not appear to take any part in the 
discussion, I feel it is important to note here, that my own voice is present in 
the arrangement and writing of the dialogue46. I do not wish to deny my own 
 
46 Regarding the guiding factors in the way I have presented the dialogue, I have selected 
points in the boys’ stories where there is both experiential (in terms of the boys’ lives), and 
philosophical convergence (in terms of Cavell and Thoreau); that is to say, where philosophy 
can speak to the boys’, Cavell’s, and Thoreau’s life experiences. 
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voice, but the focus of the dialogue is about the experience of the viewing of 
the film, rather than what I have done. 
 
5.3 The Dialogue 
(Cavell and Thoreau have just finished watching the film. There follows a 
contemplative silence which is broken by Thoreau). 
Thoreau: (Not taking his eyes off the screen) It feels to me Stanley, that in 
watching this film, I have observed something that matters. What I have 
witnessed here, in the midst of all these images, are accounts from these 
boys which speak to my imagination. There is mystery here for us to unravel, 
and truths which are not obvious. This experience has been incredible. What 
are we to make of this film, Stanley? 
 
Cavell: What you gotta understand about film, Henry is…er… I’m talking 
about the particular experience of a thing. Look at Walden…It was a surprise 
to me, to find that in Walden, every word mattered. When I yelped and got up 
from the desk from reading Walden, I felt like taking the pages from your 
book Henry, and going out onto the street, out onto the sidewalk and 
stopping strangers and saying ‘You realize how good this is?...This is some 
fantastic piece of work!...Who knew?’ It absolutely wiped me out… I thought 
it was the greatest thing. In the same way, everything matters in a film…I’ve 
never had any problem with thinking that everything matters in a film…it’s 
mother’s milk to me. 
 
Thoreau: (Leaning towards Cavell). It pleases me, Stanley, that my account 
did good service to you…and your own accounts… despite your remark that 
it sometimes seems an enormously long and boring book. When I wrote 
those pages, I was living alone in the woods. I did not set out to impose my 
business upon you as a reader, Stanley, I simply gave an account of my life 
as these young men have done in this film… And, there are many portions of 
their lives that apply to me…There are indeed many things that matter here. I 
require you, as a professor of philosophy, to tell me more of film, Stanley. 
 
Cavell: This an experience that’s kinda new to us both Henry. When I write 
about film, I’m talking about a big, big screen…the gigantism of the 
image…looking at this film…one can see smaller images now and still have 
experience of film…but there are so many intricacies involved that 
somebody’s gonna have to rewrite what I have written for each of these 
technologies. I don’t think that there’s anything a priori about how they 
110 
 
transfer to one another…but, but, here’s our chance to take a look, Henry! 
That I have thought about film is true. I don’t have an untarnished tale to tell 
about the relationship between film and philosophy…I’m…I’m very much still 
in the middle of being interested in that. In linking film as both trangent and 
permanent, is something that I find myself aware of a lot. The relation of 
blatancy and mystery in film, of presence and absence in film, of trangence 
and permanence in film…trangence of the images and eternal return of the 
images because of the nature of film strike me as, each of those, as 
characterizing philosophy. Some sense that film is a speculation has been on 
my mind for a long time… Another feature about… between philosophy and 
film, is that either of them can inspire endless talk or shut you up! 
 
Thoreau: (Leaning back) So then, Professor, let us talk…for as I wrote in 
Walden…it is admirable to profess! 
 
Cavell: (Coughing into a handkerchief) Apologies for the sniffles, Henry. 
Yeah, that’s a great idea, it’s a great thought, so let’s take our time. Let’s 
start with what you just said about giving account, there…I think that is the 
place to begin, let’s elaborate on that. What really struck me, watching this 
film, was the way these young guys were so determined to tell their stories; 
what their lives have been like, where they’re at right now, and what the 
future holds. I mean…and they’re deaf! We have both taken that path in our 
lives, have we not, in struggling to give account? Yours in the very greatest 
of masterpieces, Walden, that perfectly complete account…and me through 
my philosophical autobiography. Let’s go back to that moment in the film 
where Hashim talks about barriers… 
(Cavell leans forward and presses the button. He stops at the point (11.45 
mins.) where Hashim says…Frightened? No, I wouldn’t say frightened. I 
know I’m deaf and I know that there’s barriers that I’ll come up against, 
and I’m just trying to break through those barriers. And, people know 
that I’m deaf). Cavell continues… 
What about that guy? I’m actually moved. I am deeply interested in the right 
of address. This guy understands himself…er…er …he understands that 
addressing another is an imposition and he’s comfortable with that…it’s 
alright by him. He gives good account of himself. 
 
Thoreau: I understand his account…it is simple and sincere. What he says 
in this account, is not what he has learned of other men’s lives, but what he 
knows of his own life as a young deaf man. The scenes I see in the film are 
incredible and astonishing. In watching the film, I am watching through 
Hashim and Tyrone’s eyes! It is a privilege to be able to see through the 
eyes of another!  I am minded of what I wrote of the labors of Hercules…The 
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twelve labors of Hercules are trifling in comparison with what Hashim and 
Tyrone have undergone in their lives; for those labors were only twelve in 
number. When I was at Concord, others were curious to know if I was afraid, 
was not lonesome in the woods. Yet here, Hashim declares that he is not 
frightened, that he is prepared to break down the barriers that stand in his 
way. He will give his account. 
 
Cavell: And look at Tyrone’s story…that kid was distanced from the world 
from the start. He doesn’t get the chance to…to tell his story until he gets to 
the United Kingdom. This kid was lost in the world…distant even from those 
closest to him. His account shocks me to the core. Look at how is life was 
back in Zimbabwe…Let’s watch that part of the film again… 
(Cavell reaches for the fast-forward button, stopping at the part of the film 
where Tyrone is describing his early childhood (14.55 mins.) I was born in 
Zimbabwe. My mum and dad and my brother, they were all there, we 
were a group there. My mum used to cook for me…erm…my brother 
was a little bit naughty (laughs). I was a little bit naughty too, but it was 
funny, yeah…yeah it was funny. There wasn’t a lot of water, sometimes 
we had to go a long way. And, there was nobody deaf like me. I missed 
quite a lot of stuff and I just used to sit around. I didn’t really have a lot 
of things…I didn’t remember a lot ‘cos I didn’t hear a lot of stuff. My 
friends, they weren’t really sort of deaf aware…So, I was on my own 
(scowls). Hearing people would come to me…I had friends. Maybe a 
little teasing and pranking, it was fine. Things went on a little bit more, 
a little bit more teasing. I wasn’t really sure what was going on. I did 
have some friends, it was alright, it was alright…And then, things 
would happen. We’d have stuff, and things were taken. I didn’t really 
know about that. I didn’t always feel safe. 
 
Thoreau: (Looking upwards) This experience of film causes me to think 
about my own account. When I took up my home in the woods, it was of my 
choosing; it was my experiment. I was not lonesome; I was not afraid. Did I 
not start my experiment on Independence Day, the fourth of July, a day of 
importance? Giving account here of his early life, Tyrone is doing what I want 
from everyone; that the account is simple and sincere. He is giving an 
account from Zimbabwe...a very distant land…and yet we understand him 
well enough. 
 
Cavell: Yeah…and you say that it started accidently on Independence Day. 
Tyrone’s isolation here is different. Your book is riddled with the doings of 
society. Yours was a choice to be distanced from society, calling to account 
their beliefs and values. You challenged the way society practised those 
beliefs and values. This kid was so isolated, he didn’t have a clue what was 
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going on around him even when he was with his family and so-called pals. 
He doesn’t have the words. You know, like me Henry, that every word has 
meaning. How do you give account if you just don’t have the words? If every 
word bears its meaning from every other word in the language, where are 
you? — 
 
Thoreau: (Speaking over the end of Cavell’s sentence) …and yet, look at us 
Stanley, we who have the luxury of seeking the meaning of each word and 
line we read, looking for a larger sense than the common use permits, are 
watching here, in this film, a boy being denied even the mother tongue, the 
language we learn of our mothers. You are right Stanley, when that boy was 
young…without words…denied the ability to tell his story, he was denied 
himself. This experience of film is shocking to me.   
 
Cavell: I love it that you pick out this strain…I, too, have thought of the 
mother tongue as just part of the human condition. We have both learned 
something in watching this film, Henry. Emerson invented the phrase, ‘Hitch 
your wagon to a star’…hitching these wagons of words that carry us along, 
not randomly, to what is beyond the words. This kid had no words to hitch 
and no wagon to hitch them to. Only later in childhood, does he get the 
chance to give account for his life. It’s like a rebirth through the acquisition of 
the mother tongue. And yet, not only do these guys overcome these barriers, 
giving their accounts in the film, but they encourage other deaf kids to do the 
same! Let me show you this next bit of film… 
(Cavell, this time, presses the rewind button and stops at the place (13.40 
mins.) where Hashim says…Okay, what’s different about me, is that, I’ve 
got quite a strong personality, and I aren’t, I aren’t afraid of just telling 
people what I think. And, I don’t, I don’t want to be left out. And I try to 
encourage other people that they can do it. You are deaf, you only can’t 
hear, (smiling directly to the camera) but you’ve got abilities inside of 
yourself to do whatever you want!). Cavell picks up again… 
This guy doesn’t pull his punches! He questions and challenges other deaf 
kids to do what he does. He asks a question…asking a question, you are 
asking for a part of somebody’s life, somebody’s attention. You are drawing 
someone’s blood. It can be an assault…it doesn’t have to be a bad assault, it 
could be an assault of beauty, perhaps, an assault of real interest, or of 
surprise. He makes no excuses for himself and encourages other deaf kids 
to do the same. He gets it…he just gets it. What if other deaf kids got to see 
this film? 
 
Thoreau: (Interjecting) I know what you are saying…it is important to hear 
the accounts of others…Other deaf children will observe that the ability to tell 
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one’s own story is of pertinence to understanding the identity of the self, but 
it is not only the hard of hearing who can learn from this experience, 
Stanley…anyone can see from this, that giving account is not simply 
recounting the story of one’s life. Tyrone and Hashim are giving accounts of 
themselves as young deaf men…and as I did in Concord; they call upon 
others to account for themselves. 
 
Cavell: You’re quite right there, Henry. Like you and me…they mean to be 
demanding…they’ve exposed themselves here in this film…and a response 
is required. Making this film…these guys…they are telling us exactly what 
they think. I think it’s honest as well as wonderful. There are a lot of issues 
there, aren’t there? This is the thing from where I proceed…and where I 
continuously return…It’s about voice… and both these guys know this! Look 
at these sections… 
(Cavell once more presses fast-forward, stopping at the place (16.50 mins.) 
where Tyrone says… No, there was no signing, I had nothing, nothing, 
nothing…I used to use a little bit of gesture. I was quite sad about that. 
And then rewinds to the point where Hashim says…So like, when I’m left 
out at school, or at training? Really, you know when I can see them all 
talking away, I just try to look at them, but I’m quite used to it and I just 
try and take my time and try to lip-read and I’ll say ‘What you actually 
talking about?’ It’s my right to know these things, so I’m not bothered. 
I’ll just tackle them and say, ‘Tell me what you’re talking about’. Some 
people have a long discussion and then they’ll just tell me something 
briefly and I’ll say, ‘That’s not what you said!’).  Cavell adds… 
If these guys don’t even have a voice in their own families how do they even 
connect to the wider community? …Watch… 
(Cavell rewinds to the part (1.04 mins.) where Tyrone is saying…In my 
family, they are all hearing. I’m the only deaf one. With people who 
don’t sign, I just gesture. He then presses fast-forward to (2.11 mins.) 
where Hashim is saying…Only I’m deaf in the family, the rest of them are 
hearing. BSL is my first language…I love BSL.) 
 
Thoreau: (Visually disturbed, shakes his head) To observe this is 
troubling…there is desperation in not having their voices heard. How lonely 
they must feel. My own spirit required sweet solitude in a place where my 
ears might distinguish the sounds that gave voice to my story, but I still had 
the Fitchburg Railroad as my physical link to society…These young men 
must struggle to be heard. 
 
Cavell: I see what you’re getting at Henry…Liberalism means a state where 
each has an equal voice…What we think of as ordinary…to have and to give 
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voice…what I perceive to be democracy, is the search for one’s own voice 
and the right to speak...the right to be heard. These boys are demanding that 
right and their place in society. And, and…for me…it’s not just that I have the 
right to speak and you have a right to speak...it’s that no one is left 
out…denied the right to approach any other. This is political! I am still 
dazzled by the fact of human interchange, and regard that as the most 
remarkable thing that philosophy can attend to. That’s where I come 
from…as a philosopher, I have had my battles to have my own voice 
heard…just as I am seeing in this film. Voice is center-stage in this. 
 
Thoreau: And yet, do I not observe transformation here? …Just as I wrote 
about the moulting season of the loon? At the beginning, these young men 
tell us how their voices are denied…There may be desperation in their early 
lives, but it is not confirmed desperation…not resignation…and certainly not 
lives of quiet desperation. 
 
Cavell: Indeed not, for they both have dreams for the future and their part in 
society…What was it they said? Let’s have a look again… 
(Cavell presses fast-forward to where Hashim says… (9.14 mins.) I think for 
me now…I would still try and aim to be a footballer. That’s what I want 
to be…so I’ve got a Plan B just in case it doesn’t happen…so I become 
a football coach, or a sports coach or varying things. The plan is to be 
a footballer. But for Plan B, I’ve got quite a few things, but anyway 
that’s linked to sport really ‘cos obviously, I’ve got a great passion for 
that. I’m thinking there’s a possibility that I could go to university, or to 
get an apprenticeship, I’m not sure yet. He presses fast-forward again to 
(22.12 mins.) where Tyrone is saying…Yeah, I’m happy, I’m enjoying that. 
It’s good…Yeah, oh, yeah. I’m going really up a level now. I’m feeling 
confident in that, for me. I’m learning and getting really good at it. So, 
me, for example, if I don’t like it and I don’t learn things very well...but 
I’m really enjoying that. I get better at things.). He continues… 
Now, what you said about it not being resignation…that makes sense…From 
the get go, they struggle to give account, they struggle to have a voice even 
within their own families, even though they clearly love them dearly…but in 
making this film they have given their accounts, we have heard their 
voices…together…This film has disrupted the denial of their voices — 
 
Thoreau: (Interjecting) Would we not agree, Stanley, that it is indeed a crisis 




Cavell: And that is at the heart of the matter when it comes to film, 
Henry…surprisingly, even this little film…on a small screen!  From my 
experience of film, I have the absolute knowledge that everything that goes 
on in film matters…why each word is said, not just as it was, but where it 
was, by whom it was said…in that light. You may ask me if I’m a philosopher 
or a complete fool, Henry, but I write about film for what struck me as 
philosophical reasons. You need to be exposed to these things…like this 
film…one way or another and respond to them in a way that speaks to 
philosophy. Yeah, sure… making a film about themselves has been what you 
call a crisis in their lives…but…but (blowing his nose into his handkerchief), 
isn’t it more than that? Isn’t it an education? This is an old Emersonian 
moment of mine. Emerson has a crack…that when I read it, I thought, yeah, 
that’s something I want from writing about film and philosophy. Remember 
Henry, he says that you always need to look for the gleam of light, the little 
spark… 
 
Thoreau: Does he not call it instinct? 
 
Cavell: Not instinct, sometimes he calls it…but the main thing is 
intuition…and the reason he says intuition, is that he wants to go on to 
provide the tuition…so providing the tuition for intuition. I could say that’s 
what I would like film and philosophy to be about…That’s what thinking about 
this film does for me. 
 
Thoreau: Let me be clear…What you are saying is, in this experience, the 
young men have experienced a crisis that is part of their education…that 
comes from beyond the realms of common schooling…that their lives have 
been transformed. This is the gleam of light that we have observed. If it is a 
purpose of philosophy to solve some of the problems of life, not only 
theoretically, but practically…then, I think you not a fool, Stanley. Further 
Stanley, have we two not been unsettled by what we have observed? Did I 
not say earlier that there are portions of the young men’s lives that apply to 
me? I find myself unsettled in observing these young men and to think again 
about account and voice…And you Stanley, are you not also unsettled? 
 
Cavell: Right you are…yeah…sure… No doubt, this film makes claims upon 
us Henry. There are many parallels with my own experiences…I was raised 
in an immigrant household…I too have fought for my voice to be heard…I 
have written about this… and the experience of seeing that on film has been 




Thoreau: (Interrupting)…A state of translation…Yes, that is it…a state of 
translation…as it is for the young men…There is resonance here with what I 
intended in writing Walden…I intended to unsettle! I intended to awaken my 
neighbors! 
 
Cavell: …but it is beyond simple parallels with our own experiences. Look at 
me…my hearing isn’t what it used to be…I thought I knew what it meant to 
be deaf…but this film has shaken me…It has disrupted my easy 
understanding of what it means to be deaf. The impact is just a plain down 
and dirty impact…There are many things I shall take away from this 
experience, Henry. Those guys are just incredible! (There is a moment of 
silence) … Just reflecting on our conversation, Henry…I think we can say 
that say that what you wrote in giving your account in Walden…what I 
experienced in reading it…what I found in watching film and writing about 
it…it’s true of experiencing this film…I think that that’s remarkable! 
 
Thoreau: Incredible, indeed! It has been wonderful and thought-provoking to 
have shared this experience with you, Stanley. 
 
Cavell: (Reaching for Thoreau’s hand) Yeah, I suppose our time is up…It’s 
been great Henry, being this audience of two. Conversation and friendship 
have long been important in my life and in my work…I enjoyed it very 
much…it’s been a pleasure…and I apologise for the sniffles! 
 
 
5.4 Reflections on film and the dialogue; going beyond Cavell and Thoreau to 




In the rationale for writing the dialogue, I asked myself not only why I wanted 
to present my philosophical reading of the film (my analysis as it were) 
through dialogue, but also why I could not present my reading in any other 
way that would be right for this thesis. I described the dialogue as an 
imaginary event that would illustrate how Thoreau and Cavell might 
experience the film as a series of crises which would demand a response. 
The conversation represents a philosophical response to the experiences in 
the boys’ lives which they recognise as being of relevance to their own. This 
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imagined discussion, in which Cavell and Thoreau are exposed to the film, is 
highly original and, as I wrote in the introduction to the dialogue, authentic to 
the values that underpin my thesis. 
In reflecting on the film and dialogue, I think that there is a further level of 
understanding to be reached. This goes beyond the initial purpose of the 
dialogue, and is itself tied to the argument I make for my film being original. 
As described above, it relates to the experience of making a film on hand-
held devices, presenting it on a small screen (as I described in the 
introduction to the thesis) and having it viewed, as Cavell says in the 
dialogue, by an “audience of two”. Whilst it is important for me in this section, 
to examine the reactions of Cavell and Thoreau to the film in order to situate 
it philosophically, I must also point to my own, original, claims for the film and 
the thesis that make a contribution to our knowledge of film. This section of 
the chapter does two things. First, I reflect on what this dialogue tells the 
reader in terms of Cavell and Thoreau’s reaction to the experience of 
watching the film. Second, I will develop Cavell and Thoreau’s philosophical 
discussion of the film, going beyond this to present my own claims for what is 
unique in the film and dialogue, in preparation for reasoning those claims in 
the next, and final chapter of the thesis. 
In writing my reflections, I will speak to the philosophical themes; accounting, 
voice, and translation, in the order in which they are acknowledged in the 
dialogue. It is my intention to create a synergy between what comes out in 
the dialogue and the claims that I make here in my reflections. It is not my 
intention in this section to analyse the dialogue, nor to justify the references 
to Cavell and Thoreau’s writings that I have made, or indeed not made. The 
dialogue is my philosophical reading of the film. I stress to the reader, 
however, that the reading of these reflections may not be a simple linear 
journey, for there are layers of meaning and complexities in the reactions of 
Cavell and Thoreau to the film, and in my own contributions to the field, 





5.4.2 A claim for accounting 
 
Agog at his first encounter with film, Thoreau opens the discussion on 
account by declaring that the boys’ accounts resonate with him, allowing 
Cavell to then refer to Thoreau’s own account in Walden, and his response 
to it. That ‘account’ is part of the imagined conversation is established here. 
As the dialogue about the film develops, the two philosophers are able to 
reflect on their own, and each other’s accounts, in relation to the accounts 
given by the boys on film. There is acknowledgement that all four here have 
struggled to give account, and that it is worth overcoming barriers to do so. 
The conversation links accounting to the political realm through its potential 
to challenge the beliefs and values of society. Re-watching parts of the film, 
Cavell and Thoreau become aware that Hashim and Tyrone call others to 
account (as indeed, they also did), challenging not only others from the deaf 
community, but also friends, family, and wider society. The philosophical 
reflection I make here, reiterating my reading of Cavell’s work on accounting 
in chapter three, is that in exposing Cavell and Thoreau to film and giving 
them the opportunity to discuss it, accounting, giving one’s account, and 
calling others to account are philosophically acknowledged in the boys’ lives. 
Both Cavell and Thoreau highlight that the accounts given by the boys make 
demands on others. 
The claim I make to originality here is not in relation to exposing Cavell and 
Thoreau to the film, but it is in the exposure of the boys to the community 
(the viewers) by giving their accounts on film. In his writing on film Cavell 
talks about the Hollywood blockbuster, with high production values with a 
corresponding budget, projected onto a huge screen that is viewed by a 
large audience in a vast auditorium. Here, we have a ‘small’ film, made on a 
budget, on hand-held devices, shown to a small audience, in a small room. 
In the ‘small’ film that I and the boys have created, there is an intimacy that is 
not experienced in other films. There is something relational in this ‘small’ 
film of young deaf people (who I know well) that is unique. There are many 
films which give account and tell a story, but in reflecting upon my claims for 
this film I move towards an idea of exposure; this is an exposure of the boys 
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and their accounts, an exposure of myself as the maker of the film, and the 
community who watches this film.  
 
5.4.3 A claim for voice 
 
Notions of voice in the film are developed through the dialogue, and come 
out of the discussion on account and accounting. It is Cavell who is the first 
to raise the issue of voice in the film, pointing to the struggle the boys have in 
finding their voices, both at home and in wider society. What Cavell and 
Thoreau see in the film is a shared experience in the suppression (or even 
denial) of voice, with Cavell demanding the right to speak and the right of 
others to speak, on equal terms, which he links to democracy. In both Cavell 
and Thoreau’s philosophical writing, ‘voice’ as I have described in chapter 3, 
implies a hugely complex set of ideas. The particular reflection I wish to 
make here about voice and philosophy (through the dialogue) is that voice is 
not simply an individualistic concept, but it is tied to community and 
liberalism. Voices speak to others in a way that can be described as 
political47. That is to say, political, not in the sense of a ‘particular agenda or 
a programme for good governance, but defining what constitutes 
membership of a polis’ (Rudrum, 2013, p.137). 
That voices speak to others, to the community, is key to the claim I make for 
my film here. There is something happening in the intimacy of voice on the 
small screen as opposed to what happens on the big screen. The film is not 
merely an enactment of a story as one might experience at the cinema. On a 
small screen, we are physically close as the boys’ voices speak to us 
directly. There is something in the notion of the passionate utterance that is 
at play here. I reference here Cavell’s most intimate example of the 
passionate utterance in Philosophy The Day After Tomorrow (2006), where 
Cavell describes Carmen’s rejection of Don José’s declaration of love in the 
opera, Don Giovanni. As the voices on the small screen talk directly to us, 
 
47 The use of the word ‘political’ here refers to Cavell’s concept of voice being linked to 
political in the sense that we are members of a community; this is a concept which I will 
discuss in more detail in the next chapter. 
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we can consider relational moments on the small screen as moments of 
passionate utterance, demanding a response from the viewer (the 
community), to whom they are speaking. 
 
5.4.4 A claim for translation 
It is Thoreau who is first to recognise that there is transformation in the film. 
From difficult beginnings and finding their voices, Tyrone and Hashim begin 
to transform their lives, and see that there is a place for them in society in the 
future. There is an acknowledgement from Cavell that the making of the film 
has been, for the boys, a crisis in their lives, a moment of reassessment, and 
part of their education.  
As the conversation develops, it becomes clear to Cavell and Thoreau that 
this transformation (this state of translation) is not only confined to the boys’ 
experience in film making. They too have been unsettled, put into a state of 
translation. The film and the discussion are their crisis too. The film has 
demanded a philosophical response in the form of the dialogue. It has made 
them reflect on their own experiences, some of which converge with the 
boys’ lives, but it also goes beyond this. Through watching and discussing 
the film, they become aware that their understanding of deafness has been 
disrupted. In Walden (1854/2014), Thoreau makes reference to the old deaf 
fisherman humming his tune, and to the elderly deaf lady with her horn. In 
Little Did I Know (2010), Cavell makes reference to his own minor hearing 
problems. In watching the film, however, they are confronted by deafness 
and are able to learn more about it, in a way that is perhaps secondary to the 
confrontation and the demand for a response. The demand for a response is, 
nonetheless, present.  
Watching the film is a father tongue experience to which, as I have already 
explained, we might or might not be sensitive. Furthermore, as I alluded to 
earlier, the film can be said to be acting in the same way as a Cavellian 
passionate utterance which demands a response. The response might be 
physical, visceral, or even refused, but here in the dialogue it is 
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philosophical. Thus, the philosophical reflections I make about translation in 
the film and the dialogue are that they are a kind of enactment, that is, a 
working out of the sense of unsettlement and translation. In the dialogue, 
Cavell and Thoreau act out this moment of disruption when they realise that 
there are parallels between the boys’ life experiences and their own. This 
causes them to reflect on their own lives; Cavell talks about his own 
experience of growing up in an immigrant household, and Thoreau reflects 
on his intentions to unsettle in writing Walden. 
The claim I make for my film is that unsettlement and translation lead to the 
film being educative in a way that is cognisant of the Emersonian 
perfectionist model described in chapter 3. That is to say, the viewers are not 
gaining propositional knowledge here. The crisis and unsettlement they have 
in experiencing the film is, I argue educative. I do not mean ‘educational’ in 
the sense that the viewer is gaining knowledge about deafness (although this 
may be an unintended outcome), but ‘educative’, in the richer philosophical 
sense of unsettlement and the transformation of the self. I acknowledge that 
it could be argued that many films can unsettle; who could not react to the 
death of Bambi’s48 mother, or to the abject terror we witness in Schindler’s 
List?49 In my film, the viewer is not watching the film as a form of 
entertainment. The watching of the film is an educative moment that is more 
existentially important than in watching just any other film.  I argue that there 
should be a convening of the dominant discourses about deafness, while our 
response to the film (and what we see of the boys in the film) could enable a 
direct confrontation with our own cultural criteria. When we confront our own 
experiences with something else (in this case, the film), a moment is created 
that is both philosophical and educative. This is what is at stake when Cavell 
writes: 
 
What I require is a convening of my culture’s criteria, in order to 
confront them with my words and life as I pursue them and as I may 
imagine them; and at the same time to confront my words and life as I 
pursue them with the life my culture’s words may imagine for me: to 
 
48 Bambi (1942) is a children’s animation film directed by Walt Disney. 
 
49 Schindler’s List (1993) is an historical drama film directed by Steven Spielberg. 
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confront the culture with itself along the lines in which it meets in me… 
This seems to me a task that warrants the name of philosophy. It is 
also the description of something we might call education (Cavell, 




5.4.5 A final reflection 
 
In presenting my rationale at the start of the chapter, it was my intention to 
do two things. First, I reflected on what the dialogue tells the reader in terms 
of Cavell and Thoreau’s reaction to the experience of watching the film. 
Second, I developed Cavell and Thoreau’s philosophical discussion of the 
film, going beyond this to present my claims for what is unique in the film and 
dialogue. In the next, and final chapter of the thesis I develop the notion of 
claims and make ‘My claims to, and of, community’. 
In the Conversations with History (2002) at Berkeley University, Cavell 
explains that he does not know whether his philosophical writing on film 
could transfer to modern film technologies, both in the making and in the 
viewing experience. He goes on to say that this is for others to interrogate. It 
is my reflection, and now my claim, that this is exactly what I have done in 
making the film and creating the dialogue. The film, made with new 
technologies, has elicited a philosophical response. My film is different in 
significant ways to the experience of the big screen in the smallness of it, 
however it is not just the smallness, but also the relational aspects which are 
extremely important in this experience. I am looking at something different 
than has been looked at previously. To have made my film and presented 
the philosophical reading of the film in any other way, would not have created 
this opportunity.  
In the next chapter, I revisit the assertions I have made throughout this 
thesis, and consider ‘claim(s)’ as a philosophical concept with reference to 
Cavell’s The Claim of Reason (1999a) and Must We Mean What We Say? 
(2002). I do this not in isolation, but with reference to those communities for 
which these claims have implications: the viewers of film, the deaf 
community, and the community of the school. 
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This thesis came about as a result of many years of experience working with 
young deaf people in schools. As such, the communities I refer to in the title 
of this chapter are the deaf community, the school community, and the wider 
community through government. In the first chapter of the thesis, I focused 
on the socio-political discourse around inclusion and concluded that despite 
claims for greater inclusion of young deaf people in both mainstream and 
specialist provision, young deaf people remain marginalised. Throughout the 
thesis, I have presented a close reading of the texts of Cavell and Thoreau, 
and the making of film, in order to provide an alternative route to a different 
kind of understanding of young deaf people. In investigating the philosophical 
notions of voice, accounting, and translation, I have made a film that 
unsettles concepts of deafness. The thesis itself is, philosophically, an act of 
translation. It is this approach that is at the heart of the originality of this 
thesis. However, whilst I have justified the philosophical approach I have 
taken in my research, to leave the research ‘hanging philosophically’ would 
be insufficient, and would fail to impact positively on the lives of young deaf 
people. As I argued in the second chapter, to present the philosophical and 
the practical as being diametrically opposed is a false dichotomy. I conclude 
in this chapter then, that there are real, everyday practical implications for my 
research that are embedded in the philosophy upon which I have drawn.  
In this final chapter of the thesis, I present my claims for my research, and 
make claims upon others for whom my claims have implications. I begin with 
a reading of what Cavell has written about notions of ‘claim’ in The Claim of 
Reason (1999a) and Must We Mean What We Say? (2017). Cavell has 
written at length on the concept of ‘claim’ and ‘claiming’, and given that these 
two volumes total more than 800 pages, my reading will be necessarily 
focused. Of particular relevance to my research are what Cavell refers to as 
‘claims to community’ (Cavell, 2015, p.20). The first section of this chapter 
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will, therefore, focus on my understanding of notions of claim, supported by 
Cavell’s philosophical notion of ‘claim’. The middle section of this chapter will 
be a statement of the claims that this thesis makes in relation to accounting, 
translation, and voice, in the context of the film made with the two deaf boys. 
The third, and final, section will look to the future and the potential 
consequences for education that are imbued in my conclusions. In this part 
of the chapter, I will discuss the implications of my research, and will lay out 
the claims I make on the communities that surround these young people. I do 
not argue, in my concluding remarks, that if all the claims I make of people 
and institutions are implemented, then any disadvantage or barriers 
encountered by young deaf people will therefore be eradicated. Rather, what 
I argue for is that if the voices of young deaf people are heard, their accounts 
given, then there is the potential for unsettlement that may cause people and 
institutions to reassess the deaf experience in a way that might lead to an 
improved level of inclusion. 
 
6.2 How my claims are to be understood 
 
Cavell’s writing on claiming in The Claim of Reason (1999a) is hugely rich 
and complex. His response to Wittgensteinian criteria in the Tractatus 
Logico-Philosophicus (2001), and his own considerations of what criteria 
mean to him, are ground-breaking. However, to discuss these elements of 
Cavell’s ideas on ‘claiming’, connected as this is to scepticism and 
epistemology, would be a distraction from my aim in this part of the thesis. In 
this section of the chapter, I will outline what I mean by claiming; my 
understanding of this is philosophically supported by certain threads of 
argument from Cavell’s writing, and this gives clarity to my thinking. In The 
Claim of Reason (1999a, p.20), Cavell writes about his ‘wish and search for 
community’. In this chapter, I too seek to make my claims to community. The 
claims I make in this chapter are of little value if I cannot situate them in, and 
to a certain extent have them accepted by, the deaf and school communities, 
and those associated with them. 
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A definition of the word ‘claim’ could readily be picked from a dictionary to 
give an easy explanation of the word along the lines of; Claim: to say 
something, for example, ‘I claim something to be so’ or to demand 
something, as in ‘I claim my rights’. However, the idea of claim is a complex 
one. With a simple change of preposition, ‘claims’ can become many things; 
claims to, claims for, claims by, claims of, claims about, claims upon et 
cetera. We can even alter our understanding of claim through the use of 
adjectives, for example, empirical claims or scientific claims, in a way that 
might alter our feelings about the veracity of such a claim. However, in 
making my own claims here, it is important to note that this is not done with 
the intention of searching for an undeniable ‘truth’, but rather these claims 
speak to something I believe to be the case, and about which, I care 
passionately. In this thesis I have made claims for, and about, film and 
deafness, as well as for, and about, accounting, translation, and voice. In 
concluding the thesis, I will make claims upon the school community and 
those involved in that community. However, before proceeding to make 
these claims, I need to make clear what Cavell means by ‘claim’ and what I 
take from my understanding of Cavell’s work on claim. 
Claim is a hugely rich and nuanced concept in Cavell’s work. He 
understands claim in a variety of different ways throughout his œuvre that 
could be the subject of a whole thesis. What I intend to do, however, is to 
focus on Cavell’s work on ‘claim’ as an ordinary language philosopher. When 
writing about claims, Cavell is doing so in the context of language, and these 
notions of claims come out in three particular ways. First, there is the claim 
that language puts upon us that is related to Thoreau’s father tongue. That is 
to say, having claims made upon us could be said to be a ‘father tongue’ 
experience, in that ‘it [the claim] holds out its experience to us, allows us to 
experience it’ (Cavell, 1992, p.16), and in doing so, the claim disrupts those 
upon whom the claim is made. Second, there is the demand for a response 
that is claimed in the passionate utterance. In Must We Mean What We Say? 
(2017, p. 234), Cavell likens this demand for a response to the experience of 
pain. If a person claims they are suffering pain, he writes, ‘Your suffering 
makes a claim upon me…I must acknowledge it’, and we do this by 
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responding to a claim upon our sympathy or actions. Finally, there is the 
claim to community that I will develop further in the rest of this section, in 
relation to the claims I make for this thesis. 
It is important to understand that I do not make my claims in isolation. For 
them to have meaning, they are made, not only of, but within that community. 
There is something relational at play here. David Rudrum describes this 
relationship between claim and community when he writes: 
To stake a claim is metaphorically to stick one’s neck on the block…to 
make a statement in the public domain…whose provisionality awaits 
ratification in and from the public domain to which it was addressed 
(2013, p. 16). 
 
To stick one’s neck out implies an element of risk that I might take in making 
my claims. They may be rejected by the very community to whom they are 
addressed. Rudrum (2013, p.23) describes them as ‘fragile, open and 
provisional’. If this is the case, then in making my claims I am expecting, or 
even demanding, a response (the passionate utterance). But what if my 
claims are rejected; is that still acknowledgement, or am I even at risk of 
rejection of membership from the community? 
Community, contends Standish (2012), is at the heart of ordinary language 
philosophy. He points to the fact that in ordinary language philosophy, 
sentences often start with phrases such as ‘when we say…we mean…’ (p. 
83), and that this use of the first-person plural is a verb form ‘which binds the 
speaker to the community’ (ibid., p. 83). For Cavell, this notion of 
membership of the community is of the upmost importance, and is akin to 
membership of a political community, a polis. He argues that by accepting 
that we are members of this community, we are consenting in criteria. That is 
to say, consenting to or accepting, the rights and responsibilities of 
membership of the community (the polis) and how things are done. Rudrum 
(2013, p.145) writes that Cavell describes this as a form of contract, and the 
implications of this contract are that. ‘1. I recognise the principle of consent 
and recognise that others have consented with me. 2. I recognise the society 
as mine; therefore, I am answerable for it and to it’. In this sense, it is a 
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political participation, and we have a political voice. As such we are 
accepting of the notion that in such a polis, we have the right to speak for the 
community, and also the community has the right to speak for us. Here, I 
return to the idea of risk. When we speak (claim even), we run the risk of 
being misunderstood or disagreed with. However, this is not to be equated to 
rejection from the community. For Cavell, dissent is not entirely negative, 
‘dissent is not the undoing of consent but a dispute about its content’ (1999a, 
p. 27). In holding each other to account, there is still acknowledgement of, 
and consent to, the community. As I wrote in Chapter 3, choosing between 
conformity or non-conformity is the position of the individual in relation to 
society, to the ‘other’, or community. 
In Must We Mean What We Say? Cavell writes: 
The way you must rely upon yourself as a source of what is said 
when, demands that you grant full title to others as sources of that 
data – not out of politeness, but because the nature of the claim you 
make for yourself is repudiated without that acknowledgement: It is a 
claim that no-one knows better than you whether and when a thing is 
said, and if this is not to be taken as a claim to expertise (a way of 
taking it which repudiates it) then it must be understood to mean that 
you know better than others what you claim to know (Cavell, 2017, p. 
221). 
 
In this vein then, in the next section as I proceed to make the claims for the 
thesis, I rely upon myself and my research to say what I have to say. I do so 
now, in the context of a policy of inclusion that leaves young deaf people at a 
distance from the communities to which they belong. I make these claims, 
holding them up as a father tongue experience to be encountered by others 
(whilst acknowledging that there is no guarantee that this will happen, unless 
we are open to the experience in Thoreauvian terms). I make them as a 
passionate utterance, demanding a response. These are claims about which 
I care deeply; I await an acknowledgement, or a response, from the 





6.3 The claims this thesis makes for accounting, translation, and voice, as 
contributions to knowledge 
 
Throughout this thesis, in the sections headed ‘reflections on…’, I have made 
assertations that are the building blocks which construct the final three 
claims I make for accounting, translation, and voice. Whilst they may be read 
as claims in their own right, I also want them to be understood as 
developmental stages in the thesis which substantiate the final claims I 
make, both for the thesis and of the community. Starting in chapter one, I 
asserted that young deaf people remain marginalised in schools and in the 
community, and that there are issues relating to accounting, translation, and 
voice that merit further investigation. In the second chapter, I made the 
assertion that film and philosophy are the appropriate approaches to take in 
this study. In the third chapter, I gave a close reading of the works of Cavell 
and Thoreau to reach a philosophical understanding of accounting, 
translation, and voice which informed my assertion of the power of film to 
disrupt. The fourth chapter built upon this notion of the ability of film to 
unsettle, and there I asserted the educative potentialities of film. In the fifth 
chapter, I used philosophical dialogue to provide a response to the film I 
made with the boys, which culminated in the final claims I make for this 
thesis.  
Before restating these final claims, I need to make clear that they are not just 
linked to the contribution I make to knowledge in the thesis, but that they are 
also the mechanism by which I am making this contribution. These claims 
contribute to knowledge on two levels. First, I have taken notions of 
accounting, translation and voice as thinly understood terms, as used 
perhaps in the context of student voice, and produced a much richer, 
extended, philosophical understanding of the terms. Similarly, whilst a lot has 
been written about film and the educative potential of film (Gibbs, 2019; 
Saito, 2017), in making my own film and writing a philosophical dialogue 
about the film, I have developed a richer understanding of what is educative 
about film. Second, I have referred to the works of scholars such as Saito, 
Standish, Fulford, and Mahon throughout the thesis, all of whom have written 
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on the terms accounting, translation, and voice. In this thesis, I have taken 
these Thoreauvian and Cavellian terms and applied them in a new context. 
That is to say, I have extended the concepts by applying them to the context 
of understanding young deaf people. ‘Projecting a word’ as Cavell (1999a, p. 
180) puts it, is to project a word into new contexts, making ‘appropriate 
projections into further contexts’. In this thesis, I have shown that we can 
come to understand the words accounting, translation, and voice, differently. 
The following three claims I make are rich, and as I will describe later in this 
chapter, are of importance to the educational community. 
• Accounting 
I claim that in giving account through the making of the film, I move 
towards an idea of exposure, which is an exposure of the young deaf 
boys and their accounts, the exposure of myself as a film maker, and 
the exposure of the community who watch the film. 
• Translation 
I claim that philosophical translation leads to the film being educative 
in the Emersonian perfectionist sense, and that this also relates to a 
rich concept of unsettlement and the transformation of the Self. 
• Voice 
I claim that voices speak to others, and to the community. There are 
relational moments on the small screen that can be seen as moments 
of passionate utterance, that demand a response from the viewer (the 
community), to whom the voices are speaking. 
In conclusion, as I ask the reader to consider these claims, I also ask the 
reader to recognise the claims that the film and the dialogue, make upon us. 
As David Rudrum writes: 
They are awaiting acknowledgement, uptake, and agreement from us, 
not simply in regard to their content, or to their merit qua texts, but, 
more fundamentally, in regard to the cues or invitations they give us to 
reflect on the claims we use in order to justify our own lives (Rudrum, 
2013, p. 30). 
 
In the next section of this chapter I move from the claims I make for the 
thesis, to make claims upon others. Claims, as Rudrum describes above, 
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await acknowledgment from those to whom they are addressed, and in turn 
that will call on others to reflect upon how they justify and lead their own lives 
in relation to young deaf people. 
 
6.4 The claims I make upon community 
 
Thus far, in this chapter, I have written about Cavell’s philosophical claim to 
community and stated the claims I make for the thesis, and the film as part of 
the thesis. I come now to the implications of these claims. Out of the claims I 
make for accounting, translation, and voice, come further claims that I make 
upon others (the community). Typically, in an empirical thesis, one might 
expect to be presented with a list of recommendations at this stage. These 
recommendations would be driven by the data, rooted in the evidence 
provided by the analysis of that data. Here, I wish to make a distinction 
between such recommendations and the claims I make upon others. There is 
much more at stake here than simply recommending a plan of action for 
inclusion. I am describing these claims as moments of passionate utterance. 
I am calling out, proclaiming, and demanding a response that goes beyond 
the notion of recommendation.  
I am addressing, not just a broad sense of the word ‘community’, but specific 
communities. I am making claims upon the wider community through 
government, the school community through local government and academy 
trusts, individual school communities, and the deaf community. My research 
may be richly philosophical, but the outcomes have the potential to be highly 
practical in these communities in the future. I do not make these claims upon 
community as some sort of panacea that will, once and for all, put right all 
that is wrong with the young deaf experience. Rather, I am addressing the 






• I make a claim upon government to review the effectiveness of 
national policy on the inclusion of young deaf people in schools. 
This claim comes from my own experience in schools and from the evidence 
in the academic literature, for example, Olsson et al., (2018) on the 
application of inclusion policy and the young deaf experience. Young deaf 
people do not achieve academically in line with their peers, nor do they have 
the same social and cultural experiences throughout their time in school. As I 
explained in chapter 1, this disparity in both social and academic progress 
has been further widened by the experience of the current pandemic. The 
review might take the form of a select committee review, headed by a leader 
from the world of deaf education, taking evidence from experts in the field. 
As a result of this review, changes to policy and practice could be 
implemented that impact positively on the deaf educational experience, and 
further guidance offered to those responsible for its implementation.  
The terms of reference for the review are described below. They lay out the 
key themes and questions that need to be considered, and how the review 
will respond to the long-term needs of young deaf people, especially in light 
of the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. These terms of reference will 
consider means of securing accountability for those with responsibility for the 
outcomes of young deaf people They will also investigate the means by 
which to provide the support which will empower families, and focus on 
helping young deaf people to thrive in a range of contexts. 
The review will consider the following key themes and questions: 
1. A broad support remit: Identify the support that is necessary to meet 
the needs of young deaf people, in order to improve outcomes, and to 
make a lasting significant difference to deaf individuals and to society. 
2. Empowering the families of young deaf people: Identify what can be 
done to ensure that young deaf people thrive and develop in the 
family unit. To grant agencies the powers to support and intervene 
where appropriate, balancing the needs of the deaf child with the right 
to a family life. 
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3. Educational provision: Identify the key agencies who will implement 
the review and raise standards for young deaf people. Decide who will 
provide the leadership, build a strong and resilient workforce, and 
create the partnerships in school settings that will lead to improved 
social and academic outcomes for young deaf people. 
4. A long-term view: Identify the most sustainable and financially efficient 
means of delivering services to young deaf people and their families, 
including those services that require a high level of investment. 
Decide who is best placed to deliver them, and how can this be future 
proofed in a post-pandemic context. 
5. Accountability: Identify the accountability measures needed to ensure 
that there is oversight of consistently high standards of provision for 
young deaf people in all localities. 
Making a claim upon government is also deeply rooted in Thoreauvian 
philosophy. In writing “On the Duty of Civil Disobedience” in Walden 
(Thoreau, 1854/2014, p. 180), Thoreau makes a claim ‘on every man to 
make known what kind of government would command his respect, and that 
will be one step toward obtaining it’ (ibid., p. 181). He describes government 
as the mode by which ‘the people have chosen to execute their will’ (ibid., p. 
180), arguing that if government is to be expedient it must listen to the will of 
the people so they can act through it. He also points to the potential for 
government to be open to the abuse of a few vociferous individuals, citing his 
objections to slavery, and the war in Mexico (ibid., 1854/2014). So strong 
were his abolitionist beliefs, and objections to the war in Mexico, that he 
refused to pay his poll taxes, resulting in him spending a night in jail. He went 
on to deliver lectures about the duties and rights of the individual to make 
claims upon government, as I do here.  
• I make a claim upon local authorities and academy trusts to use 
films like mine in the continuing professional development of 
(CPD) school and academy staff in relation to deaf awareness. 
Brinkley (2011, p.64) calls for ‘deaf awareness…and deaf understanding’ to 
be achieved through the CPD of all school staff. In the film, Tyrone 
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remembers his time as a new arrival in the UK and his first encounters with 
sign language at school, “I was practising and practising with sign 
language…Time went on, and I was encouraged” (17.32 Mins.). Brinkley 
argues that if all staff were deaf aware and had some basic signing ability, 
then young people like Tyrone would come to feel encouraged much sooner. 
This, he writes, might be achieved through deaf awareness days or the 
teaching of some basic British Sign Language. I would go further, to argue 
that films such as the one I have made with the deaf boys could be highly 
effective in teaching an understanding of deafness and the needs of deaf 
learners. If these films are made with the young deaf students from those 
specific authorities and trusts (as communities), with the support of their 
families, then such films have the potential to be highly effective indeed. 
• I make a claim upon school leaders to be aware of the 
marginalisation of young deaf people in their schools, and the 
implications this has for both socialisation and academic 
outcomes. Subsequently, I make claim upon them to take action. 
Olsson et al. (2018), in their research, are clear that young deaf people are 
at a double disadvantage, in that they are at risk of both academic and social 
exclusion. There may be policy issues specific to individual schools that may 
impact on that marginalisation. Take, for example, policy on students’ use of 
mobile phones in schools. It is worth noting here, that Gavin Williamson, the 
Secretary of State for Education, is currently proposing to ban the use of 
mobile phones in schools (Criddle, 2021). However, in a school where there 
are deaf children, such as the one in which I worked, I have witnessed 
texting as a common means of communication, especially with hearing, non-
signing peers. School leaders do have the ability to improve the experience 
of young deaf people, and to reduce that element of marginalisation in their 
schools. In chapter 3, I described how Cavell felt marginalised from an 
academic community that was predominantly analytic in its approach to 
philosophy. He felt that there were those in that community that would 
suppress his voice and his right to speak, not only for himself, but for others. 
It is the marginalisation of young deaf people through the suppression of 
voice that brings me to my next claim. 
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• I make a claim upon schools to give voice to young deaf people, 
to hear their accounts in a meaningful way that goes beyond 
current iterations of ‘student voice’. 
Stefan Ramaekers (2010, p. 59) proclaims that ‘owning a voice, is ‘having an 
expressed existence’. I wrote in chapter 3 that I am concerned with the voice 
of young deaf people in terms of them having the right to express 
themselves, to give account, and claim that they have the right to be heard50. 
It follows then, that it is incumbent upon schools to provide opportunities for 
those deaf voices to be heard, and for their existence to be experienced. 
School leaders, I argue, have a duty to be aware of the experience that all 
young people live in their schools, and especially of the experiences of those 
who are vulnerable or marginalised. Whilst I have experienced some 
outstanding work in schools with regards to this, too often listening to 
children is done at quite a superficial level (Morris, 2019). I am not 
advocating giving voice to students in some reductive form of ‘student voice’ 
as a tick box exercise. Rather, I mean that the challenge to school leaders is 
to hear the accounts of young deaf people in their schools and respond 
accordingly. This might take the form of making and watching film with young 
deaf people. 
• I make a claim upon the whole school community to learn, at 
least some, British Sign Language (BSL) that will enable them to 
make some contact with young deaf people within that 
community. 
In the film, when Hashim is talking about trying to make friends with his 
hearing peers, he quotes the other children, “…and like, oh, you’re deaf. You 
can’t hear us, but they didn’t really know anything about deafness” (3.35 
mins.). The inability of the other children to understand deafness, and to be 
able to communicate with him, is something he clearly remembers from his 
 
50 I remind the reader here of what I wrote about the use of the verb ‘to hear’, in the 
introduction to the thesis. The verb ‘to hear’ here and throughout the thesis, is to be 
understood, not on a superficial or tokenistic level, in that we are simply listening to stories 
on film. Rather, ‘hearing’ is used in a richer sense, in that what we are hearing puts a 




early childhood. Tyrone too is acutely aware of the importance of 
communication, “No, there was no signing. I had nothing, nothing, nothing…” 
(16.50 mins.). It is incumbent then, on all the members of the school 
community (including the children) to have at least some basic means of 
communication with the deaf members of the school community, preferably 
through BSL. There is an occasion in the section titled “The Ponds”, in 
Walden (2014), when Thoreau describes an encounter with an elderly deaf 
fisherman. It is a moving description that emphasises a shared humanity 
rather than a shared language, but which defines nonetheless, a moment of 
harmonious community. Thoreau writes: 
Once in a while we sat together on the pond, he at one end of the 
boat, and I at the other; but not many words passed between us, for 
he had grown deaf in his later years, but he occasionally hummed a 
psalm, which harmonized well with my philosophy. Our intercourse 
was thus altogether one of unbroken harmony (Thoreau, 2014, p. 96). 
 
If Hashim and Tyrone were able to sit with hearing peers and exchange but a 
few words of BSL, their experience might similarly be a little more 
harmonious and less isolating. 
• I make a claim upon the deaf community to encourage and to 
support their young people in engaging with the wider 
community. 
It is important to remember that when we refer to the ‘deaf community’, we 
are not talking about a homogenous group of people living side by side in a 
shared environment. Rather, we are talking about a disparate set of 
individuals or families spread out amongst any given town or city. The deaf 
experience is one of isolation. If the deaf child is not at school, they might not 
meet with another child for long periods of time. In the film, Hashim describes 
how this feeling of isolation increased as he was growing up. He starts by 
describing his early experiences “So, around Year 5, I had some friends that 
were neighbours, around the same age. They were hearing and I was deaf, 
but the communication was really difficult. But there were lots of activities. 
We played through activities, and that’s how we made the connection” (3.35 
mins.). However, when he comes to his late teens, he says, “I rarely meet 
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these people though now, because they are all at work and they’re 
busy…and I’m busy catching up with my work” (3.35 mins.). It is clear from 
the film, however, that Hashim’s passion for football, and Tyrone’s love of 
boxing and rugby, give them both the opportunity to engage with other 
people in a positive and meaningful way. Both speak of their practising sport 
with others with animation. The challenge for the deaf community, and 
parents of the deaf, is to break that isolation and to encourage deaf children 
to engage with others beyond the school gates. 
• I make a claim upon the parents and siblings to learn and use 
some British Sign Language. 
There are two specific points in the film that I find poignant, and even 
perhaps, shocking. The first is when Tyrone says, “In my family, they’re all 
hearing. I’m the only deaf one. With people who don’t sign, I just gesture” 
(1.04 mins.). The second moment is when Hashim echoes, “Only I’m deaf in 
the family, the rest of them are hearing. BSL is my first language, I love BSL. 
Mostly my family speak English, but sometimes they use gesturing, like 
‘Mum’ or ‘Dad’” (2.11 mins.). That both boys live in families where they are 
the sole users of BSL (which they each regard as their first language) points 
to an isolation from family life that is hard to conceive. Unfortunately, this is 
more common than we might imagine, as I pointed to in chapter one. Terry et 
al. (2017, p. 56), in their research, found that there was often ‘devaluation 
and disrespect’ of the deaf child in a hearing family, including sometimes 
treating them as if they were not present, or making decisions about them 
without consulting them. Acknowledging that this might not be a simple task, 
the challenge for families of deaf children is to learn and use, at least, some 
basic BSL. 
• I make a claim upon young deaf people to shout out and 
challenge the community! 
In the film, Hashim makes just this claim, when he movingly says, “I aren’t 
afraid of just telling people what I think…You are deaf, you only can’t hear, 
but you’ve got abilities inside of yourself to do whatever you want” (13.40 
mins.). This rallying call can be likened to that of Thoreau’s chanticleer, 
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waking the neighbours and calling them to account. Hashim is loudly giving 
his own account, and is calling on others to give a good account for 
themselves. 
 
6.5 Final reflections on my claims 
 
The writing of this final chapter and making my claims for the thesis, and 
upon the communities it relates to, has been full of emotion. It stems from the 
very reasons I embarked upon this journey. I felt I was taken back to and 
reliving injustices I have been fighting against in schools for many years, on 
behalf of a group of young people who have been very special to me. It 
relates to my hope for the future, and my desire to end the marginalisation of 
young deaf people, particularly in the school community. The emotion also 
relates to the philosophical journey I have made in my reading of Thoreau 
and Cavell, which has been a long, and often challenging journey. The 
making of the film too, was an emotional experience, working with two young 
people with whom I have worked since they were five years of age. However, 
the claims I have made do not belong to me, or between the cover of this 
thesis. They belong to the communities I have served and to whom they are 
addressed. I end with one final quote from Cavell: 
If I have successfully established my claim, I have said enough  




Ainscow, M., Booth, T. and Dyson, A., (2006). Improving Schools, Developing 
 Inclusion. Oxon: Routledge Publications. 
 
Akmese, P. and Acarlar, F., (2016). Using narrative to investigate language 
 skills of children who are deaf and with hard of hearing. Educational 
 Research and Reviews. 11(15), pp. 1367-1381. 
 
Avramidis, E., Bayliss, P. and Burden, R., (2000). A Survey into 
 MainstreamTeachers’ Attitudes towards the Inclusion of Children with 
 Special Educational Needs in the Ordinary School in one Local 
 Educational Authority. Educational Psychology: An International 
 Journal of Experimental Educational Psychology. 22(2), pp. 191-211. 
 
Berkeley University., (2002). Stanley Cavell: Conversations with history. 
 [Online]. [Accessed 20 November 2020]. Available from 
 http://globetrotter.berkely.edu./conversations/  
 
Bernaix, N.E., (2013). Oral and written production in children who are deaf 
 and hard of hearing. Unpublished MSc Dissertation. University of 
 Washington. 
 
Bold, C., (2012). Using Narrative in Research. London: SAGE Publications 
 
Brinkley, D., (2011). Supporting Deaf Children and Young People. London: 
 Continuum International Publishing Group.  
 
British Educational Research Association (BERA)., (2018). Ethical 
 guidelines for educational research. 4th edn. [Online]. [Accessed 12 




Bryant, D. Bryant, B. and Smith, D. (2017)., Teaching Students Special 
 Needs Inclusive Classrooms. London: SAGE Publications. 
139 
 
Caemmerer, J., Cawthon, S. and Bond, M., (2016). Comparison of Students’ 
 Achievement: Deaf, Learning Disabled, and Deaf with a Learning 
 Disability. School Psychology Review. 45(3), pp. 362-371. 
 
Calderon, R. and Greenberg, M., (2003).  Social and Emotional Development 
 of Children: Family, School and Program Effects. Oxford Handbook of 
 Deaf Studies. 1, pp. 178-181. 
 
Cambridge Dictionary. [Online]. [Accessed 25 August 2020]. Available from 
 https://www.dictionary.cambridge.org. 
 
Cavell, S., (1979). The World Viewed. USA: Harvard University Press. 
 
Cavell, S., (1990). Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The Constitution 
 of Emersonian Perfectionism. USA: Chicago University Press. 
 
Cavell, S., (1992). The Senses of Walden. USA: Chicago University Press. 
 
Cavell, S., (1994). A Pitch of Philosophy: Autobiographical Exercises. USA: 
 Harvard University Press. 
 
Cavell, S., (1996). Contesting Tears. Chicago: The University of Chicago 
 Press. 
 
Cavell, S., (1999a). The Claim of Reason. New York: Oxford University 
 Press 
 
Cavell, S., (1999b). An Interview with Stanley Cavell. Harvard Journal of 
 Philosophy. 11, pp. 19-28. 
 
Cavell, S., (2005a). Cities of Words: Pedagogical Letters on a Register of the 
 Moral Life. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
Cavell, S., (2005b). Philosophy the Day After Tomorrow. USA: Harvard 
 University Press. 
140 
 
Cavell, S., (2008). Time and Place for Philosophy. Journal of 
 Metaphilosophy. 39, pp. 51-56. 
 
Cavell, S., (2010). Little Did I Know: Excerpts from Memory. California: 
 Stanford University Press. 
 
Cavell, S., (2015). Must We Mean What We Say? UK: Cambridge University 
 Press. 
 
Charteris J. and Smardon, D., (2019). Democratic contribution of information 
 for reform? Prevailing and emerging discourses of student voice. The 
 Australian Journal of Teacher Education. 44(6), pp. 1-19. [Online]. 
 [Accessed 24 April 2021]. Available from ro.ecu.edu.au 
 
Ciaca, O., (2011). Teacher: Can you see what I am saying? A research 
 experience with deaf learners. Profile. 13(2), pp. 131-146. 
 
Clough, P. and Nutbrown, C., (2007). A Student’s Guide to Methodology. 
 London: Sage publications.  
 
Colapietro, V., (2012). Voice and the Interrogation of Philosophy. In 
 Standish, P. and Saito, N. eds. 2012. Stanley Cavell and the 
 Education of Grownups. New York: Fordham. pp. 123-145. 
 
Covill, M. (2018). A Brief History of Movies Shot with Phones. [online] 
 Filmschoolrejects.com. [Accessed 6 February 2019]. Available at:  
 https://filmschoolrejects.com/movies-shot-with-phones/ . 
 
Crosson, J. and Geers, A., (2001). Analysis of Narrative Ability in Children 
 with Cochlear Implants. Ear & Hearing. 22(5), pp. 381-394. 
 





Cuskelly, M., (2005). Ethical inclusion of children with disabilities in research. 
 In, Ethical Research with Children. Ed. Farrell, A. (2005). Berkshire: 
 OUP. 
 
Dammeyer, J., Chapman, M. and Marschark, M., (2018). Experience of 
 Hearing Loss, Communication, Social Participation, and Psychological 
 Well-Being Among Adolescents with Cochlear Implants. American 
 Annals of the Deaf. 163(4). pp. 424-439. 
 
Davis, A., (2009). Examples as Method? My Attempts to Understand 
 Assessment and Fairness (in the Spirit of the Later Wittgenstein). 
 Journal of Philosophy of Education. 43(3), pp. 371-389. 
 
Duke University., (2009). Stanley Cavell: “Excerpts from memory” Discussion 
 at Duke University.  [Online]. [Accessed 22 November 2020] Available 
 from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DHswwGefmw8  
 
Emerson, R. W., (1995). Essays and Poems. London: Orion Publishing 
 Group. 
 
Esera, T., (2008). An Insight into the Educational Needs of Deaf High School 
 Students: Interviews with School Staff and Students. Kairaranga. 9(2), 
 pp. 32-36. 
 
Etymology Dictionary. [Online]. [Accessed 25 June 2019]. Available from 
 https://www.etymonline.com/word/method 
 
Farrell, A., (2005). Ethical Research with Children. Berkshire: Open 
 University Press. 
 
Foster, S., Long, G., and Snell, K., (1999). Inclusive instruction and learning 
 for deaf students in postsecondary education. Journal of Deaf Studies 
 and Deaf Education. 4(3), pp. 225-235. 
 
Fulford, A., (2009). Ventriloquising the Voice: Writing in the University. 




Fulford, A. and Hodgson, N., (2016). Philosophy and Theory in Educational 
 Research: Writing in the margin. London: Routledge. 
 
Fulford, A. and Skea, C., (2019). Student Complaints: Performative or 
 Passionate Utterances. Philosophy and Theory in Education. 1(2), pp. 
 55-75. [Online]. [Accessed 3 April 2020]. Available from 
 https://www.peterlang.com/fileasset/JournalsPTIHE022019_book.pdf 
 
Gaslight. (1944) Cukor, G. (Dir.) [film –DVD] Warner Home Video. 109 mins. 
 
Gibbs, A., (2017a). What Makes My Image of Him into an Image of Him? 
 Journal of Philosophy of Education. 51(1), pp. 267-280. 
 
Gibbs, A., (2017b). “Not to explain, but to accept”: Wittgenstein and the 
 pedagogic potential of film. In Peters-Michael, A. and Sidney, J. eds. 
 2017. A companion to Wittgenstein on Education: Pedagogical 
 Investigations. Singapore: Springer. 
 
Gibbs, A., (2019). Seeing Education on Film: A conceptual Aesthetics. 
 Palgrave Macmillan.   
 
Golos, D., Moses, A., Roemen, B., and Cregan, E., (2018). Cultural and 
 Linguistic Role Models: A survey of Early Childhood Educators of the 
 Deaf. Sign Language Studies. 19(1), pp. 40-74. 
 
Goodenough, J. 2005. A Philosopher Goes to the Cinema. In Read, R. and 
 Goodenough, J. eds. Film as Philosophy. New York: Palgrave 
 Macmillan, pp. 1-28. 
 
Goodson, I and Sikes, P., (2001). Life History Research in Educational 
 Settings. Berkshire: Open University Press. 
 
Gould, T., (1998). Hearing Things: Voice and Method in the Writing of 




Grant, C and Osanloo, A., (2014). Understanding, selecting, and integrating 
 a theoretical framework in dissertation research: creating the blueprint 
 for your house. Administrative issues journal: connecting education 
 practice and research. 4, pp. 12-24. 
 
Griffiths, M., (2016). On provocation, fascination, and writing in philosophy of 
 education. In Fulford, A and Hodgson, N. eds. Philosophy and Theory 
 in Educational Research: Writing in the margin. London: Routledge, 
 pp. 110-119. 
 
Hammer, E., (2002). Stanley Cavell: Skepticism, Subjectivity, and the 
 Ordinary. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. 
 
Hardy, J., (2010). The development of a sense of identity in deaf adolescents 
 in mainstream schools. Educational and Child Psychology. 27(2), pp.  
 58-67. 
  
Hatamazideh, N., Ghasemi, M., Saeedi, A. and Kazemnejad, A., (2008). 
 Perceived competence and school adjustment of hearing-impaired 
 children in mainstream primary school settings. Child Care Health 
 Development. 34(6), pp. 789-794. 
 
Hodgson, N. and Ramaekers, S., (2019). Philosophical Presentations of 
 Raising Children: The Grammar of Upbringing. Switzerland: Palgrave 
 Macmillan. 
 
Hodgson, N. and Standish, P., (2009). Uses and misuses of 
 poststructuralism in educational research. International Journal of 
 Research & Method in Education. 32(3), pp. 309-326.  
 
Irish, T., Cavellerio, F., and McDonald, K., (2018). Sport saved my life but I 
 am tired of being an alien! : Stories from the life of a deaf athlete. 
 Psychology of Sport and Exercise. 37, pp. 179-187. 
 
Israelite, N., Ower, J. and Goldstein, G., (2002). Hard-of Hearing 
 Adolescents and Identity Construction: Influences of School 
 Experiences, Peers, and Teachers. Journal of Deaf Studies and Deaf 
 Education. 7, pp. 134-148 
144 
 
Jones, A., Toscano, E., Botting, N., Marshall, C., Atkinson, J., Denmark, T., 
 Herman, R. and Morgan, G., (2016). Narrative skills in deaf children 
 who use spoken English: Dissociations between macro and 
 microstructural devices. Research in Developmental Disabilities. 59, 
 pp. 268-282. 
 
Khairuddin, K., Miles, S. and McCracken, W., (2018). Deaf Learners’ 
 Experiences in Malaysian Schools: Access, Equality and 
 Communication. Social Inclusion. 6(2), pp. 46-55. 
 
Knight, P. and Swanwick, R., (2013). Working with Deaf Children: Sign 
 Bilingual Policy into Practice. Oxon: Routledge Publications. 
 
Kobosko, J., (2010). How Do Deaf Adolescents Experience Themselves? 
 Deaf Identity and Oral or Sign Language Communication. Cochlear 
 Implants International. 11(1), pp. 319-32. 
 
Kouppanou, A., (2016). Imagining imagination and Bildung in the age of the 
 digitized world. In Fulford, A and Hodgson, N. eds. Philosophy and 
 Theory in Educational Research: Writing in the margin. London: 
 Routledge, pp. 120-128. 
 
Lederman, N. and Lederman, J., (2015). What is a theoretical framework? A 
 practical answer. Journal of Science Teacher Education. 26, pp. 593-
 597. 
 
Lerner, M., (2010). Narrative Function of Deafness and Deaf Characters in 
 Film. [Online]. [Accessed: 27 November 2018] Available from: 
 http://journal.mediaculture.org.au/index.php/mcjournal/article/view/260 
 
Lost in Translation. (2003) Coppola, s. (Dir.) [film-DVD] Focus Features. 102 
 mins. 
 
Lu, A., Hong, X., Yu, Y., Ling, H., Tian, H., Yu, Z. and Chang, L., (2015). 
 Perceived Physical appearance and life satisfaction: A moderated 
 mediation model of self-esteem and life experience of deaf and 
 hearing adolescents. Journal of Adolescence. 39, pp. 1-9. 
145 
 
Mahon, Á., (2019). Losing Our Way: Pragmatism, Perfectionism and 
 Education as Anxiety. Journal of Philosophy of Education. 53(4), pp. 
 748-758. 
 
Marschark, M. and Hauser, P., (2012). How Deaf Children Learn. New York: 
 Oxford University Press. 
 
Marschark, M., Paivio, A., Spencer, L., Durkin, A, Borgna, G., Convertino, C. 
 and Machmer, E., (2017). Don’t Assume Deaf Students are Visual 
 Learners. Journal of Developmental & Physical Disabilities. 29, pp. 
 153-171 
 
Marshall, C., Jones, A., Fastelli, A., Atkinson, J., Botting, N. and Morgan, G., 
 (2018). Semantic fluency in deaf children who use spoken and signed 
 language in comparison with hearing peers. International Journal of 
 Language & Communication Disorders. 53(1), pp. 157-170. 
 
McCall, J., (2015). A narrative account of the experiences of three deaf 
 students in a resourced provision in a mainstream high school in 
 Leeds. Unpublished MA Dissertation. Leeds Trinity University. 
 
McMahon, S., Keys, C., Beradi, L., Crouch, R. and Coker, C., (2016). School 
 inclusion: A multidimensional framework and links with outcomes 
 among urban youth with disabilities. Journal of Community 
 Psychology. 44(5), pp. 656-673. 
 
Mukherji, P. & Albon, D., (2010). Research Methods in Early Childhood. 
 London: SAGE Publications. 
 
Munday, I., (2009). Passionate Utterance and Moral Education. Journal of 
 Philosophy of Education. 43(1), pp. 57-74. [Online]. [Accessed: 1 April 




Munday, I., (2017). Problems in Translation. In Standish, P. and Saito, N. 
 eds. 2017. Stanley Cavell and philosophy as translation: The truth is 
 translated. London: Rowman and Little. pp. 89-102. 
146 
 
Napier, J., Lloyd, K., Skinner, R., Turner, G. and Wheatley, M., (2018). Using 
 video technology to engage deaf sign language users in survey 
 research. The International Journal for Translation & Interpreting 
 Research. 10(2), pp. 101-121. 
 
National Deaf Children’s Society, (2021). Schools and other education 
 settings – coronavirus info for families of deaf children. [Online]. 




Nikolaraizi, M. & Hadjikakou, K., (2006). The Role of Educational 
 Experiences in the Development of Deaf Identity. Journal of Deaf 
 Studies and Deaf Education. 11(4), pp. 477-492. 
 
Nunes, T., Pretzlik, U. and Olsson, J., (2006). Deaf children’s social 
 relationships in mainstream schools.  Journal of Deaf Education 
 International. 3, pp. 123-136 
 
Ohna, S.E., (2006). Deaf in my own way: identity, learning and narratives. 
 Deafness & Education International. 6(1), pp. 20-38. 
 
Olsson, S., Dag, M. and Kullberg, C., (2018). Deaf and hard-of-hearing 
 adolescents’ experiences of inclusion in mainstream and special 
 schools in Sweden. European Journal of Special Needs Education. 
 33(2), pp. 494-506. 
 
Poe, C., (2006). The Affects [sic] of Deafness on Adolescent Development. 
 [Online]. [Accessed: 16 January 2019]. Available from: 
 http://lifeprint.com/asl101/topics/adolescentdevelopment.htm 
 
Powers, S., (2002).  From Concepts to Practice in Deaf Education: A United 
 Kingdom Perspective on Inclusion. Journal of Deaf Studies and Deaf 
 Education. 7, (3), pp. 230-243. 
 
Powers, S., (2006). Learning from Success: High Achieving Deaf Pupils. 
 Birmingham: University of Birmingham Publications. 
147 
 
Rabova, M. (2014). Mobile phone filmmaking as a participatory medium: The 
 case study of 24 Frames 24 Hours.  Master Thesis. Lunds Universitet, 
 Sweden. 
 
Ramaekers, S., (2010). Multicultural Education: Embeddedness, Voice and 
 Change. Ethics and Education. 5(1), pp. 55-66. 
 
Rathmann, C., Mann, W., and Morgan, G., (2007). Narrative Structure and 
 Narrative Development in Deaf Children. Deafness and Education 
 International. 9(4), pp. 187-196. 
 
Riessman, C., (2008). Narrative Methods for the Human Sciences. 
 California: SAGE Publications. 
 
Rudrum, D., (2013). Stanley Cavell & The Claim of Literature. Maryland 
 USA: John Hopkins University Press. 
 
Ruitenberg, C., (2009). Introduction: The Question of Method in Philosophy 
 of Education. Journal of Philosophy of Education. 43(3), pp. 315-323. 
 
Saito, N., (2007), ‘Philosophy as Translation: Democracy and Education from 
 Dewey to Cavell’, Educational Theory. 57, No.3, pp. 261-275. 
 
Saito, N., (2012). The Gleam of Light: Initiation, Prophesy, and Emersonian 
 Moral Perfectionism. In Saito, N. and Standish P. eds. Stanley Cavell 
 and the education of grownups. New York: Fordham University Press. 
 pp. 170-187  
 
Saito, N., (2016). ‘Gifts from a Foreign Land: Lost in Translation and the 
 Understanding of Other Cultures’. Philosophy of Education Yearbook. 
 pp. 346-444. 
 
Saito, N., (2017). ‘Immigrancy of the self, Continuing Education: Recollection 
 in Cavell’s Little Did I Know and Terrence Malick’s The Tree of Life. In: 
 Standish, P. and Saito, N., eds. (2017). Stanley Cavell and Philosophy 




Skea, C., (2019). Student Satisfaction in Higher Education: Philosophical 
 Perspectives on Voice, Settlement, and Customer Relations. 
 Unpublished PhD thesis. University of Leeds. 
 
Smith, R., (2009). Between the Lines: Philosophy, Text and Conversation. 
 Journal of Philosophy of Education. 43(3), pp. 437-449. 
 
Smith, S. and Cormier, K., (2014). In or Out? Spatial Scale and enactment in 
 Narratives of Native and Nonnative [sic] Signing Deaf Children 
 Acquiring British Sign Language.’ Sign Language Studies. 14, pp. 
 275-301. 
 
Standish, P., (2004). In Her Own Voice: Convention, conversion, criteria. 
 Educational Philosophy and Theory. 36(1), pp. 91-106. 
 
Standish, P., (2006). Uncommon Schools: Stanley Cavell and The Teaching 
 of Walden. Studies in Philosophy of Education. 25, pp. 145-157. 
 
Standish, P., (2010). What is the Philosophy of Education? In: Bailey, R. ed. 
 The Philosophy of Education: An introduction. London: Continuum 
 International Publishing Group, pp. 4-21. 
 
Standish, P., (2012). Stanley Cavell in Conversation with Paul Standish. 
 Journal of Philosophy of Education. 46(2), pp. 155-176. 
 
Standish, P., (2018). Language must be raked: Experience, race, and the 
 pressure of air. Journal of Educational Philosophy and 
 Theory, 50(4), pp. 428-440. 
 
Standish, P. and Saito, N., (2017). Stanley Cavell and philosophy as 
 translation: The truth is translated. London: Rowman and Little. 
 
Stella Dallas. (1937) Vidor, K., (Dir.) [film-DVD]. Warner Bros. Archive 




Stinson, M. and Antia, S., (1999). Considerations in educating deaf and hard-
 of-hearing students in inclusive settings. Journal of Deaf Studies and 
 Deaf Education. 4(3), pp. 163-175.  
 
Stinson, M. and Foster, S., (1999). Socialization of deaf children and youths. 
 In: Spencer, P., Erting, C. and Marschark, M. eds. The Deaf Child in 
 the Family and at School. Psychlogy Press. pp. 193-202. 
 
Swanwick, R. and Marschark, M., (2010). Enhancing Education for Deaf 
 Children: Research into Practice and Back Again.  Deafness & 
 Education International.  12(4), pp. 217-235. 
 
Swanwick, R., Oppong, M., Offei, Y., Fobi, D., Appau, O, Fobi, J., and 
 Mantey, F., (2020). The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on deaf 
 adults, children, and their families in Ghana. Journal of the British 
 Academy. 8, pp. 141-165. [Online]. [Accessed: 23 March 2021]. 
 Available from: https://doi.org/10.5871/jba/008.141 
 
Tanner, A. in Emerson, R. W., (1995). Essays and Poems. London: Orion 
 Publishing Group.  
 
Tarwacka-Odolczyk, A., Tomaszewski, P. Szymanska, A., and Bokus, B., 
 (2018). Deaf children building narrative texts. Effect of adult-shared 
 vs. non-shared Perception of a picture story. Psychology of Language 
 and Communication. 18(2), pp.149-177. 
 
Terry, D., Le, Q., Nguyen, H., and Malatzky, C., (2017). Misconceptions of 
 the Deaf: Giving voice to the voiceless. Health Culture and Society. 9-
 10, pp. 49-61. 
 
Teruggi, L. and Gutierrez-Caceres, R., (2015). Narrative Skills in Written 
 Texts by Deaf and Hearing Bilingual Adolescents. Reading 
 Psychology. 36, pp. 643-672. 
 
The Guardian, (2020). Open Letter. [Online]. [Accessed: 23 March 2021]. 





The Tree of Life. (2011) Malik, T. (Dir) [film-DVD] Fox Searchlight Pictures. 
 139 mins. 
 
Thoreau, H. D., (2009). The Journal 1837-1861. New York: New York 
 Review Books. 
 
Thoreau, H. D., (1854/2014). Walden. Scotland: Black & White Classics. 
 
Van Deusen-Phillips, S.B., Goldin-Meadow, S. and Miller, P.J., (2001). 
 Enacting Stories, Seeing Worlds: Similarities and Differences in the 
 Cross-Cultural Narrative Development of Linguistically Isolated Deaf 
 Children.  Human Development. 44(6), pp. 311-336. 
 
Vansieleghem, N., (2016). Making voices visual: two images. In Fulford, A 
 and Hodgson, N. eds. Philosophy and Theory in Educational 
 Research: Writing in the margin. London: Routledge, pp. 92-100. 
 
Vlieghe, J., (2012). From Radical Translation to Radical Translatability. In 
 Standish, P. and Saito, N. eds. 2017. Stanley Cavell and philosophy 
 as translation: The truth is translated. London: Rowman and Little. pp. 
 73-88. 
 
Vlieghe, J., (2016). The Educational Meaning of “Practising”. In Fulford, A 
 and Hodgson, N. eds. Philosophy and Theory in Educational 
 Research: Writing in the margin. London: Routledge, pp. 57-64. 
 
Vlieghe, J., (2017). From Radical Translation to Radical Translatability: 
 Education in an Age of Internationalization. In Stanley Cavell and 
 Philosophy as Translation: The Truth is Translated. Standish, P. and 
 Saito, N. eds. USA: Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 73-88. 
 
Walls, L. D., (2017). Thoreau; A life. Chicago: The Chicago University Press. 





Waltorp, K., (2018). Intimacy, Concealment and Unconscious Optics: 
 Filmmaking with Young Muslim Women in Copenhagen. Visual 
 Anthropology, 31(4-5), pp. 394-407. Available at: Leeds Trinity 
 University Library https://lib.leedstrinity.ac.uk [Accessed 8 February 
 2019]. 
 
Wareham, T., Clark, G., and Turner, R., (2006). Developing an inclusive 
 curriculum for students with hearing impairments. Gloucestershire. 
 University of Gloucestershire Publications. 
 
Wittgenstein, L., (2001). Trans. Trench and Trüber. Tractatus Logico-
 Philosophicus. New York: Routledge Classics. 
 
Wolters, N. and Knoors, N., (2014). Social Adjustment of Deaf Early 
 Adolescents at the Start of Secondary School. Exceptional Children. 
 4, pp. 438-453. 
 
Wong, C. L., Ching, T. Y. C., Whitfield, J., and Duncan, J., (2018). Exploring 
 the social capital of adolescents who are deaf or hard of hearing and 
 their parents: A preliminary investigation. American Annals of the 
 Deaf. 162(5), pp. 463-478. 
 
Ye, J., Peng, A., Lu, A., Tian, H., Hong, X., Yi, H., Wang, L., Song, P., 
 Zhang, L., Lan, Y., Qiu, Y., and Guan, W., (2016). Attachment, 
 loneliness, and social anxiety: a comparison of deaf   and hearing 
 Chinese adolescents. Social Behavior and Personality. 44. pp.1033-
 1042.  
 
Young, A. and Hunt, R., (2011). Research with d/Deaf people. Methods 
 review. 9. NIHR. School for Social Care Research. 
 
